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THE PRIVATE HISTORY

OF

A POLISH INSURRECTION

FROM OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL SOURCES.

BY

H. SUTHERLAND EDWARDS

LATE SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF 'THE TIMES' IN POLAND.

'Remember, I pray thee, whoever perished being innocent, or where were the righteous cut off.'—ELIPHAZ *the Temanite.*

'I have heard many such things.....I also could speak as ye do. If your soul were in my soul's stead I could heap up words against you and shake mine head at you. But I would strengthen you with my mouth, and my words should assuage your grief.'—JOB.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

36240

LONDON:

SAUNDERS, OTLEY, AND CO.

66 BROOK STREET, W.

1865.

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LONDON

PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.

NEW-STREET SQUARE

PREFACE.

THE point of view from which I look upon the Polish insurrection of 1863 is, perhaps, altogether wrong; for if Poland is destined some day to recover her independence, that result might have been retarded by even a temporary reconciliation between Poland and Russia. This was the argument of the extreme democratic party when Russia was making concessions, and Poland was divided as to whether they ought to be accepted or not. Nor is this party dissatisfied with the general result of the insurrection. It has always held that until every trace of the *corvée*, even in the form of rent, was abolished, the peasants could never be got to take part in a struggle for national independence; and the peasants are now freeholders. The farms were

made over to them, first of all, by the Polish National Government, with the view of gaining their support; and the transfer was maintained or renewed by the Russian Government with precisely the same object. But whether the endowment of the peasants with the land, for which they formerly paid rent, or performed task-work, be attributed to revolutionists or to the agents of despotism working with revolutionary weapons, in either case their position is much improved; and it is hoped that now, under more favourable circumstances than ever existed for them before, they will gradually become animated by the same spirit of patriotism which is so strongly felt by all classes above them.

The insurrection, too, has, of course, had the effect of keeping up and intensifying the national hatred of the Poles for everything Russian. As for destroying Poland—a country like Poland, with an independent and for the most part glorious existence of eight centuries * to look back

* Those who repeat the common assertion, that the ancient form of government in Poland was intrinsically and

to, is not destroyed so easily. If to insure its final ruin it were only necessary to execute its inhabitants by hundreds, massacre them by thousands, and exile them by tens of thousands; to confiscate the estates of its principal nobles, plunder its libraries, abolish its ancient places of education, and seek to impose upon its population the use of a foreign tongue,—then Poland would have ceased to exist long ago.

The last Polish insurrection was in some respects more formidable than any that have preceded it. For the first time, the working classes in the Polish towns took up arms of their own accord, without any active personal encouragement from the aristocracy—indeed, in the first instance, in spite of the aristocracy. For the first time, the

irremediably bad, should remember that the Polish Republic lasted from the tenth to the eighteenth century, when the crown, from elective, was made hereditary by the Poles themselves. It was this all-important change that caused the second partition, which, being followed by Kosciuszko's insurrection, led to the complete dismemberment of Poland.

Poles, though not assisted, and though greatly injured by the diplomatic intervention of France, England, and Austria, seemed really at one period to have a fair chance of obtaining help from abroad. For the first time, moreover, a rising in Poland, instead of cementing the union between the three partitioning Powers, caused a breach between two of them—or, if the breach already existed, made it strikingly apparent, and widened it. It was a good sign for Poland, that while Prussia took part with Russia, Austria sided at once with France and England.

On the other hand, Poland has now no chance of regaining the complete administrative autonomy which the Marquis Wielopolski obtained for the kingdom just before the insurrection broke out. The insurrection may also be said to have cost Poland a considerable amount of territory. A great many estates in Lithuania and Ruthenia, which, though they had been confiscated by the Emperor Nicholas, were still administered for the Government by Polish agents, have now passed

definitively into the hands of Russian proprietors. It is, nevertheless, improbable that Russia will ever be able to establish a Russian landed aristocracy in any part of the Poland of 1772.

With regard to myself, after spending four months in the 'Kingdom,' Galicia, and Posen, during the agitated period which preceded the insurrection, I revisited Poland after the insurrection had broken out, arriving in Cracow just as the greater part of Langiewicz's disorganised army was hurrying to the Galician frontier. I saw in Galicia how the civil business of the insurrection was conducted, and how the detachments were formed; and I accompanied one detachment on an expedition against the Russians. From Galicia I went to the Kingdom of Poland; and remained as long as I was allowed to do so at Warsaw. From Warsaw I went through Grodno and Wilna (neither of which towns I was permitted to visit) to St. Petersburg; from St. Petersburg, through Moscow, to Kieff; and from Kieff, through the Ruthenian provinces (where I

found the peasants armed and empowered to stop and search all travellers, and to make 'domiciliary visits' at the houses of the landed proprietors), back to Galicia. Two days after my arrival at Lemberg, the state of siege was established throughout Austrian Poland, and the passage of detachments to the Russo-Polish frontier rendered impossible. This, together with the political diversion caused by the invasion of Denmark, put an end to the Polish insurrection of 1863, and to all interest in affairs of Poland.

I must add, that nearly the whole of my second volume is made up of letters addressed to the 'Times' from Poland and Russia while the insurrection was going on, and that these letters are now republished by permission of the proprietors. In the first volume, which is entirely new, many statements are made, and several conversations reported, for which it may appear, at first sight, that I ought to have quoted my authorities. I can only say that, in all these cases, I have obtained my information from the best possible sources.

Those who take a particular interest in the organisation of conspiracies and rebellions, on the modern Polish, Italian, and Hungarian system, may be referred to Nos. 28 and 29 (August, 1865) of the Moscow political and literary journal entitled *Sovremennyi Letopis*, for an account of the formation of the Polish National Government or 'Junta' (*Rzond*), written from a Russian point of view, and based on Russian official documents. In my own account, which I consider to be be written from an English point of view, I have been careful to mention no names except those of persons who are now beyond the reach of harm; but there was of course no reason why the Moscow journal should take any such precautions.

I had intended to spell the Polish names in these volumes systematically, as they ought to be spelt, but, on consideration, determined to spell the names of well-known personages as they are usually spelt in England. The Poles themselves, in writing their names for foreign eyes, frequently misspell them, in the vain hope that foreigners may not mispronounce them.

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Errata.

Page 30, line 2, *for* last autumn *read* in the autumn of 1863.

„ 154, „ 22, „ February „ January.

„ 158, „ 4, „ firstly „ finally.

„ 188, „ 17, „ Russian „ Prussian.

„ 228, „ 11, „ creating „ erecting.

„ 281, „ 7, „ establishment of the Uniate *read* reunion of the Uniates to the Orthodox.

THE PRIVATE HISTORY

OF

A POLISH INSURRECTION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW.

THE POLISH INSURRECTION of 1863 originated as an armed movement, in the resistance of a portion of the population to the execution of a measure of recruitment, which had all the character of a proscription, and was directed against the younger inhabitants of towns, as against a class bent at all hazards on subverting the Russian dominion in Poland, and already, to a great extent, leagued together for that purpose, and bound by oath to a secret governing committee.

Nevertheless, the Russian official accounts represent the Poles as the aggressors; and, putting aside the military kidnapping as a detail without importance, say that the origin of the actual conflict was a treacherous massacre of peaceable Russian soldiers by fanatical Polish revolutionists. In fact, on the night of the 22nd January, eight days after the recruitment had been effected at Warsaw, and when it was about to be carried out in the provinces, the Poles in several villages and small towns rose by order of the central insurrectional committee, fell upon the Russian troops in their cantonments, killed some, disarmed others, and, in one place, set fire to a house from which three soldiers were defending themselves, who, refusing to come out and surrender, perished in the flames. This is the one 'atrocity' mentioned in the Russian official accounts of the outbreak* —unless the attempt made throughout the country to surprise the Russian troops be regarded in itself as such.

* See extracts from the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, given in the Correspondence on Polish Affairs, laid before Parliament.

In the histories of the insurrection fabricated for the benefit of the Russian people, and distributed gratuitously, or sold at nominal prices, in the villages and at the large fairs in Russia, great stress is laid upon this so-called massacre, without any mention whatever being made of the odious measure by which the attempt at a general rising was immediately provoked. The Russian government, moreover, the better to excite the hatred of the Russian peasantry, and of the Ruthenian peasantry belonging to the Russian Church, against the Poles, attributed to the Polish movement on behalf of national independence a special religious and propagandist character. 'Oh, what orthodox blood was shed that night by men calling themselves Christians!' says a passage, describing the first outbreak, in an address to the Ruthenian peasantry issued from Kieff;* while a pamphlet, published at Moscow under the title of 'Russian Truth and Polish Lying'† (the title printed in Church-Slavonian characters, with 'Lord have mercy upon us!' as an epigraph), sets forth that the intention of the Poles was to re-establish

* Appendix, No. 1. † Appendix, No. 2.

serfdom*, to convert the Russians by force to the Roman Catholic religion, and to introduce into the Russian Churches 'the abomination that maketh desolate, predicted by Daniel the prophet.' The Russian journals, all tuned to the same official note, cried with one accord that the true object of the Poles in rising against the imperial government was to regain exclusive privileges for the Polish nobility, and to re-establish the authority of the nobility over the peasantry.

The Russians cannot believe, or, at least, will

* The students of the university of St. Petersburg and Moscow were accused, in the same manner, of wishing to re-establish serfdom, when, in the autumn of 1861, they objected to some new regulations introduced by a minister of instruction, who seemed to have mistaken his functions for those of minister of police. The device did not answer at St. Petersburg, probably because the authorities were afraid to press the execution of their plan in a city inhabited by so many foreigners and by a foreign diplomatic body. At Moscow, where less ceremony is observed, peasants were armed with sticks, placed in ambush, and at a given signal, and immediately after a cavalry charge, fell upon the students and beat them unmercifully. I was myself at St. Petersburg, and afterwards at Moscow, during these disturbances.

not admit, that the Poles suffer from being subjected to the rule of a foreign and, in many respects, barbarous power, which year after year has marked out and seized all their most promising young men in the schools and gymnasiums, to bury them in the Russian army; which has closed their universities, carried off their libraries, forbidden the establishment of every useful and necessary institution, and, in a word, has systematically impeded the development of their country, with a view of rendering it too feeble for resistance; but they consider it quite natural that the Polish proprietors should wish to keep their peasants in a species of serfdom, and that the whole civilised population, or, at least, members of every class belonging to it, and especially the working men, should fly to arms, with death or exile as their reward in case of defeat— not to free Poland from Russian dominion, but simply to prevent any improvement being effected in the position of the Polish peasantry.

After circulating such a detestable calumny as this, what pity do the Russians deserve, when they complain that the West of Europe accepts all the

accusations brought against them by the Poles, without listening to anything they may have to say in self-defence?

The West of Europe knows that Russia is obliged to give a very bad character to the Poles in order to justify her occupation of Poland; and it naturally doubts the sincerity of those who attribute vices to an enemy, and then plunder him by way of punishment. As to the emancipation of the serfs, that measure, whatever may be said about it now, when it is too late to protest any longer, met, when it was first proposed, with strenuous opposition from a large portion of the Russian proprietors;* and the reproaches on the subject addressed by the Emperor to the nobility of Moscow were recorded at the time in the

* Nevertheless, it was not to the personal liberation of the peasant that so many of the Russian proprietors objected, but to the cession of land by which it was to be accompanied. The proprietors of the Russo-Polish provinces may also have objected to the arbitrary apportionment of their land by the government. But they at once accepted the principle of emancipation, with whatever consequences it might entail. Moreover, they were opposed to the insurrection until, by the force of circumstances, they were drawn into it.

Russian official journals, and republished in every newspaper in Europe. On the other hand, the thanks addressed by His Majesty to the nobles of the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, for their immediate and spontaneous assent to his proposition, have been recorded and republished in a similar manner.

The nobles of Moscow, when the emancipation scheme had become law, evinced their profound irritation by voting, with scarcely a dissentient voice, an illegal address to the crown, demanding, in pressing terms, a complete change in the system of government, and the immediate publication of a constitution, in the utility of which few beyond those who actually proposed it were suspected of believing.* The Russians seem to imagine that the more serious opposition offered soon afterwards by Poland, as a nation, proceeded, in a similar manner, from a wish to avenge upon the Russian government the benefits it had conferred upon

*. The movement among the Russian nobility in favour of a constitution commenced three years ago (at the Begining of 1862). It ceased for a time when the Polish Insurrection broke out.

the Polish peasantry; and that if the first object of the Poles was to liberate their country from foreign domination, their second was to replace their peasantry in a state of slavery. Although, if this argument be maintained at all, it must be maintained in the teeth of facts, it is much employed, both by Russians who are really ignorant of the facts, and by Russians who wilfully ignore them.

Now, as to the real cause and also the real object of the insurrection. Lord Russell—unable in a diplomatic despatch to state the simple fact that the Poles rise from time to time against the governments imposed upon them, because they abhor foreign rule*—was obliged, in his corre-

* There is not, and never has been, any party in Poland in favour of linking the fate of their country *permanently* with that of Russia, Austria, or Prussia. 'The Poles in general,' says the Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Castlereagh, in a letter dated Vienna, June 25, 1814, 'are pleased at the idea of becoming a kingdom attached to Russia *for the present*, in the idea that it will lead to their future independence. Some of the most reasonable look upon this as illusory, and flatter themselves that the day will come when Austria will espouse their cause, in order to wrest Poland from Russia. But it is remarkable that among all the Poles whom I see (and I see a great many) there is not one

spondence with the Russian government, to argue that the insurrection of 1863 was caused by the government of the Emperor Nicholas from 1831 to 1855. But the execrable system of Nicholas alone, without the relaxation of that system by which the accession of the present Emperor was followed, could not—whatever other evils it may have produced—have caused an insurrection; for no one dared rise against it. The peaceful attitude of the Poles during the Crimean war, when, for the first time, they found England and France united in arms against Russia, has been accounted for in various ways—by the material prosperity of the country,* most remarkable just

individual who is attached either to Russia or to any other power, but as they think that power may ultimately favour their views for the independence of Poland.' (*Castlereagh Correspondence* x. 59). I have myself conversed with hundreds of Poles, of all classes and conditions, on this subject, and I can say positively that the views of the Poles now are precisely what they were in 1814. Sometimes, however, they *do* incline towards Russia, sometimes towards Austria; and it seemed to me that their only hope in 1861 lay in accepting peaceably from Russia whatever concessions they could obtain.

* A report from a former consul at Warsaw, written immediately after the Crimean war, and of which a few copies

then; by the fact that the Poles were quite unprepared for war; and finally, by a belief that the time of action had not arrived, and that if Poland waited, she would be appealed to and terms would be proposed to her by the allies.

In fact, the chief of the Polish emigration *was* sounded on the subject, when he informed the French government that the Poles would not stir unless the allies formally engaged to obtain a certain minimum of concessions for them as one of the conditions of peace. At the same time orders were sent to Warsaw to keep quiet—rather unnecessarily, I fancy, for Warsaw swarmed with police agents and spies, and was occupied by a large army. Russia, pressed as she was on the Baltic and on the Black Sea, yet found means to keep one hundred thousand men in Poland during

were printed for private circulation, calls attention to the increasing resources of Poland and expresses a belief that a new era of material prosperity has commenced for that country. This may account, to some extent, for the Poles having soon afterwards commenced their agitation against Russia. It should never be forgotten that material prosperity is only valued in Poland as a means towards an end. The ultimate object of the Poles is not to grow rich and fat, but to gain their independence.

the Crimean war. This seems to have been the chief reason why Poland gave no sign of life at a time when, had she risen, France and England could scarcely have avoided making her cause to some extent their own. She had been terrorized by the Emperor Nicholas to such a degree that she feared Russia, even when Russia had France, England, Turkey, and Piedmont to contend with.

The Emperor Nicholas being dead, and a sovereign of quite a different character having ascended the throne,* a reaction took place, and the Poles gradually proceeded from an attitude of defiance and menace to open insurrection; and without

* But the Poles, it may be said, have suffered as much from the government of the Emperor Alexander as from that of the Emperor Nicholas. Probably at this moment they have suffered even more. Nevertheless, when Alexander II. ascended the throne, if he did little to improve the legal position of the Poles, he at least ruled them with a light hand. This was not and ought not to be enough to satisfy the descendants of a free people; but the fact remains that the Poles were stifled during the last twenty-five years of the reign of Nicholas, and that they were able to breathe during the first five years of the reign of Alexander and until the regular organisation of the Warsaw demonstrations.

any promises, without any reasonable expectations even of foreign assistance, and almost entirely unprovided with arms and ammunition, engaged single-handed in a struggle with the whole force of the Russian empire.

In 1830, when they had thirty thousand of the best troops in Europe to begin their insurrection with, and when they had the whole country in their hands, with a peasantry to whom the Russians were really foreigners, and who had never, in a direct manner, felt the force of Russian rule, they adopted a dignified and, as much as possible, a conciliatory tone towards the Russians, and assured them that their war was with the Russian government, but that they had no hatred for the Russian people, who are Slavonians like ourselves.' For some months the insurrection of 1830 had purely a political character; nothing was said about separation from Russia, the Russians were spoken of as fellow-subjects, and the government of the country was carried on in the name of the Emperor Nicholas. At that time the Poles of the 'kingdom' had only been fifteen years under the Russian sceptre, and, though they had an

Emperor of Russia for their constitutional king, and a Russian Grand Duke for the commander-in-chief of their national army, they retained the complete direction of their own internal affairs. Indeed, in spite of many cases of individual persecution, the national life of the Poles had been very little interfered with, even in Lithuania and the other provinces (Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff) acquired by Russia at the partition of the eighteenth century.

After the suppression of the insurrection of 1830, however, the Poles had to pass through a quarter of a century of unexampled and almost inconceivable oppression; and in 1863, though the Russians had certainly improved since the time of Nicholas, and, at least, had established a national administration and an excellent system of national education in Poland, the Poles rose with a feeling of intense national hatred, declared war against the Russians as a people, and lost no opportunity of representing them as savages, incapable by race and from their very nature of being civilised.

The system of Nicholas, then, if it did not

produce, at least prepared the way for the insurrection of 1863, which, however, was caused above all by a belief that Russia was exhausted, and that the power which had helped Italy to gain her independence would not abandon Poland in a similar struggle.

The Russians argue now that the concessions made to the Poles by the Emperor Alexander encouraged them to rise, and that but for the national administration introduced at the urgent solicitation of the Marquis Wielopolski the organisation on which the insurrection was based would have been impossible. The fact is, the reforms, whether sufficient or insufficient, were introduced at a time of great excitement, when it was too late to give them a fair trial, and when a small but desperate party had already resolved, at all hazards, to take up arms.

It was an evil resolution. It was not merely the *væ victis* character of the struggle that had to be dreaded, but also the terrible means by which alone it could be carried on. In 1830 the war was in one sense a civil war; but all Poland was in arms against Russia, the contest

was above-ground, and every Pole was the avowed enemy of every Russian.

In this last insurrection many of the chiefs fought under assumed names, and had deserted the Russian army—which, however, they had in the first instance been forced to enter. Numbers of insurgents were the sons of proprietors, who could not openly defy the government, or their estates would have been confiscated, and who had to plead compulsion when they were charged with having furnished supplies to their own countrymen. In the same family one brother would be fighting in the woods, while another would be working in some government office—unable, it is true, to leave his post, for the very fact of doing so would have exposed him to suspicion at a time when suspicion, accusation, and exile followed one another in close succession without the existence of proof being at all required. Officials nominally in the service of the Russian government were actually helping the insurrection—at the peril no doubt of their lives, but in violation also of their oaths. In short, thousands of Poles who had not only not declared

war against the government, but who still wore the government uniform, were fighting against it in secret, and could scarcely do otherwise; for how could they refuse to help their own countrymen against the Russians? The timid peasants, threatened, maltreated, and put to death if they assisted the insurgents, had to be treated with at least equal severity by the insurgents to prevent them from leaning too much to the Russian side. Then, as the Russians maintained spies, it was absolutely necessary to kill the spies, or the secrets of the anonymous government would have been discovered.

We all know that the Poles have no objection to open war when open war is possible; but what were they to do without arms, without a single town to themselves, and with their enemies spread over the whole face of the country? All that need be said is, that they were placed in most trying circumstances by a deplorable insurrection, which was not, and could not be, an insurrection of the whole country, though all the townspeople, together with every educated man in the rural districts, and every man habitually

brought into relations with educated people, prayed for its success.

But for those daring reckless spirits who were ready to risk an appeal to arms there were no arms to be had. The peasantry, who had their scythes, were for the most part neutral, and were even inclined here and there to take the side of the government, which they felt was the safe side in the long run. The great proprietors, though by no means neutral, had the fear of confiscation before their eyes, and could only aid the insurrection cautiously, secretly, and by means of money, which, when they had once joined the movement, they gave abundantly.

If, however, the Poles engaged in a desperate struggle, with the certainty of incurring the most terrible losses in case of failure, it must also be remembered that they had a great prize in view They were fighting for the independence of their country as it existed before the partitions of the eighteenth century, and for the immediate liberation of all Russian Poland, as a first step towards that end.

Unfortunately the educated class is very small

in Poland, and in those provinces where the peasantry, intent only on cultivating their fields in peace, are very numerous, and where the proprietors and the inhabitants of towns are but few, no movement on behalf of national independence, unless supported by a regular army, can meet with even a momentary success. Indeed, in those parts of ancient Poland where the peasant was until quite recently a serf—that is to say, in the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, where emancipation has only just taken place, and in Galicia, where it dates only from 1847-1848—the peasantry are far more inclined to oppose than to support a national movement. They prefer safety and the existing order of things, under which they are free, to danger and a return to an ancient system, under which all they remember is that they were slaves.

With only a very small number of Poles ready to risk their lives on behalf of national independence, and with three great military governments ready to assist one another in crushing any such movement, how is it that Poland ever thinks of

stirring? Because, with the credulity of extreme misery, she trusts too much to her own strength, to the weakness of her enemies, and to the sincerity of her friends.

No one assisted Poland when she rose under Kosciuszko in 1794, immediately before the third partition.

If Napoleon assisted her in 1806, and out of the province from which the Prussians had been expelled formed the Duchy of Warsaw, he also drew from the Duchy an army of 100,000 men for his Spanish and other wars.

No one helped the Poles in 1830 against Russia, nor in 1846 against Austria, nor in 1848 against Prussia; and now they have been left once more to fight a hopeless battle against Russia, not without implied promises of help, but without any actual aid.

As regards this last insurrection, however, the Poles were far too ready to believe what their countrymen abroad were too ready to tell them as to the supposed chances of an intervention. The Polish national government, on the other hand, and the Polish newspapers misled the

West of Europe as to the importance of the insurrection. The Poles rarely, if ever, acknowledged that they had lost a battle, though, as every one of their very numerous detachments was in the end broken up, they must have been defeated altogether several hundred times.

The French, English, and many of the German newspapers were so anxious the Poles should be victorious that they readily and most willingly placed confidence in all accounts of Polish victories that reached them. If any one told the truth as to the hopeless character of the movement, and the terrible calamities it would inevitably draw down upon the Poles, he was looked upon as an illiberal, hard-hearted person, and a friend of the despotic governments, to which the Polish insurrection has been as much an advantage, as to Poland it has been a misfortune. In short, there seemed to be a general understanding in Europe to force Russia to strengthen herself, and to force Poland to destroy herself. When Russia was evidently strong no one would venture to attack her, and when Poland was evidently exhausted every one deserted her.

CHAPTER II.

OPINIONS AND MANŒUVRES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY AND OTHER PARTIES IN POLAND.

THE art of getting up revolutions is as little understood in England as that of getting up joint-stock companies seems to be in most parts of the Continent. The reason no doubt is, that for the former kind of speculation a vast number of grievances are necessary, and for the latter a large amount of capital. The grievances must not be imaginary nor the capital fictitious, or neither enterprise can be set going, however much it may be talked about for a little while. But in England, except when money is unusually 'tight,' almost any industrial or commercial scheme can be started, if experienced speculators will only take it in hand; and in Poland, the richest of all countries in misfortune, a professional revolutionist can always get up an insurrection, except,

indeed, in such periods of 'tightness as existed during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas, when grievances were locked up because it was dangerous to show them. The revolutionary speculators, like the commercial ones, are generally sincere, as far as a belief in the success of their own schemes is concerned, and as the former are not afraid of death, so the latter do not fear that milder form of dissolution, known as bankruptcy.

Admitting the object in view to be good, it is upon this question of success, or rather the antecedent probabilities of success, that the whole morality of speculation, whether based upon joint-stock companies, or upon secret political societies, must be held to depend. It is in vain for the getter up of companies to plead that an enterprise, in which, by his earnest representations, he has caused thousands to lose their property, was really a bonâ fide affair, if at the same time it never had any chance of prospering; and it is no use telling us that the sole object of the Polish revolutionists in urging their countrymen two years ago to take up arms was to relieve them from oppression, if it was evident from the first

that this object could not be attained by the means proposed, and that to attempt it would only render the position of the sufferers ten times worse than before. The failure of an insurrection against such a power as Russia does not mean simply defeat in the field, but the execution of hundreds, the banishment of thousands and tens of thousands, the depopulation of entire districts, the disorganisation of society, and the denationalisation, as far as possible, of the whole insurgent country.

It may be said that, after all, the probability of the Polish insurrection failing or succeeding was a matter of opinion, as it is also a matter of opinion whether a new flying-machine will answer, or whether a man, disabled, and without arms, can fight with advantage against a tiger. Speculators who make mistakes in such matters, and who mislead others, are very dangerous members of society, and some of our professed revolutionists have been doing this sort of thing all their lives.

There is another cause, in addition to the existence of permanent grievances, such as must

be felt by every man capable of the slightest patriotic feeling, which renders Poland a most promising soil for the schemes of revolutionists.

The Polish flag, whenever and by whomsoever hoisted, is sure to attract, not only those who fly to it at once from ungovernable enthusiasm, but also a great many others who dare not say positively that the time for hoisting it has not yet arrived, and who, however much they may object to its being raised inopportunely, at least cannot help to knock it down. The Poles are highly sensitive; and they have so long been reproached with factiousness that if, at a given moment, an important part of the nation is opposed sincerely and conscientiously to a movement on behalf of national independence, it is afraid, nevertheless, to pronounce its opinion openly and before all the world. The extreme party does not hesitate to accuse of want of patriotism all who are unwilling to encourage it in hopeless attempts; and these accusations are so intolerable to the moderate party, and it is so impossible for this party to unite with a foreign government against any portion of its own countrymen, that the most extreme

men in Poland have only to begin to act, in order to be joined, one after the other, by numbers who have no faith at all in their projects.

In a free country one part of the nation may be for war and another against it. But in Poland, whenever there is any question of war against Russia, no men calling themselves Poles can say much against it without seeming to place themselves on the Russian side. This is one of the misfortunes arising naturally from the position of the Poles; but though it has proved a misfortune hitherto, it is at the same time an honour to the country that such a feeling should exist, and it may one day be found a source of strength.

This tacit understanding, that no foreign government is a government for Poles, is very general in all parts of Poland; and I have noticed curious examples of it among the working classes in some of the Polish towns. In Cracow, for instance, I saw a workman one evening beating another workman inside a shop, with the evident approbation of the lookers on. On inquiring into the matter, I found that the man who was getting the worst of it had been attacked by his

antagonist before on some private ground of quarrel, and that he had appealed for protection to the Austrian police. 'Why can't Poles settle disputes among themselves?' cried the combatant who had might as well as right on his side. 'Couldn't he have got a Pole to help him? . . . . In any case, he had no right to call upon the Germans to interfere.'

The man who had sought Austrian aid against a Polish assault was, by general consent, voted a scoundrel, as I have no doubt he was; and the same opinion is entertained in Poland of any one who, for the sake of public order, or of personal protection, looks to the Russian, Austrian, or Prussian government for assistance.

This feeling as to the main question exists among all classes of Polish society, except the peasantry — that is to say, every man in Poland above the position of a serf detests the domination of foreigners; but very different opinions are entertained as to the best means of escaping from it.

Poland, as every one knows, is divided politi-

cally into three parts.* It should also be known that in each of these three parts the population may be divided into two sections—the recently emancipated peasantry, and the rest of the inhabitants. The first, and most numerous, of these sections either does not desire much, or scarcely desires at all, or positively objects to the re-constitution of an independent Poland, which it associates with serfdom; while the second desires the re-constitution of an independent Poland most ardently.

But that section of the Polish population, whether under Prussian, Russian, or Austrian rule, which desires the liberation of Poland is again divided into two parties, one of which has an aristocratic, the other a democratic character. The aristocratic party has no faith in insurrection unless supported by foreign intervention, while the democratic party has no faith in insurrection unless supported by the Polish peasantry. The two parties have, until quite lately, been sepa-

* Administratively, the Poland of 1772 is divided into four parts—namely, Posen, Galicia, the kingdom of Poland, and the Lithuanian and Ruthenian provinces, incorporated with Russia, and described in official language as the 'Western Provinces' of the empire.

rated, not only by what separates the extreme from the moderate party, the republican from the monarchical party, the party of action from the so-called party of reaction in Italy and Hungary, but also by a social question, or at least by an economical question of a social character. In Italy all traces of serfdom have long disappeared. In Hungary serfdom was abolished, and the land which the peasants had previously cultivated, on condition of working for it, left to them as absolute property, two years before the insurrection of 1848. In Prussian Poland (1815) and in Austrian Poland (1847-48) the peasantry had also become free proprietors of their little farms. But in the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire the peasant remained a serf; while in the kingdom of Poland, though not strictly speaking a serf (for since 1807 he had not been attached to the soil), he had to perform task-work, and could be beaten if he did not perform it properly.

Such at least was the state of things on the great majority of the estates in the kingdom of Poland when the 'manifestations' began which ended in

the insurrection of 1863. This state of things the extreme party, consisting chiefly of non-proprietors, had long wished to abolish by making the peasants freeholders as regarded their farms; while the moderate party, consisting chiefly of proprietors, objected to this arrangement in 1831, when it might easily have been effected, but adopted it in principle, and on the basis of a system of redemption in 1861, by a resolution of the recently founded Agricultural Society.

Mieroslawski and other experienced revolutionists established abroad regarded this decision as a sign that the country was getting ripe for a general insurrection, inasmuch as the higher classes were ready to make sacrifices for the benefit of the peasantry, while the peasantry were about to find themselves in a position for which it would be really worth their while to fight. This was Mieroslawski's starting point in his insurrectionary programme, drawn up immediately after the decision of the Agricultural Society became known, and of which numerous copies, reproduced by photography on thin pieces of paper the size of a crown piece, were sent to

all parts of Poland. One of these programmes was found last autumn crumpled up and lying on the floor in a room in the Zamoyski Palace, which the Russians had just taken possession of, in consequence of an attempt having been made upon the life of General Berg from the house adjoining it. A great deal was made of this discovery at the time, which, however, only showed that a curious document had reached some of the inmates of the Zamoyski Palace as well as many other persons.

Mieroslawski was of opinion that with a little shaking from the Poles the edifice of the Russian empire would fall to pieces. But it was to be shaken gently and undermined quite gradually, until the time had fully arrived for its enemies to bring it down with a crash. The Polish officers and civil functionaries in the Russian service were to do all the preliminary work, aided by the agitation which was regarded as the inevitable consequence of the emancipation of the serfs. Public opinion abroad was to be prepared by continual attacks on Russia and by accounts of Russian atrocities real or invented.

This was the '*mentez hardiment*' principle of Voltaire, much used by revolutionists, though Mieroslawski is the first I believe who has been weak-minded enough to let out the secret in a formal programme. In the meanwhile the proprietors in Poland were to cultivate by all possible means the goodwill of their peasantry, arms and ammunition were to be introduced into the country, and at the last moment, when everything was ready, the proprietors were to call upon the peasants to take up their scythes and follow them into the field.

This scheme, if it only could have been persevered in for a sufficient length of time, would not on the day of action have failed. But were the Russians likely to wait until it was matured, and could such an excitable and demonstrative people as the Poles possibly keep quiet during the interval? Moreover, one part of the scheme could only have been carried out by a nation of scoundrels, another only by a nation of brave and generous men. Consequently it was, as a whole, impracticable, and so little came of it that, as a rule, neither peasants nor proprietors went into

the field at all, the class that took up arms consisting for the most part of townspeople.

Very different was the tone of the 'Address from the Inhabitants of Warsaw,' which, if not written, was at least printed and circulated throughout the country by Martin Borelowski, better known under the name of 'Lelewel,' which he assumed in memory of the celebrated Polish historian, when he went at the head of his workmen to meet the Russians in the field. He was one of the true heroes of the Polish insurrection, a man of the Kosciuszko stamp, without ambition, without deceit, and whose simple plan consisted in gaining the affection of the peasantry by kind treatment and by an amicable cession of the farm-land, in accordance with the plan of the Agricultural Society; in avoiding the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian service as a contamination; and in practising the most rigid economy in everything but the purchase of arms. 'Though the liberty of Poland concerns the whole of Europe, we must count on ourselves alone,' says one passage. * * * * 'But as for rising now, without reckoning our forces and

elaborating a material power, of that we must not think.'

Such a simple-minded, straightforward patriot as Lelewel must have been looked upon with something like contempt by the practised hands of revolution. His was the national and ideal programme, as distinguished from the cynical and equally impossible one of the revolutionary schemers. But in all impulsive popular movements those who go furthest take the lead and drag the others after them. Indeed, in a few months even Mieroslawski seemed to have been distanced; and when the Grand Duke Constantine and the Marquis Wielopolski arrived in Warsaw, with their bundle of reforms, nothing would satisfy the madmen of the extreme party but to fire upon one, and stab the other—as if to show that measures of conciliation were not wanted, and that their introduction would not be tolerated.

If there are two permanent parties in Poland radically different in their ideas and general

tendencies, there were in 1861, when I visited Warsaw for the first time, at least four parties—that is to say, two clearly defined sections of the aristocratic, and two less clearly defined of the democratic party.

On the extreme left of the democratic party, or party of action, were a few partisans of Mieroslawski (1), who proposed as long ago as February 1861 (almost before their chief had finished his programme) to commence the insurrection. The funeral of the five men shot in the massacre of February 27th was to be the occasion. It was known that the whole population of Warsaw, with a certain number of well-disposed peasants from the environs,* would follow the procession to the cemetery. The Russian troops, numbering only 5,000 men, had, in presence of the universal excitement, quitted the city, and it was thought by the extremest of the 'extremes' that they might be surprised in the citadel.

* Peasants in the neighbourhood of the towns, and of the great towns especially, are patriotic enough.

The great bulk, however, of the party of action (2), with such men as 'Lelewel' for their leaders, were convinced that without arms and without organisation it would be folly to make any such attempt.

On the other hand, the moderate and aristocratic party (3) were opposed to forcible measures altogether, and the recognised chief of this party, who exercised great personal influence among all classes, had pledged his word that, as regarded the funeral, it should take place without disturbance. This promise, given by Count Andrew Zamoyski on behalf of the whole population, was religiously kept. The funeral procession was followed to the grave in the greatest order by tens of thousands of Poles, while only three Russians were present in an official capacity —the Marquis Paulucci and two aides-de-camp.

In the meanwhile one member of the aristocratic party, with a small entourage (4), a man whom national adversity had hardened instead of softening, and who must be placed on the ex-

treme right of the moderate party, would hear neither of surprises, nor of preparations for a future rising, nor of 'manifestations' against Russia in the processional or any other form.

This was the Marquis Wielopolski, who had long been convinced that his country must lean either upon Russia or upon the west of Europe, and who had learned in 1831 the sad lesson that if she leaned upon the west of Europe she would be allowed to fall. The marquis is detested by his fellow-countrymen, who wish to save themselves not by means, but in spite, of Russia; and by the more ignorant portion of them is called a traitor. The Russians, on the other hand, regard him also as a traitor, because he obtained great advantages for Poland, which in their opinion would, had they been accepted by the Poles, have placed Russia in a very difficult position. Next to action against Russia, the marquis was opposed to total inaction; and he foresaw that if the moderate party—the great bulk of the aristocratic party—did nothing to support him it would in the end be dragged at the heels of the party of action.

After a certain amount of systematic agitation the party of action became tolerably united, and had one general plan. A rising was to be brought about in all parts of the country as soon as a sufficient number of arms could be obtained, and the aid of the peasants was to be secured by making over to them forthwith, in freehold, the land for which they had hitherto performed task-work or paid rent. This decision, with respect to the land, has to me a very revolutionary air, for it was arrived at without the consent of the proprietors—who, however, were promised an indemnity, payable after the country had recovered its independence!

The moderate party also formed a compact body, and took up an attitude of observation, unwilling to give its cordial support to the reforms introduced by the Marquis Wielopolski (though it could not but approve of the measures in themselves as far as they went), and unwilling, also, to join in the project of the revolutionary party, because (to mention no other reason) it considered the time for an armed rising had

by no means arrived. Some members of the moderate party did really support the marquis; but, generally speaking, the attitude of this party was one not of reaction, but simply of inaction.

CHAPTER III.

EVENTS FROM THE ACCESSION OF THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER TO THE BEGINNING OF THE WARSAW DEMONSTRATIONS.

THE agitation, which went on gradually increasing until, in January, 1863, it took the form of open war, first assumed a serious, and to good observers an intelligible form in 1860, when, on November 29th, the anniversary of the insurrection of 1830 was celebrated. There had been signs, however, of what was coming in 1858, when the funeral of General Sowinski's widow was made the occasion of a patriotic demonstration; * and the Emperor

* Towards the close of the bombardment of Warsaw in 1831, the feeble garrison who defended the village of Wola concentrated itself in the church, when the commandant, Sowinski, made his troops swear on the crucifix not to surrender. After a heavy and crushing cannonade from two points the church was stormed, the Poles who occupied it were slain, and Sowinski himself fell, covered with wounds,

Alexander had already given the Poles to understand that they had nothing to expect from him in 1856, immediately after the conclusion of the treaty of Paris.

During the Paris Conference it had been proposed that, in settling the conditions of peace, some stipulations should be made in favour of Poland. To this Count Orloff, the Russian representative, had replied that if anything were asked for nothing could be given; that he could not consent even to discuss the Polish question; and that the liberal concessions which the Emperor intended of his own free will to grant to the Poles would lose all their effect if it should appear that they had been extorted from him by foreign powers.

The report that liberal concessions were to be made to Poland increased the hopes that the

at the foot of the altar. The Wola church is maintained as nearly as possible in the state in which it was the day after Sowinski and his immortal garrison were put to the sword. I visited it in 1861, and counted sixty odd cannon balls sticking fast in its desecrated walls.

Poles had already formed of the Emperor who had just ascended the throne, and when it was known that he intended to visit Warsaw the aristocracy resolved to give him a most cordial reception.

His Majesty reached Warsaw by way of Kieff, and at one point during the journey was met by Count Jezierski, through whose estate he was passing, and whom he honoured with a private interview. What took place is not known, except that Jezierski read a paper.

I must here mention that this Count Jezierski was one of two delegates (the other being Prince Lubecki) sent by the Polish Diet, immediately after the outbreak of 1830, to propose terms of peace to the Emperor Nicholas. They demanded what Krukowiecki demanded nine months afterwards, when Paskiewicz was preparing to storm Warsaw; what Kosciuszko had asked of the Emperor Alexander I. as the one condition of his support in 1815; what the Polish aristocracy, through Count Andrew Zamoyski, represented as an indispensable preliminary to any concurrence on

their part in the reforms undertaken by the Grand Duke Constantine in 1862—namely, the union of the polish provinces seized at the partitions of the eighteenth century to the Polish kingdom of 1815, under a constitutional government. The Emperor Nicholas replied to Jezierski's and Lubecki's propositions that the insurgents must lay down their arms, and trust to his forbearance and generosity; but that if they failed to do this, and persisted in seeking to redress their grievances by means of war, he would crush them, and they must expect no mercy at his hands. Jezierski and Lubecki returned to Warsaw convinced that the Emperor, in one case or the other, would keep his word; and stating this opinion frankly, and advising immediate submission, they were, of course, looked upon as traitors. Lubecki left Poland altogether, and has since resided at St. Petersburg. Jezierski remained in Warsaw four days, to be able to answer any questions or reproaches that might be addressed to him, and then went abroad. He returned to Poland after the war, and when the Emperor Nicholas visited Warsaw in 1836 was sent for by his Majesty and

treated in a very friendly manner. This must have rendered Jezierski still more unpopular with his own countrymen, but it was only natural that the Emperor Nicholas should be well-disposed towards a man who had endeavoured to avert a war which, if fatal to Poland, was disastrous also to Russia, and which quite put an end (at least for a considerable time) to Russia's plans for conciliating her own Polish subjects, with the view of attracting those of Austria and Prussia.

What passed between Jezierski and Alexander II. in 1856 has not been made known; but it is certain that Jezierski submitted some scheme which his Majesty did not approve of.

On arriving at Warsaw the Emperor was received with the greatest enthusiasm, and among other entertainments offered to him was a ball, given, not to order, but voluntarily and spontaneously, by the nobility of Poland. No pains had been spared to render this ball fully worthy of the occasion—the first on which an Emperor of Russia had met his Polish subjects in the true

character of a guest since the insurrection of 1830. The Emperor seemed delighted with his reception, and when he retired it was announced that the nobility could wait upon his Majesty the following day at the palace of Lazienki.

The next day the Emperor thanked the nobility for their magnificent ball, and assured them that he had the welfare of all his subjects at heart, and that he should not forget the manner in which he had been received at Warsaw. This was all very well and would have been enough; but after a slight pause the Emperor (urged, I am told, by Prince Gortchakoff,* who stood by his side) began again, and uttered the following harsh and insulting words, which he seemed to address especially to Jezierski. At least, those who were present declare that he looked particularly at Jezierski as he pronounced them: —

'But, above all, no dreams,' said his Majesty; 'I shall know how to restrain† those who give

* The late Prince Michael Gortchakoff, then Lieutenant-Governor of the kingdom of Poland.

† According to one version, '*je saurai sévir*;' according to another, '*je saurai contenir*,' &c. I have adopted the milder of the two.

themselves up to them. . . . What my father did was well done, and I shall maintain it. My reign will be the continuation of his.'

This language chilled the heart of every Pole who heard it. The 'dreams' were indeed dispelled, and the nobility went away from Lazienki reflecting only that the reign of Alexander II. was to be a continuation of the odious reign of Nicholas I.

In the passage, 'what my father did was well done, and I shall maintain it,' the Emperor in all probability referred to the substitution of a Russian for a Polish administration in the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire—a far more important, and for the Poles injurious, measure than the abolition of the constitution in the kingdom of Poland. In any case, the matter and the tone of the supplementary speech were such that they changed the loyalty of the listeners forthwith to disaffection. The new Sovereign had made a bad beginning with his Polish subjects. He had gone out of his way to offend them, and had wounded them at the very time when they seemed disposed to accept whatever he might have to

offer them in a favourable spirit. The reforms which five years afterwards made no impression on the Poles might have had a good effect had they been introduced in 1856.

The people of Warsaw thought it strange that the Polish nobility should give entertainments to an Emperor of Russia; and the energetic men who were afterwards to form what is called the 'party of action' sneered contemptuously at the 'aristocrats,' who, after getting up the most magnificent hunting parties and balls for Alexander II., after surrounding him with every conceivable mark of attention, were coolly told by their imperial visitor not to dream, and that what the Emperor Nicholas had done was well done, and would be maintained!

Nevertheless, the Emperor Alexander *did* do something for the Poles immediately after his coronation. He recalled some thousands of exiles from Siberia, re-established Polish as the language of the administration and schools in the kingdom of Poland, and abolished the law by

which the nobility of the Polish provinces were obliged to send at least one son from each family to serve in the Russian army.

In 1857, when the Emperor revisited Warsaw in company with the Empress, a presentation took place, at which the Polish ladies were, with singular bad taste, required to appear in the Russian costume as worn at the Court of St. Petersburg. Polish gentlemen not in the government service were excluded from the reception. On the other hand, the Emperor founded a medical school at Warsaw. As to re-establishing the universities and high schools suppressed throughout the territory of Russian Poland after the insurrection of 1830, not a word.

In 1858 the Emperor visited Warsaw again, and sanctioned the establishment of an Agricultural Society—*the* Agricultural Society destined soon afterwards to play an important part.

In 1859 the Emperor received Prince Napoleon at Warsaw. This year he granted to the Agricul-

tural Society permission to discuss the peasant question.* In 1859, also, a new law on the subject of recruitment was published, and the system of conscription by designation was replaced (in the book of laws) by the French system of conscription by ballot.

A certain number of reforms, then, had really been introduced in Poland during the four years that followed the accession of the Emperor Alexander, and it is said to have been the intention of his Majesty to make some fresh concession every year to the Poles, and ultimately to replace them under a constitutional system. It was thought necessary, however, to postpone this last step until the settlement of the peasant question and the formation of provincial assemblies in Russia, as well as in Poland, had prepared the way for it; and it was considered of the highest importance that no rights or privileges should be given to

* The emancipation of the serfs had now been finally decided upon in Russia, and the Russian nobility in each province had already been invited to prepare detailed projects on the subject for presentation to the government.

the Poles which were not at the same time extended to the Russians.

I believe in all this, and in the general good intentions of the Russian government, from the accession of the present Emperor to the outbreak of the Polish insurrection. At the same time, if the Russian government is to be praised for having allowed an Agricultural Society to be established in Poland in 1858, it must be blamed for having dissolved it in 1861. If it was a meritorious act to introduce a new and equitable law of recruitment in 1859, it was a very culpable one to treat it as if it had never existed in 1863.

I once knew a man who reformed his habits very much as the Russian government reforms its laws. He drew up an elaborate programme of conduct, and posted it up in his bedroom, that he might think of it morning and night. According to this programme my friend was to rise in the summer at five. From five to six he was to take his bath, say his prayers, and dress; at six, coffee; from six to nine, original composition; from nine to ten, on horseback; from ten to half-past, break-

fast; from half-past ten to three, study—and so on throughout the day, and until eleven at night, when, according to the programme, he was to retire to rest. But if I called on this leader of a model life at eleven in the morning I generally found him in bed, and I never remember him studying anything except novels and his own costume. I do not know at what time he retired to rest, but I came across him now and then at one in the morning. Inconsiderate persons called this man an impostor, but when he drew up his programme he had every intention of observing it. The Russian government would also, I think, like to reform its laws; only unfortunately it has never had habits of legality, and seems incapable of making a fair beginning. It has introduced many good laws of late years both in Russia and in Poland, but it has never hesitated to violate them when it has suited its immediate purpose to do so.

In the meanwhile, putting written law on one side, the rule of Prince Gortchakoff, the Emperor's lieutenant in Poland, had really not been severe. Indeed, it had been unprecedentedly mild.

Moreover, there had been no recruitment since the Crimean war,* no one had been exiled, and when the demonstrations which ended in the insurrection of 1863 first began there was not a single political prisoner in the Warsaw citadel. I must also mention that the government had done away with the old restrictions on travelling, and had reduced the price of foreign passports from something like 600 or 700† roubles to 10 roubles. This induced a large number of Poles to visit foreign countries who under the old system would have been unable to leave Poland.

The Emperor Nicholas knew that if the Poles went abroad they would talk about their intolerable position, that they would meet with sympathy, and that they would come back exasperated more

* During the reign of the Emperor Nicholas there was a conscription or proscription every year; but as it was not followed by an armed insurrection it excited no interest in the West of Europe. The recruitment, however, was effected in a purely arbitrary manner; and every schoolboy who distinguished himself by energy and ability was marked down for the army.

† It was difficult to get a passport for abroad at all, and most of the money paid for the privilege went in the shape of bribes to officials.

than ever at the recollection of their country's wrongs. There was, above all, the direct influence of the Polish emigration to fear. But in the present day if the Poles are prevented from travelling, how are the railways which connect Warsaw with Vienna and Berlin to pay their expenses? It must be a source of great annoyance to the Russian government to have the Poles on the western instead of the eastern frontier of the empire. But there they are, and it is really very difficult to connect Russia with the west of Europe and, at the same time, keep up a separation between the west of Europe and Poland.

Moreover, as it was the settled policy of the Emperor Nicholas to deprive the Poles of everything, and to keep them constantly guarded, and, as it were, imprisoned, it is impossible now to do them the slightest amount of good, to show them the slightest amount of mercy, without in the same measure strengthening them and enabling them to some extent to resist their oppressors. Poland during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas was in the position of a prisoner with both arms

chained. The present Emperor loosened one arm, upon which the prisoner, being a brave and desperate man, endeavoured to liberate himself altogether—at the risk of being half murdered and chained up again.

There had already been one unmistakeable 'demonstration,' in 1858 (on the occasion of Madame Sowinska's funeral), when, in 1860, the Emperor Alexander paid a fifth visit to Warsaw, —not this time in order to meet the nobility of Poland, but for the purpose of holding council with the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, in the capital of the country which Austria, Prussia, and Russia had dismembered. The object of the interview was supposed to be the formation of a league against France and against the Italy which had just been liberated.

This was more than the Poles could bear. All the principal families left Warsaw. Those who did not take their departure resolved not to show themselves at any entertainment that might

be got up by the Russians in honour of the allied Sovereigns; and ultimately the general feeling on the subject became so strong that before the chiefs of the partitioning powers arrived almost every noble family had gone away, and only the officials, the shopkeepers, the work-people, and generally those who were kept at Warsaw by their occupations remained.

At the theatre a 'gala representation' was given, when the after-piece announced was the ballet of *Robert and Bertrand, or the Two Thieves.*

'Those who go to the play to-night will see, not two thieves, but three,' was remarked, and the word 'three' was substituted for 'two' in the play-bills exhibited at the doors.* The few Poles who attended the performance had their clothes burnt with vitriol, and the atmosphere of the theatre was rendered intolerable by means of *assafœtida*, offered by the students of the Medical School, in lieu of incense, to the allied Sovereigns. The Polish officials who attended the reception at the Belvidere Palace were hooted,

and even pelted. Finally, the imperial fêtes had their festive character so entirely spoilt that they were brought abruptly to a termination, and the three monarchs returned prematurely to their respective capitals.

This took place at the end of October; and the success of the demonstration against the despotic trio had been so complete that it was resolved to repeat it in another form. Moreover, the libefation of Italy by means of France had now inspired the Poles with a belief that their turn would come next, and that Poland would ere long be helped to recover her freedom by the armies of Napoleon III.

The pupils of the School of Fine Arts organised a grand patriotic manifestation for November 29th, the anniversary of the outbreak which preceded the insurrection of 1830. An immense crowd assembled, a procession was formed, at the head of which standards exhibiting the white eagle of Poland were carried, the national hymn, *Boze cos Polske*, destined soon afterwards to acquire a world-wide celebrity, was sung in gene-

ral chorus; and all this in open day, and in the principal streets of Warsaw. The troops did not interfere, but many arrests were made in the evening, and the lieutenant, Prince Gortchakoff, telegraphed to St. Petersburg for instructions.

'Manifestations' on a small scale now took place daily, and the Russians found themselves in a difficulty, which became greater and greater, until at last they stood face to face with armed insurrection. If they repressed the manifestations by force they excited general indignation, not only in Warsaw, but throughout Europe. On the other hand, if the manifestations were allowed to continue they grew and multiplied of themselves. The policy adopted by the government was, as far as possible, that of prevention. They stationed patrols of cavalry outside the churches, with orders to allow no processions to be formed; and detachments of infantry were marched up and down the streets to keep the principal thoroughfares clear. 'This display of force,' says a Polish writer of the revolutionary party, 'had a result which the authorities had not foreseen. The men of action who desired a conflict, and

also those who were in favour of merely pacific demonstrations, accustomed themselves to elbow the soldiers, and to be brushed against by the detachments of cavalry stationed in the streets—so much so that, after three months of these demonstrations on the part of the soldiers, the patriots resolved to celebrate February 25th, the anniversary of the battle of Grochow.'*

We now come to events with which the English public are more familiar. The procession in honour of the battle of Grochow—the first great battle fought between the Polish insurgents of 1830 and the Russian troops—was dispersed by force. The accounts of this affair given by the Poles of the extreme party agree with those published by the Russians, and differ in some very important respects from the versions generally circulated in France and England. In the pamphlets published by the Poles of the moderate party, or by their friends and coadjutors abroad,

* Précis Historique sur la Pologne, rédigé sur les Notes du Comte Ladislas Stroynowski. Genève, chez les principaux libraires.

the Warsaw 'massacres,' of which that of February 25th, 1861, was the first, were unprovoked onslaughts made by ferocious soldiers on harmless and unresisting crowds. This, however, is what I find on the subject in the memoirs of Count Stroynowski, already referred to above:—

'The patriots who carried the torches at the head of the column refused to withdraw; they continued to advance, making use of the torches to keep off the horses of the gendarmerie and open a passage for the procession up to the Alexander Place. The troops then used their sabres; the patriots fought as well as they could, some with the torches, others with the standards carried at the head of the procession—for none of them had arms. At the same time the crowd sang patriotic hymns. . . . The gendarmes urged their horses towards the people, but they could not be got to approach the torch-bearers. The torch-bearers occupied the first rank, and directed the flames towards the horses' nostrils, who thereupon either turned back or reared and threw their riders.'

When the torches went out the troops attacked

and sabred many persons in the crowd. A nominal list of the wounded was circulated in the town the next day. It was not asserted at the time that any one had been killed, though the affair of the 25th was afterwards spoken of and generally regarded as a 'massacre.'

On the 27th a funeral service was celebrated in the church of the Bernardins. A crowd had assembled outside, and was being watched by the troops, who did not know whether or not a demonstration was intended. This time there was no thought of provoking a conflict; but no sooner had the procession left the church to proceed to the cemetery than it was set upon and attacked by Cossacks. Then, as it did not break up, the Cossacks were called back and a detachment of infantry sent forward. The infantry loaded their muskets in presence of the people, and, without further warning, fired upon the unarmed crowd.

Five bodies were taken possession of by the Poles, and it was found that two members of the Agricultural Society, one workman, one student,

and one Jew had fallen. The Agricultural Society had taken no part in previous manifestations; but the fact that in the massacre of the 27th every class in Poland had lost one or more of its members made a deep impression in Warsaw, and it was resolved that the funeral of the victims should be attended by the population of the whole city.

The five bodies were carried to the Hôtel de l'Europe, and laid out in two adjoining rooms on the second floor. Some hours afterwards, in the middle of the night, a number of police agents, bringing with them five stretchers, came to the hotel. The officer who had charge of the party demanded admission, and stated that he had come to take away the bodies and have them buried. The door was not opened, and the officer was told, in answer to his summons, that the bodies would not be given up, and that the friends of the deceased would see to their interment. The officer demanded admission a second time, and receiving no reply, gave orders to break the door in. At that moment an aide-de-camp of Prince Gortchakoff arrived and informed the officer that the bodies were to be left at the hotel.

A deputation from the Agricultural Society having represented to Prince Gortchakoff that any attempt to stop the public funeral would inevitably be followed by grave disturbances, the Prince had telegraphed to St. Petersburg for instructions; and an answer had arrived in the middle of the night directing him to allow the funeral to take place.

Three days afterwards, March 2nd, every house in Warsaw was closed, and black cloth was hung before all those by which the funeral of the five victims was to pass. The clergy of all denominations, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, marched at the head of the procession, in which the whole population of Warsaw joined, and which extended from the Hôtel de l'Europe, in the heart of the city, to the cemetery beyond the barriers, a distance of nearly three miles. The ceremony lasted from eleven in the morning until late in the afternoon, and when the foremost of the mourners reached the cemetery, at two o'clock, the last in the long line had not yet left the town. The Russians had been assured that there should be

no disturbance, and all passed off in the greatest tranquillity. The Marquis Paulucci, who, during a long residence in Poland, had acquired a knowledge of the Polish character, asked, as a favour, that no speeches should be delivered over the graves of the victims. A promise to that effect was made to him, and he knew that it would be kept. He then said that he had with him his report already prepared, stating that the funeral had taken place in the most orderly manner, and that at the conclusion of the ceremony the people had quietly dispersed to their own homes. He asked whether he could sign it in all confidence, and was assured that he might do so. The marquis then left the cemetery, accompanied by his aides-de-camp, convinced that he could trust to the Poles, and that all danger for that day had passed.

A small knot of the extreme men among the party of action had advised that on the occasion of the funeral the population of Warsaw should provoke a conflict with the troops, who at that time numbered only 5,000 men. They argued

that the garrison of Warsaw would never be smaller than it was at that moment, and that, the funeral giving the population of a city of 150,000 inhabitants a pretext for appearing in a mass, advantage should be taken of it to disarm small bodies of soldiers, attack the others with the weapons thus procured, and, proceeding rapidly from one operation to another, rush to the citadel, and take it by a *coup de main*.

This proposition was scarcely less unreasonable than the project of insurrection executed two years afterwards, when the Russians had become infinitely stronger. But the troops were kept under arms all the day of the funeral, every preparation had been made at the citadel, and any attempt at a general rising would undoubtedly have been suppressed in the most bloody manner. Nevertheless, the 'moderate,' 'aristocratic,' 'reactionary' party are now reproached by the extreme party with having restrained the popular enthusiasm at a moment when, had it been allowed full play, it would (say the 'extremes') have carried everything before it. The fact is, the moderate party wished to avoid

an appeal to arms in January 1863, as well as in March 1861. In reference to that point its views did not change; but, at last, circumstances became too strong for it and forced it into the insurrection in spite of itself.

CHAPTER IV.

LIFE AND DEATH OF THE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY.

An Agricultural Society can have no political importance in countries like England, where there is a Parliament. Neither can it in countries like Russia, where neither Parliament nor Parliamentary traditions exist. But the Poles had a representative government and enjoyed habits of free discussion for eight centuries before the destruction of their country by the surrounding despotisms; and it is only since 1830 that the little kingdom of 1815 has been altogether deprived of its constitutional rights. Accordingly, the passion for political life is so strong in Poland that every assembly of Poles, for whatever purpose formed, is sure, sooner or later, to assume a political character. Such was the fate of the Agricultural Society of the kingdom of Poland—and this in spite of the care

with which some of the principal members endeavoured to guard against the danger, knowing, as they did, that it had only to go a step beyond the sphere assigned to it to be at once dissolved.

Count Andrew Zamoyski had long wished to form an Agricultural Society, and when, on the representation of M. Muchanoff, the Minister of the Interior, permission to establish one was obtained, the nucleus of it already existed in the shape of a committee of shareholders directing an agricultural review. This review had been started by some of the principal proprietors of the kingdom, and was edited by Count Andrew Zamoyski and M. Louis Gorski. Its directors invited fifty proprietors, and among them the Marquis Wielopolski, to join them in forming a new committee. On the day fixed for the first meeting the marquis did not appear, but sent his son, Count Sigismund, to take his place. The other proprietors were offended at this. They refused to receive the son in lieu of the father, and neither of the Wielopolskis took part in the founding of the Agricultural Society.

The meeting elected sixteen of those present to form the committee of the Agricultural Society, with Count Andrew Zamoyski as President, and M. Ostrowski as Vice-President. All proprietors, great and small, could become members on payment of an annual subscription of 100 Polish florins (2*l.* 10*s.*). Before long the number of members amounted to as many as 4,000, and the Society acquired a peculiarly national character from the presence at its annual meetings of delegates from the Agricultural Societies of Lemberg, Cracow, and Posen.*

The Society was divided into sections, on one of which devolved the task of awarding premiums, while another discussed and prepared reports on the breeding of cattle, a third devoting itself to the consideration of farming operations in general, and so on. From the year 1859 one section occupied itself specially with the condition of the peasants, and with plans for the conversion of

* In 1860 there was a fair prospect of an Agricultural Society being established at Wilna. This seems little enough to us, but it would have been a great deal to the Poles of Lithuania, to whom every kind of national institution had long been denied.

their dues, payable in labour, and to a certain extent in produce, into rent. The meetings of sections took place in the morning, and the general meetings, when the reports of the sections were brought up, in the evening.

The committee, the governing body of the Society, had eighty-six correspondents in the various districts into which the kingdom of Poland is divided. These correspondents were elected in the localities to which they belonged, and it was their duty, each in his own district, to carry out the instructions and communicate the general notifications received from Warsaw.

The scheme for endowing the peasants with their plots of land, which has often been spoken of as the great work of the Agricultural Society, was not brought forward by the committee, who were for the most part opposed to it, nor by the President, who was notoriously opposed to it; which, however, did not prevent his being a liberal and enterprising landlord. But the aim of Count Andrew Zamoyski was not to cover his estate with a number of petty freeholders, un-

able, from want of capital, to improve or even keep up the cultivation of their land, and very likely at the first opportunity to sell it to the Jews or to German speculators: his object was to encourage as much as possible the formation of a good class of farmers; and with this view he had divided nearly the whole of his estate, on the English system, into large farms, and leased them to the peasants on very easy terms. For this Count Andrew Zamoyski has been called an Anglo-maniac by those who know some little about England, and a 'feudalist' by those who know nothing about the feudal system. Suffice it to say that he did not recognise any absolute right of property on the part of the peasant in the land assigned to him on condition of his working for it or paying rent; that he thought it unjust and inexpedient to make over the land to him as a gift; and that he considered it undesirable, moreover, under any circumstances to increase the number of penurious peasant proprietors.

Doubtless Count Andrew Zamoyski was right in the abstract. He may have been right, too, in

all respects, in an agricultural, and yet wrong in a political, point of view; for, however weak the claim the peasant of Poland may have to the peasant-land cultivated by him and by his ancestors for centuries, it is quite certain that he holds to this claim, and that it has suited the Prussian and Austrian governments to allow it in Posen and Galicia. Accordingly, however fatal such an arrangement might be to the introduction of the English system of farming (of which the Marquis Wielopolski, as well as Count Andrew Zamoyski, was a warm partisan), it might yet be highly politic to conciliate by far the most numerous class of the population by making over to them, on easy conditions, the land which, rightly or wrongly, they regard as their natural inheritance.

Many of the Polish proprietors, and the great majority of the Poles as a nation, are convinced that the Diet made a great mistake in not solving this question of the peasant's property-right in his plot of land in 1830-31, when the Poles had their country to themselves; and it was Count Thomas Potocki, one of the heroes of the 1830

war, who proposed a solution of it to the Agricultural Society in 1861. Count Thomas Potocki (a brother-in-law, by the way, of the Marquis Wielopolski) was only a private member of the Society: but, from his age, his personal character, his services to his country, and his reputation as a political writer, his opinion carried particular weight. The veteran, who had received fourteen wounds at the battle of Grochow, and had recovered from them, was now suffering from an incurable spinal complaint, under which he soon afterwards sank. He spoke without rising from his seat, and, using the arguments already familiar to the readers of his 'Evenings at Carlsbad,' showed that the 'peasant question' was the most important of all questions in Poland, and that the interest of the peasant was the interest of the whole country. Finally, he proposed a resolution, approving the endowment of the peasants with the portions of land for which they had, until that time, performed task-work or paid rent; the proprietors to be indemnified by letters of credit from the Polish Landed Bank, to the extent of four-fifths of the land thus ceded, and the peasants to contribute towards a special redemption

fund, in connexion with this bank, by a series of payments extending over a term of years.

The Agricultural Society had, of course, no power to make laws on this or any other subject; and its opinion, however formally expressed, would have had no more value than that of a debating club, had it not been for the fact that here was a body of landowners agreeing to a solution of a great social question by which landowners alone were to lose. They did not, however, and could not, bind themselves to carry out their decision, which was only important in so far that it might be looked upon as an express invitation to the government to adopt it as the basis of a legal enactment. In point of fact, the resolution passed by the Agricultural Society led to nothing. Its observance by the whole body of proprietors could not be enforced, and individual proprietors did not care to make sacrifices for the good of the peasants without being sure that they would be made generally. The resolution on the peasant question was adopted on February 21st.*

* According to Prince Czartoryski (*Statement of Polish Affairs*, etc., 1863–4), it was adopted on the 20th, the day

On the 25th the Agricultural Society was still sitting, when the first collision between the people and the troops took place.

The same evening eight members were appointed to prepare an address to the Emperor on the state of affairs.

The day afterwards general mourning was decided upon — no one can say by whom; but it was generally adopted. To enrage the Agricultural Society, and draw it into the movement which now, under the direction of the extreme party, was becoming more important every day, a report was industriously spread that the Emperor was about to thank it for having taken no part in the patriotic demonstration of the 25th. The notion that, in the form of a compliment, a reflection on their patriotism was about to be addressed to them so stung the members that many of them resolved to show at once whether

on which the public proceedings for the year commenced; according to L. Stroynowski, on the 27th, the day on which they were closed; according to the Russian author of *Fictions et Réalités Polonaises*, on the 5th March. It was adopted on the 21st February, new style, which the Russian author has mistaken for the 21st February, old style.

they were really loyal to their country or to the foreign power by which it was ruled. The false rumour had the desired effect, and made the Agricultural Society much more inclined than it had previously been to look with favour upon street demonstrations.

On the 26th, the day on which the word passed through the town, as if by electricity, that mourning was to be adopted, two men stationed themselves on the staircase of the Agricultural Society's Hall, stopped every member or visitor as he went out, took his hat from him, and brushed it the wrong way. This was understood to signify mourning on the part of the men. As for the women, they dressed entirely in black—wearing nothing else for nearly three years, until at last, at the end of 1863, they were compelled by brute force to adopt colours.

The unanimity of all Poles capable of national feeling of any kind in presence of the acts of ferocity* committed by the Russians was shown

* It is only fair, however, to explain that these acts were not worse than those committed under similar circumstances

not only in the adoption of mourning, but also in the wearing of Polish mementoes, the abandonment of dancing and of public amusements of all kinds, and in the crowded attendance at the churches whenever a service was to be performed in honour of some Polish patriot, or in commemoration of some great day in the history of Poland. If all this was contrived by the men who aimed only at bringing about an appeal to arms, it was certainly contrived most cunningly. Not only the national sentiment in general, but the actual disposition of the national mind at that particular time was appealed to in a manner that could not fail to elicit a response. Every one was sad and wanted to wear mourning. No one wanted to dance or to go to the theatre. There was a general presentiment of a coming crisis, and the churches were attended quite naturally by many persons who at less solemn times did not go to church at all. Finally, the patriotic hymns were the prayers specially suited for such a period of trial.

by French, Russian, and Austrian troops. The military and despotic governments of Europe have only one way of dispersing a crowd that refuses to move.

Millions of sincere Poles prayed, sang, dressed in black, and abstained from all amusement, without any precise thought as to what all this was to lead to. But others knew, and had carefully reckoned that if the Polish ladies wore nothing but mourning, and lived economically in other respects, avoiding parties, theatres, and all entertainments, then immense sums of money would be saved, which their husbands would be able to give towards the expenses of the meditated insurrection.

The black clothes, moreover, the crucifixes, the symbolical chains worn as the only appropriate ornaments for the wives and mothers of Poland, the solemn religious services for those who in former contests had died for their country, the plaintive and touching hymn sung on all possible occasions, with its refrain—

Deign, O Lord, to give us back our free country—

could not the effect of this on the most impressionable people in Europe be calculated—a people who, with all their levity, have certainly the most intolerable grievances to complain of; grievances so hard to bear that even those of their

friends who blame them the most severely for not supporting them would perhaps after all, think worse of them if they did so for any length of time?

That there might be no mistake as to the feeling of the Polish aristocracy on the subject of the demonstrations, and the manner in which that of the 25th had been put an end to, the Marshals of the Nobility* waited upon Prince Gortchakoff to protest against the violence of the troops. On their return they were sharply attacked for not having profited by the occasion to say a great deal more. In consequence of these reproaches the Marshals wished to resign,

* 'Marshal of the Nobility' is a Russian office instituted by the Empress Catherine, through the charter which first settled the position of the Russian nobility and recognised their titles to the hereditary possession of their estates. The Marshals have the right of representing to the Sovereign the wants of the nobles of their province or district; but they are exiled or imprisoned if they exercise it (as in the case of the Marshal of Tver in 1859, the Marshal of a district in Mohilew in 1861, and all the Marshals of Podolia in 1862). The office of Marshal was introduced into the kingdom of Poland by the Emperor Nicholas; with what object is not very clear.

but they were requested by their constituents, and ultimately consented, to retain their offices.

I cannot but admire the Polish nobility resolving in a serious and dignified manner to call Prince Gortchakoff to account for the violence committed by his troops, just when the Russians were flattering themselves that the street demonstrations were of no importance, because they were not supported by the very class which immediately afterwards protested solemnly against the Russian mode of dispersing them. But Poland resents every cruelty or injustice that may be practised on a Pole, whether it be a workman shot in a demonstration, or a prelate sentenced to death for defending the sanctity of his church against the inroads of the Russian soldiery, or a nobleman sent into exile because he is felt to be in the way. Not many months after the first attack on the people at Warsaw the university students at Moscow were treated as barbarously as the Poles, and upon infinitely less provocation—in fact upon no provocation whatever; but no Russian in any official capacity had a word to say against the young men being sabred by cavalry and gensdarmes when they had

simply gone in a body (and in the most orderly manner) to submit a petition to the governor-general, which the governor-general had consented beforehand to receive. The Moscow Marshal could not be prevailed upon to transmit to the Emperor the remonstrances of those members of the Moscow nobility who, as students, had come in for their share of the outrages, and had been either wounded by the soldiers or violently beaten by the police.

So that the Pole, with all his wrongs and all his sufferings, is still a freer man than the Russian. His soul is free, and in certain supreme cases he will, without reference to the innumerable *ukazes* and *prikazes* directed against him, do what in accordance with his liberal traditions of a thousand years he feels to be just and proper. The Russian, on the other hand, feeling that in his country there is not and never has been any such thing as legality, dares not and, morally speaking, cannot take his stand even upon such rights as are plainly given to him by the written law.*

* I know as well as any one that there are exceptions to this rule; but they are rare; and those Russians who, in

On the 27th, at mid-day, while the commotion was taking place which ended in the slaughter of five unarmed persons, the proceedings of the Agricultural Society were brought to a close.

The same day the eight members of the Society commissioned to prepare the address to the Emperor met, for that purpose, the principal members of the municipality, the heads of the clergy of all denominations, and other notabilities of the capital. Permission having been obtained from Prince Gortchakoff to send the address to St. Petersburg, it was drawn up and signed on the 1st of March. It asked for nothing, but simply set forth that 'a nation which had been governed for centuries by liberal institutions had for the last thirty years endured the most cruel sufferings, and, being deprived of every legal means of laying its grievances and wants at the foot of the throne, was reduced by violence to make its voice heard through the cries of martyrs sacrificed daily in the cause of patriotism.' 'A country once on a level with the civilisation of its Chris-

dealing with the government, stand upon their rights are treated in a manner not calculated to encourage other Russians to do the same.

tian neighbours cannot,' continued the address, 'grow morally or materially, so long as its church, its legislation, its public instruction, and its whole social organisation are forcibly subjected to foreign innovation, and withdrawn from the national influence.'

Some members of the extreme party were of opinion that the address should have contained explicit demands, and that it ought to have been presented as coming not from the kingdom of Poland alone, but from Russian Poland in general. To send such an address, however, would have been as useless as it afterwards was to draw up the celebrated one entrusted to Count Andrew Zamoyski, which, though never presented, is known to have contained a demand for the annexation of the Russo-Polish provinces to the Polish kingdom.

The Marquis Wielopolski, on his side, was also in favour of explicit, but at the same time moderate and, so to say, legal demands. Already in 1860 he had prepared an address, in which the re-estab-

lishment of the constitution of 1815 was expressly petitioned for. After the withdrawal of this constitution the Emperor Nicholas had published an 'Organic Statute,' which, however, was not put in action; and the marquis is understood to have suggested that the constitution of 1815, having never been replaced in practice by the statute intended to supersede it, might still, though in abeyance, be regarded as the law of the country. Count Thomas Potocki, at whose house the delegates charged with the preparation of an address to the Emperor met, had too much political discernment not to recommend the adoption of the one already drawn up by the Marquis Wielopolski. Here something positive was petitioned for, something that there was a chance of the Emperor's granting; something, moreover, that the constantly increasing constitutional party in Russia would at that time have been delighted to see granted. It was rejected, however, partly because it expressed regret for the insurrection of 1830, and partly also because it made no mention of the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, which since the insurrection of 1830 had been

governed as belonging, in a national as well as in a political sense, not to Poland, but to Russia.

Ultimately the vague complaint, the petition without a prayer drawn up and signed by the deputies from the Agricultural Society, by the Catholic Archbishop, the President of the Evangelical Consistory, the Chief Rabbi, and all the principal men of Warsaw, signed also by hundreds of private persons of all classes,* was forwarded, on the part of the whole nation, to St. Petersburg.

The Emperor replied that the address proceeded from 'a few individuals,' and that he ought to treat it as if it had never existed. Nevertheless, he promised certain reforms, and Prince Gortchakoff, the Foreign Minister, despatched a circular to the various foreign governments explaining in detail what they were to be. It may be stated briefly that they included the formation of a Polish Council of State and of elective district and municipal councils. About the same time the Marquis Wielopolski was appointed Minister of

* Copies of the address, after the original had been sent to St. Petersburg, were signed by tens of thousands.

Worship and Public Instruction, and also Minister of the Interior. As for the Agricultural Society, it was dissolved, and its dissolution was attributed by public opinion to the agency of the Marquis Wielopolski, who was reported to have said that, having gone quite beyond its sphere, it had now become an *imperium in imperio*, and as such could no longer be allowed to exist. This, however, was mere supposition.

The address to the Emperor had nothing to do with the dissolution of the Society, as the address was not the exclusive production of that body, nor adopted and signed until after its debates had been closed. The resolution on the peasant question, *per se*, had also nothing to do with it. An official document was published, assigning as the cause of the dissolution the impossibility of permitting such an organisation to exist and exercise pressure during the approaching elections of members for the newly-constituted district and municipal councils. This in itself was a fair excuse; but there were two other reasons, not mentioned in the published justification, which had very great weight in deciding the fate of the Agricultural Society.

1. The committee of the Society had published and printed circular instructions to their correspondents in the country (eighty-six in number), commenting on the resolution passed, and desiring agents and members to impress the peasants with a due sense of the benefits to accrue to them from this new measure. The priests were to assist in this work.

2. The members of the Society had met in their various districts, and had elected new correspondents or agents of the central board, and these elections had resulted, as the government well knew, in favour of persons far more advanced,* in their opinions, than the former correspondents.

The dissolution of the Agricultural Society (April 6th) caused great indignation at Warsaw; and no sooner did the news become generally

* Let me once more explain that I never knew a Pole who did not hate the Russian government. But some thought that it was impossible to attack it with advantage; others thought that for the present it was impossible to do so; others, again, thought that everything ought to be sacrificed merely on the chance of being able to overturn it. This last was a very 'advanced' opinion.

known than (April 7th) an immense number of persons went in a body to Count Andrew Zamoyski's house to make a formal protest against it. From Count Zamoyski's the crowd proceeded to the hall of the Society, and covered it with mortuary garlands.

Prince Gortchakoff had already been enjoined from St. Petersburg to tolerate no further disorders, and at a council of war held on the morning of the 7th it had been decided, in case of fresh demonstrations taking place, to fire on the people. The Prince, however, was still unwilling to adopt this cruel measure. When the demonstration of the 7th was at its height he called upon the crowd to 'go home.' Some of the leaders replied that it was for him and his Russians to 'go home,' for that they as Poles were at home already. This argument—which, like a great many other Polish arguments, though true in the abstract, was by no means to the point—met with great success; and, as the Russians still did not fire, the demonstrations lasted some considerable time.

The Emperor's contemptuous reply to the very moderate address forwarded to his Majesty by the

principal persons in Warsaw had no doubt a great effect in increasing the irritation caused by the dissolution of the Agricultural Society, and which again manifested itself on April 8th. On that day an immense mass of persons went, with national banners and with various religious emblems, to the graves of the men who had fallen in the massacre of February 27th. The procession, after leaving the cemetery, made its way to the Sigismund Square, and there stationed itself in front of the palace occupied by the Imperial Lieutenant. The national hymn was sung; newspapers containing the Emperor's reply to the Warsaw address were burned; the crowd, summoned by several officers and called upon and entreated by Prince Gortchakoff himself to withdraw, refused to move; and, ultimately, when full warning had been given—but also when no act of violence had been committed—the Russians fired upon the unarmed people, and from time to time renewed the slaughter until at last the square was evacuated. On this, as on so many other occasions of the same kind, the utmost fortitude was displayed by the Poles. Very few left the square in obedience

to the summons of the Russian officers. The vast majority remained, knelt down, and sang the patriotic hymn. The leaders of the manifestations exhorted the timid to be firm, and here and there joined hands to prevent their departure. Some were actually attracted to the spot by the first discharge. Among others, a Jewish student named Landé joined the crowd after the firing had begun, and was raising a wounded man * from the ground when he was himself struck to the heart. Thus the people of Warsaw protested with terrible earnestness against the dominion of Russia in Poland.

This was the third, the most bloody, and also the last of the massacres committed in Warsaw during the stormy period which preceded the insurrection of 1863. For five weeks before, from March 2nd until April 7th, the city had been given up entirely to the Poles, and order had been preserved by the exertions of a body of Polish special constables. But tranquillity had prevailed

* This man is said by some to have been a priest; by others (whom I believe to be better informed), a leading member of the party of action disguised as a priest.

in consequence, above all, of a general belief that the Emperor of Russia would make important concessions to Poland. When his Majesty's answer to the address was received, and the order destroying the Agricultural Society was made known, the demonstrations began again in full force, and it was impossible now to persuade the party of action that anything was to be gained by remaining quiet and laying the grievances of the nation before the Emperor. The moderate party lost all influence, and the first result of the renewed agitation was the massacre of April 8th, and a renewed occupation of the streets of Warsaw by Russian troops, whose numbers had now been increased from 5,000 to 13,000.

The general who at the battle of the Alma had led in person the charge of the Vladimir regiment, which lost 48 officers and 1,300 men* in the course of the action, and who at Warsaw had ordered his soldiers to fire volley after volley upon an unarmed, unresisting crowd, did not long survive his disgrace. The grief which had preyed upon Prince Gortchakoff was visible in his last

* Todleben's *History of the Crimean War.*

instructions. He gave orders on his death-bed that his body should be carried from Warsaw, and buried in the town of Sebastopol, which he had defended to the last extremity, and where it would have been well for him had he fallen. He lived to be placed in a position which no man of honour could occupy with advantage, and where the Russians charge him with having invited a revolt by his excessive mildness, while the Poles accuse him of having provoked it by his harshness and cruelty.

CHAPTER V.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE AND THE EXILE OF COUNT ANDREW ZAMOYSKI.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF was succeeded at Warsaw by General Soukhozanet, who was succeeded by Count Lambert, who was succeeded by General Luders, who was succeeded by the Grand Duke Constantine. Before Count Lambert's nomination, and immediately after the communication of the Emperor's reply to the Warsaw address, the division between the two parties, the moderate and the extreme—otherwise, in common parlance, the white and the red—had become more clearly marked than ever, and the publication of all the details of the project of reform, by which the arrival of Count Lambert was heralded, gave rise to an animated discussion between them. *What am I to do with these Concessions?* was the title of a pamphlet issued from the secret press of the

'reds,' in which it was maintained that the concessions already granted amounted to nothing, and, moreover, that no concessions ought to be accepted for the kingdom of Poland which were not at the same time extended to the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire. The 'whites,' on the other hand, argued in their clandestine journal, the 'Watchman' ('Strajnica'), that, such as they were, the reforms or concessions offered to the kingdom of Poland ought not to be rejected. The result of the discussion was that the elections for the district and municipal councils took place. The extremest of the extreme party protested in vain. They even sought to intimidate the electors, and at Warsaw it was only through the exertions of 'Lelewel'*—a man of action, but also a man of sense—that the voting could be proceeded with. 'Lelewel' was present, with some hundreds of the men who were afterwards to form his insurgent band, and it was they, under his direction, who kept order in the crowd and restrained the more violent and precipitate of the 'action' party.

* i. e, Borelowski, the iron-worker.

The following were now the views of the four parties or sections of parties in Warsaw :—

1. The men who wished to hasten the insurrection, and who thought it had already been too long delayed, regarded the concessions made by Russia as unsatisfactory, and indeed as illusory, and not worthy even to be taken into consideration.

2. The men who were preparing for the insurrection, but who also did not wish to be premature in resorting to arms, regarded the concessions as unimportant, though, at the same time, they thought it their duty not to separate from the moderate party.

3. The plan of the moderate party consisted in accepting whatever little reforms the Russians could be got to yield, and in pressing them continually to yield more and more.

4. The Wielopolski party was still very small, but there were a certain number of men, chiefly among the large landed proprietors, who really believed in the utility of the new reforms, and were opposed to all agitation in favour of further concessions, at least for the present, as useless and, moreover, dangerous.

The municipal elections took place at Warsaw on September 22, 1861. Men of all classes and conditions were chosen, from Count Andrew Zamoyski to Hiszpanski,* the bootmaker. So far the counsels of the moderate party had prevailed, though no sooner had the municipal councillors been chosen than a protest, drawn up by the extreme party, and setting forth that the slight reforms granted by the Emperor to the kingdom of Poland alone were insufficient, was handed to Count Andrew Zamoyski by the student Leon Frankowski. The demonstrations—sure, sooner or later, to lead to another collision—recommenced immediately afterwards. On October 10th the union between Poland, Lithuania, and Ruthenia † was celebrated at Horodlo, on the

* Hiszpanski was highly esteemed as an honest man, a good bootmaker, and an exile who had suffered in Siberia under the Emperor Nicholas. When I was in Warsaw for the first time, in 1861, Hiszpanski had many Russian officers among his customers. It was considered 'liberal' to buy boots at his establishment.

† 'Ruthenia' is the name given by the Poles to the south-eastern division of ancient Poland and south-western of modern Russia, comprising the provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff, in which the peasant population is

Bug, by an immense concourse of persons from all parts of the territory of the old Polish republic.

At the same time the manifestations began again in Warsaw. The state of siege was proclaimed. The day afterwards, October 15th, religious services were performed in the principal churches of the city in memory of Kosciuszko. The government had forbidden the celebration, and at ten o'clock, mass having been commenced, the churches were surrounded by troops. Eighteen hours afterwards, during which time a strict siege had been maintained, the soldiers, at four in the morning, entered the churches, seized several thousand persons, and carried them off to the citadel.

'The deeds of profanation committed yester-

Ruthenian, or, ethnologically speaking, Russian—but not Great Russian, or 'Muscovite.' Lithuania is the north-eastern division of ancient Poland and north-western of modern Russia, comprising the provinces of Wilna, Kovno, Grodno, Minsk, Mohilew, and Witepsk. In Lithuania the peasant population is Ruthenian, mixed with Lithuanian. But the civilisation of both Lithuania and Ruthenia is entirely Polish—as that of Brittany is French, that of Wales English.

day,' said the Vicar-General of the diocese, the day following, in a letter to the Emperor's lieutenant, 'have filled the inhabitants of the entire country, to whatever religious denomination they belong, with indignation and horror. *Acts such as these are beyond the reach of language, and carry us back to the times of Attila.*'

It would be impossible to characterise the conduct of the Russians on this occasion more justly than in the words of the Vicar-General. To mark their sense of the outrage that had been committed, and to guard against the possibility of its being repeated, the Consistory ordered that every church in Warsaw should be closed. The Russian government replied, in its own peculiar style, by sentencing the Vicar-General (Bialobrzeski) to death. His punishment was afterwards commuted to imprisonment in Siberia. After the arrival of the Grand Duke Constantine in Warsaw, as the Emperor's lieutenant, he was recalled from Siberia; and he was again arrested and imprisoned by General Berg after the Grand Duke's departure. By what law he was sentenced to

death, by what law exiled, by what law re-imprisoned after his return from exile, it would be difficult to say.

In the meanwhile Count Lambert, himself a catholic, had had a violent altercation with General Gerstenschewig, the military commandant, by whose directions the churches had been besieged, invaded, and cleared. The end of the dispute—as to the exact nature of which very little is known—was that General Gerstenschewig blew his brains out. Count Lambert went away from Warsaw, and even from Europe, and General Luders was nominated in his place.

The reds had now their regular organisation, as well as the whites. The organisation of the white party was based on that of the late Agricultural Society. It had groups of members among the landed proprietors of every district in the kingdom, and its affairs were directed by a committee of three, sitting at Warsaw. This party had already considerable funds at its disposal, including the subscriptions received from the members of the Agricultural Society, the proceeds of various collections made after religious

celebrations in the churches at Warsaw and in the provinces, as well as contributions from other sources.

It was not until after the municipal elections, and the triumph of the moderate party, that the extreme men of the party of action resolved to count their forces, to appoint leaders, to levy taxes, and to establish a national directing committee, which ultimately undertook, and really performed, the functions of a regular government. The first meeting of the chiefs of this party had been fixed for October 15, 1861, the very day on which the churches were besieged. The chiefs were to have assembled at the Leipsic Hotel at twelve o'clock, immediately after the service in memory of Kosciuszko. When the time came very few of them arrived, the others being shut up in the churches, whence they were conducted the next morning to the citadel. Of the three or four thousand persons arrested, however, the greater number, including all the women, were set free the same morning. Many of the others were let out after a short detention, and on the evening of the 17th the meeting at the Leipsic Hotel took

place in the rooms of Count Ladislas Stroynowski, and was attended by eighteen of the most energetic members of the party of action. Among those present who afterwards played a prominent part in the insurrection I may mention Leon Frankowski, one of the first chiefs captured and executed by the Russians, and Stephen Bobrowski, who signed with his own name the first proclamation issued by the national government after the defeat of Langiewicz, and who soon afterwards fell in a duel, of which the nomination of Langiewicz to the dictatorship was the cause.

At the meeting of October 7, 1861, it was resolved to organise a 'national committee,' which was the origin of the 'Central National Committee,' which, after the appeal to arms, united with the directing committee of the moderate or 'white' party, out of which combination the first 'national government' was formed. A plan was drawn up in writing, in which it was specified that the committee should be divided into three sections—one for the propagation of patriotic ideas, and for making known the general decisions of the committee; a second for financial matters, and

for the preparation of circulars and addresses; a third for enrolling and arming intending combatants. Each of these sections was directed by a chief, to whom an assistant was attached, capable, if necessary, of replacing him.

The first section started a secret journal called the 'Awakening,' which, in spite of the efforts of the police to stop it, found its way into all the towns and even villages in the kingdom.

The second section collected subscriptions, and sent out stamped papers asking for them in the name of the National Committee. The stamp (which was afterwards adopted by the National Government) displayed the arms of the ancient Polish republic; the White Eagle of Poland and the Horseman of Lithuania appearing side by side. It was not until after the insurrection that a third shield was added between the two others, representing St. George of Ruthenia.*

* There are several millions of Ruthenian peasants (i. e. of the Russian, but not of the Great-Russian or Muscovite race) in Lithuania, and also in the eastern portion of Galicia, and in Hungary. But what the Poles in the present day generally understand by 'Ruthenia' is (as I have before observed) the three south-eastern provinces of ancient Poland or south-western provinces of modern Russia, i. e. Volhynia, Podolia, and Kieff.

The third section did what it could in the way of making enlistments for the bands and arranging for the purchase of arms, which, for the most part, had to be ordered from abroad.

On October 17, 1861, when the formation of the National Committee was first decided upon, the party of action, which the committee was to represent, had only a sum of from five to six hundred pounds at its disposal. Of this, a little more than half had been collected after a religious service ordered by some government officials * in memory of those who fell in the massacres, and the remainder after two similar services ordered respectively by the association of hackney-coachmen and the association of house porters. The Polish insurrection of 1863 has been called an aristocratic movement; but the porters and cab-drivers of Warsaw were getting up subscriptions in furtherance of the insurrection at a time when the pru-

* I need scarcely say that these officials were Poles. The administration in the kingdom of Poland has always been Polish, as regards the persons employed; and this (except indeed in the superior offices) even when Polish had ceased to be the official language.

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dent landed proprietors were doing all in their power to stop it.

When the financial section had once commenced its labours, money soon came in; and after some months' propagandism, in the month of May 1862, the National Committee felt itself in a position to impose a general tax, payable in the month of November—when it was in fact levied.

In the meanwhile, the members of sections had met from time to time to report progress to the chiefs and sub-chiefs remaining at Warsaw. At the first meeting of all—on the evening of October 17th, or rather morning of the 18th, 1861—it had been decided that two months afterwards a second general meeting should be held; and on December 18th the eighteen members of the National Committee re-assembled at a house close to the terminus of the Warsaw and Cracow Railway. From the reports of the delegates sent into the provinces, it appeared that no further propagandism was required in the 'kingdom,' where, according to general testimony, public opinion was everywhere prepared for the insurrection. In the early part of the year 1862 provincial committees

were formed in communication with and under the direction of the National Committee, which then became in fact the 'Central National Committee.' It adopted this name in the month of October; or rather in that month the 'National Committee' was dissolved and a 'Central National Committee' reorganised in its place, and on a wider basis.

As soon as the National Committee issued its stamped papers summoning all Poles to recognise its authority and contribute by payment of a fixed tax to the expenses of the coming insurrection (end of May and beginning of June 1862), the Russian Government, which had made no recruitment since the year 1856, resolved to execute a forced levy and to carry off to the army all Poles suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy which evidently existed, though the police were quite unable to discover the chiefs or indeed to gain precise information of any kind respecting it.

Leon Frankowski, the most active of all the revolutionary agents, and a Swiss named Baumegard, governor of the young Count Starzynski,

now made it their special business to warn the country of the danger which menaced it, and of which information had been conveyed to the committee through a secret channel. According to some members of the committee, the only way to escape the blow was to take up arms before it could be struck; and it was decided that in any case the execution of the forced recruitment must be regarded as the signal for a general rising. These views were expressed in a short paper entitled 'National Appeal,' which bore the stamp of the Warsaw Committee, and was circulated throughout Poland.

The police did their utmost to discover the authors, printers, and distributors of this warlike summons, and somehow or other got on the track of Baumegard, who was staying with Count Starzynski at Hrubieszow. Officers and soldiers had entered the place and were about to seize him, when the young Count, who was much attached to his tutor, drew a revolver and shot down three of the party. During the confusion produced by this sudden and vigorous attack, the Count urged and entreated Baumegard to make

his escape, but in vain. Baumegard, from a feeling of personal dignity, would not leave the young man. Then, seeing there was no hope either for himself or for his tutor, Starzynski, in despair, blew his brains out. Baumegard was arrested, marched off, and thrown into the citadel.

That same summer the fortress of Modlin is said to have been nearly falling into the hands of the intending insurgents. It contained an immense quantity of arms and ammunition, and if the leaders of the extreme party could have gained possession of the place, the signal of the insurrection would have been given at once.

One thing is certain, that a conspiracy of some kind was discovered among the officers of the garrison, and that two of them, Arnold and Sliwicki (one a Finlander, the other a Pole), together with a Polish non-commissioned officer, were shot. A large number of officers and sub-officers, concerned or suspected of being concerned in the plot, were sent to Siberia.

Immediately after the executions, General Luders, commander-in-chief of the army, and acting for the time as lieutenant of the kingdom,

was fired at and wounded, the ball shattering his jaw in the most horrible manner. The period of assassination had now begun. Not only were spies and officials who had rendered themselves odious in the discharge of their functions stabbed openly in the streets, but when the Grand Duke Constantine arrived in Warsaw, on what was known to be a mission of pacification, a poor fanatic who had placed himself at the service of a clique of unscrupulous revolutionists was put forward to take his life, and succeeded in wounding him with a pistol shot. The fanatic, Jaroszinski by name, did not attempt to escape, nor did he for one moment deny what he had done. He was hanged, though the Grand Duke is said to have been personally desirous that the capital sentence should be commuted.

It was mentioned in favour of Jaroszinski, that he abstained from firing on the Grand Duke on the occasion of his entry into Warsaw, out of consideration for the Grand Duchess, who was with her husband in the same carriage. The man seemed to be inspired by no feeling of hatred; but he had asked in what manner he could best serve

his country, and his criminal advisers had replied, that he must shoot the Grand Duke Constantine—who had come to Warsaw to re-establish the university, which had been closed for thirty years, to increase the number of gymnasiums in the kingdom from five to thirteen, to found schools for the peasantry, to restore publicity of trial in the tribunals, and to apply the principle of autonomy so strictly in the administration, that not one Russian was allowed to remain a member of it. The whole administration was not, it is true, changed from Russian to Polish, for it was almost entirely Polish before; but three Russians acting as civil governors were replaced by Poles, and about eighty such changes were made in minor offices.

The kingdom of Poland is rich in functionaries, and possesses, according to the official *Year-Book*, upwards of 7,000. The entire number, however, counting clerks not recognised as belonging to the public service, amounts to about 11,000, and nearly all of those were Poles before the arrival of the Grand Duke at Warsaw. Nevertheless, the Russian notion on the subject is that the Marquis Wielopolski, the author of the reforms, and their

proposer and advocate at St. Petersburgh, got rid of an immense number of Russian officials, that he did so in order to prepare the way for the Polish National Government, and that in this he was countenanced by the Grand Duke Constantine. The Grand Duke is accused of having trifled with the interests of Russia, just as the Marquis Wielopolski is charged with having sacrificed those of Poland. In these contradictory and irreconcilable accusations, we can read the fate of any man who, either on the Russian or on the Polish side, seeks to act as a mediator between Russians and Poles.* The Polish Marquis was looked upon as a traitor, and so was the Russian Grand Duke. Each lost reputation among his own countrymen, and neither gained the goodwill even of his country's enemies. If (as the Russians said) the Grand Duke wished to do so much for the Poles at the expense of the Russians, the Poles, nevertheless, could not perceive it. If (as

* I found, in my own humble sphere, that because I endeavoured to take, I will not say an impartial, but a just view of what was going on in Poland, the Polish newspapers regarded me as a Russian apologist, while the Russian ones described me as a Polish enthusiast and fanatic.

the Poles said) the aim of the Marquis was to attach the kingdom of Poland more firmly than ever to the Russian Empire, the Russians thought he went a strange way to work, and that the ultimate result of his measures would be something very different indeed.

On the whole, the Russians, as well as the Austrians, and above all the Prussians, understood the importance of the Wielopolski reforms much better than the Poles. Those Russians who attached an extreme importance to them saw that Poland would be separated from Russia by its government, and did not believe that it could ever become attached to it by ties of sympathy, or even by a feeling of common interest. They also perceived that the kingdom of Poland, with its Polish administration, its Polish university and gymnasiums, its Polish Council of State, and district, and municipal councils, would soon become a centre of attraction to the Poles of the Polish provinces, incorporated with the Russian Empire, and would help to develope and strengthen the Polish or civilised element in those provinces.

The Prussians thought that the 'kingdom,' under the Wielopolski system, would exercise too much influence on Posen, and, from the very beginning of the agitation in Warsaw, advised the Russian Government not to make concessions, but to assume a decided attitude, and restore order by military means.

As to the Austrians, I remember an Austrian general, well versed in the politics of eastern Europe, saying to me some time after the Poles had taken up arms: 'The Poles think they know their own interests, but we also think we know ours; and when we found that Wielopolski's scheme was rejected, we could not contain ourselves for joy. If the system devised by the Marquis had been adopted by his countrymen, the "kingdom" would have become so intensely Polish, and would have exercised such an irresistible attraction on all the other portions of ancient Poland, that in a few years Galicia, aided by the Poles of the kingdom and by the Russians, would have been lost to Austria.'

In England, though the state of Poland was being constantly discussed in and out of Parliament, the Wielopolski reforms were scarcely ever mentioned; or if by chance they were alluded to, they were undervalued or even misrepresented. Speakers in Parliament little knew the harm they were doing to the Poles by indirectly, and no doubt unintentionally, encouraging them to maintain a defiant attitude towards Russia—instead of urging them to accept whatever Russia had to offer, and impressing upon them above all that if they appealed to arms they would be left, as far as England was concerned, to fight alone. This would have seemed heartless at the time, but it would in reality have been less heartless than the course that was pursued. It was imagined, I believe, that by dwelling with more or less eloquence on the sufferings of the Poles, it might be possible to shame the Russians into making very important concessions to them. With that idea many well-meaning men delivered speeches on the subject of Poland when they had really nothing to say. It was considered a good thing, however, to

let the Russian Government perceive that the eyes of Western Europe were upon it.

What the Russian Government must also have perceived was that, as regarded Poland, the West of Europe had eyes, but saw not; and it concluded that the West of Europe, as represented by the parliamentary assemblies of France and England, did not wish to see; and that it was simply animated by a blind hatred of Russia, and a desire to weaken her by irritating as much as possible the seemingly incurable Polish wound.

Now England has no special policy in respect to Poland. In 1814 Lord Castlereagh declared that it was the earnest desire of England to see Poland re-established as an independent state, with the limits of 1772; and that England was willing to make sacrifices in favour of such a result. But he did not think it was the duty of England (and certainly not her interest) to go to war on the question, provided always Russia would give up a certain portion of Poland. It was only in the event of Russia insisting on keeping the whole that Lord Castlereagh was ready to declare war,

in conjunction with France and Austria, and on behalf of European civilisation.*

Russia's position in Poland having been definitely pushed back, the only aim of the English Government in connexion with Poland was that

* In spite of the British Radicals' belief that Lord Castlereagh admired Russian despotism, and was fascinated by the Emperor Alexander, the fact is, Lord Castlereagh, whatever he may have thought of the Emperor's personal qualities (which, however, were not likely to make much impression on that clear-headed, high-minded, and quite unsentimental statesman), regarded Russia as an essentially barbarous power, which is certainly not the opinion of our utilitarian Radicals in the present day. 'If,' wrote Lord Castlereagh on November 11, 1814, from Vienna, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in London, 'His Imperial Majesty shall change his tone and make a reasonable arrangement of frontier on the side of Poland; if he shall allow the other European arrangements to be equitably settled, including those of Holland, and alter his tariff besides; then, my dear Vansittart, I must come upon you for my pound of flesh; or, if I do not stop his power on the Vistula and it breaks loose and carries everything before it to the Meuse, I cannot answer for the consequences. I only beg you will believe I shall do my best to save your purse. The engagements with Holland shall be no obstacle to this, as I had rather give the Prince of Orange something more to defend and fortify the Low Countries than *assist the credit of a Calmuck Prince to overturn Europe.*'—*Castlereagh Correspondence*, x. 200.

the condition of the Poles under their foreign governments should be rendered as tolerable as possible; and since the re-arrangement of the Russian frontier by the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw, the whole of which, during the French retreat from Moscow, had fallen into Russian hands, neither England nor France has ever maintained that Poland ought to be restored by force of arms to her ancient independence, but only that she ought to be ruled in accordance with the principles laid down in the treaties of 1815—principles, by the way, that Prussia, Austria, and Russia have all equally violated. Accordingly, it was the duty of English statesmen, knowing what our policy is, and also what it is not, to welcome and applaud any approximation on the part of the Russians towards good government in Poland. And it was anything but their duty to celebrate and praise the Polish manifestations which, however interesting in themselves, were sure, sooner or later, to lead the Poles into a danger from which *we*, at least, were not likely to rescue them.

Now, how did it happen that the Poles themselves, who must be allowed to know something of their own affairs, could not bring themselves to accept the reforms procured for Poland by the Marquis Wielopolski? The Poles of the extreme party say plainly that they desired an insurrection. Such being the case, they naturally detested the Marquis, who wished above all things to avoid a conflict with Russia, and who had managed to persuade the Russian Government to make valuable concessions to the Poles, in the hope of conciliating and appeasing them.

But the so-called 'moderate' Poles, who were glad to receive permission to found an agricultural society in 1858; who presented an address in vague terms, more of lamentation than of petition, on behalf of the kingdom of Poland alone in 1861, but who in 1862 could only support the government on condition of the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire being detached from Russia in an administrative sense, and united to the kingdom of Poland under a Polish constitutional system—how was it that *they* were unwilling to give support to the Marquis,

when by withholding it they virtually encouraged the men who were hurrying the country as fast as possible towards a fatal rebellion?

To understand this it is necessary, I fancy, to be a Pole, and to have felt what the Poles have felt under the government of foreigners. The small substantial good offered to them was nothing compared to the shadowy prospect of national independence, which since the liberation of Italy had haunted their vision more than ever. The Italians of Lombardy had looked for nothing, had asked for nothing, from Austria; and in due time the sovereign whose supposed mission it is to raise up suffering nationalities in all parts of Europe had set them free. How was it possible that he should forget the Poles, and that at the proper moment he should not strike a blow in favour of Poland? To accept the Wielopolski reforms fully and frankly would have been to abandon this chance; and as far as I can make out, that was the essential reason why they were received with so little favour.

That there were faults on the Russian side it would be superfluous to add. Russia's rule in

Poland has been a series not of faults but of crimes. From the accession of Alexander II., however, until the breaking out of the insurrection, the intentions of the Government, and of Russians generally, towards Poland were, at least, not what they had been during the previous reign. But, unfortunately, Russia did not make all the concessions she intended to make until it was almost too late to make any at all. The massacres in the streets of Warsaw, the besieging of the churches, the constant arrests, the number of persons sent into exile—all this could not be forgotten because a Russian Grand Duke had arrived in Warsaw to introduce administrative reforms, to found Polish assemblies, and to re-establish the Warsaw university. 'Your father suppressed three universities,'* the Poles might have said to him, 'and for a quarter of a century endeavoured systematically to abolish Polish education.'

The Grand Duke felt this himself. He had read in the works of Polish authors the history of the war of 1830, and of the mode in which the

* The universities of Warsaw and Wilna (Lithuania), and the High School of Krzemeniec (Volhynia).

Poles were afterwards governed, and he observed, as he was conversing with a Pole, soon after the attempt made upon his life: 'I understand why they fired upon me. It was not for anything *I* had done, for I had only just arrived in Warsaw.'

It is not at all clear to me that hatred of the Emperor Nicholas alone caused the attempt; and I am inclined to think that the small party of determined revolutionists who directed it wished it simply to be understood that reconciliation between Russia and Poland was impossible, and not to be thought of. By the great majority of the Warsaw population the crime of Jaroszinski was of course disavowed and deplored, and every man of any position in Warsaw went to the castle to enquire personally after the Grand Duke's health.

The attempt on the Grand Duke's life was followed by no special measures of repression, such as were taken by Louis Philippe after the attempt of Fieschi, and by Napoleon III. after that of Orsini; and his Imperial Highness published a proclamation, in which he assured the Poles that he did not consider them responsible for the acts of an individual malefactor, but at the same time

called upon them to support his government, and directed their attention in emphatic terms to the critical position of the country.

It was resolved to reply to the proclamation, and between 300 and 400 of the principal landed proprietors met, and drew up an address, in which they assured the Grand Duke that they did not refuse their support to the new institutions given to the 'kingdom,' but that they must be extended to the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian Empire. If these provinces were united to the kingdom of Poland,* under a Polish administration and with a constitution, the address

* Let me once more remind the reader that the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, otherwise north-western and south-western provinces of Russia, are the provinces seized at the first, second, and third partitions of Poland; and that the so-called kingdom of Poland is the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw annexed to Russia in 1815, *minus* a large fragment (Galicia) thrown as a sop to Austria, and a smaller one (Posen) thrown as a sop to Prussia. The astonishing discovery was made, during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas, that the provinces seized by Russia at the three partitions of the eighteenth century were not Polish at all, but Russian. Neither the Emperor Alexander I., nor the Emperor Paul, nor the Empress Catherine II., had the least suspicion of this.

promised that the Poles would loyally and cordially cooperate in the government of the country. Otherwise they would be unable to take part in it, 'for as Poles they could only love their country in the limits given to it by God, and consecrated by history.' The address recognised the dangerous position of affairs, and predicted great calamities, which could only be averted by the adoption of the above measures.

This address was taken to Count Andrew Zamoyski, who was invited to present it to the Grand Duke as an answer to his proclamation. Count Zamoyski refused to do anything of the kind. He at last, however, agreed to accept it, on the understanding that he might make whatever use he thought fit of the contents; but he never agreed to present to the Grand Duke a formal demand for the annexation of the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire to the kingdom of Poland.

News had reached the Grand Duke that an address had been entrusted to Count Andrew Zamoyski for presentation, and its contents had even been communicated to him. Now the

Grand Duke had nothing whatever to do with the Polish provinces, and could only listen to suggestions made to him with respect to the government of the kingdom. That the Poland partitioned in the eighteenth century was thoroughly Polish by its civilisation, and remains so to this moment (with the exception of some towns and districts in Prussian Poland where Germans have penetrated and settled, but without Germanising the original inhabitants), is undoubtedly true. It is true, also, that by the treaties of 1815 the Poles of all the provinces composing the Poland of 1772 are promised 'national and representative institutions;' that the Emperor Alexander assured numbers of Poles that it was his intention to unite the Polish provinces under his rule to the newly formed 'kingdom;' and that in order to be in a position to do so, with the consent of Europe, His Majesty caused a clause to be inserted in the Act relative to his title, by which he 'reserved to himself the right of giving to this state, enjoying a distinct administration, the internal extension (l'extension intérieure) that he might think proper.' That is to say, he reserved

to himself the right of enlarging his constitutional kingdom of Poland by joining to it the Polish provinces contiguous to it on the Russian side.*

But it is useless for the Poles to appeal either to their natural rights, or to the rights guaranteed to them by treaties, or to promises made to them by Russian sovereigns, whether positively or only by implication. Treated justly, they would never have been partitioned; treated justly, the effects of the partition would, as far as possible, be effaced even now. This is not what the Russian Government desires. Its great aim is by fair or by foul means to keep the Poles quiet in the central 'kingdom of Poland,' and it seems to me that the Poles would have done well to take what was offered to them in a conciliatory spirit two years ago. It was good in itself, it was

* Our Foreign Office has taken the trouble to translate this document, and, not understanding it, has translated it wrong. It renders 'extension intérieure' by 'internal developement.' But the French word '*extension*' means 'extension,' not developement; and in this particular instance meant territorial extension, and could mean nothing else. (See the translation of the French documents in the correspondence on Polish Affairs laid before Parliament, last page).

far more than they had ever had for thirty years before, and it was the utmost that they were likely to get, at least for a time, and until the complete restoration of tranquillity. Moreover, a benefit to one section of Poland is a benefit to Poland in general, and all Poles would have profited directly or indirectly by the new Polish life that would have been awakened in the kingdom. It would surely have been better to have this little Poland, which at some more or less distant day would have grown bigger, than to have no Poland at all.

In the meanwhile the Grand Duke Constantine had sent for Count Andrew Zamoyski, and an animated conversation took place between them on the subject of the address, which the Grand Duke maintained it was Count Zamoyski's intention to present, though as has been already explained, he had only accepted it for himself under certain conditions, and with the understanding that it was not to be presented at all.

At a previous interview the Grand Duke had asked Count Andrew for 'some notions' in reference to the government of Poland, and on the

latter replying in general terms (as, for instance, that the Grand Duke before taking any new measure should ask himself whether it was likely to benefit or to injure the Poles), had pressed him for 'details.' Count Andrew, also, I believe, called the attention of His Imperial Highness to the fact that a Cossack whipping his way through the streets, sometimes along the pavement, was a sight peculiar to Warsaw, or at least to Poland; and expressed his conviction that His Imperial Highness could have seen nothing of the kind in other European cities. It may be fairly said that the Grand Duke was willing to receive suggestions, as he was most certainly anxious to obtain support, from the principal men in the kingdom of Poland, provided these suggestions related to the kingdom of Poland alone. But to propose the annexation of the Polish provinces to the kingdom was in Russian eyes a treasonable offence—an offence, moreover, of which there had lately been two examples in the provinces themselves,* and which the govern-

* The nobility of the district of Rogaczew in the 'government' of Mohilew, and the nobility of the whole 'govern-

ment had in each instance condemned 'as a project for the dismemberment of the Russian Empire.' For being suspected of intending to present an address in favour of this project, Count Andrew Zamoyski, in accordance with instructions received by telegraph, was ordered to proceed to St. Petersburgh to give an account of his conduct to the Emperor. He was accompanied to the Russian capital by a military escort, and on his arrival was summoned to an interview with the Emperor, which lasted some hours.

On this occasion Count Zamoyski did not fail to press upon his Majesty with all possible earnestness the acceptance of this proposal contained in the address. He entreated his Majesty to do justice to the Poles, and make himself a name in history by his magnanimity. The Emperor entered into an historical discussion with Count Andrew as to the real claims of the Poles upon the disputed provinces, arguing that if in the

ment' or province of Podolia, had petitioned for annexation to the kingdom of Poland; in consequence of which the Marshal of Rogaczew and all the Marshals of Podolia were imprisoned.

eighteenth century they belonged to Poland, they for the most part belonged four centuries before to Russia. The Count replied that in the fourteenth century no 'Russia' existed, but only a number of duchies or principalities, which though inhabited by a Russian population, in an ethnological sense, were bound together by no political ties, and formed no political unity deserving the name of a state.*

A political question of pressing and vital importance can scarcely be settled by historical arguments extending over a period of five centuries; and the historical discussion between the Emperor Alexander II. and Count Andrew Zamoyski led to no political result. Nor was it to be expected that any political result would be

* These principalities were governed by chiefs of the same family; and the head of the family ruled first at Kieff, then at Vladimir, then at Souzdal, then at Moscow. During the Tartar invasions the western duchies, for the most part, became united to Poland, either through their own chiefs or through Lithuanian conquerors, but always on terms of perfect equality with the more civilised nation; while the grand duchy of Moscow, founded among a half-Finnish population, and developed under the supreme government of Tartar chiefs, grew into a semi-oriental despotism.

arrived at. Alexander II. would doubtless never have planned the partition of Poland. It was equally certain that whatever his own historical and other convictions might be, he would not undo the work of his predecessors, and in spite of the advice of his ministers, the feelings of his people, and the traditional policy of his empire, give back to the Poles provinces which, though still retained under the Russian sceptre, would have been lost to Russia by being openly acknowledged to belong, in a national sense, to Poland.

The end of Count Zamoyski's interview with the Emperor was that he was recommended to go to the west of Europe, not by way of punishment, or his destination would have been eastward. Indeed Count Zamoyski had not been, and could not be, charged with having committed even an illegal action. He was told, however, that he was being put forward as the agent of a party, and that it would be better for him and for his country that he should remain for a time away from Poland.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MARQUIS WIELOPOLSKI AND THE CONSCRIPTION.

After Count Zamoyski's exile the party of action was joined by many who had previously belonged to the moderate party; and Poles of the moderate party declare now that had Count Zamoyski been allowed to remain in Warsaw his influence would have been sufficient to prevent the insurrection taking place at all.

That Count Andrew Zamoyski *did* possess great influence among all classes in Poland is quite certain; but I also believe that he would have lost it had he tried to exercise it on behalf of the Wielopolski government. The Russian Minister of the Interior, in his secret report to the Emperor,* on the state of the 'western provinces' (i. e. Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire), mentions that on the

* See Appendix, No. 3.

occasion of Count Andrew Zamoyski's visiting one of the family domains in Lithuania, he was met by a crowd, composed of persons of all classes, who welcomed him with cries of 'Long live Zamoyski, the first gentleman in Poland.'

Count Andrew is known to all his countrymen as the worthy descendant of the Zamoyski who, as Grand Chancellor of the Republic, refused to sign and never did sign the treaty of partition. To him there is no Poland but the Poland of 1772; and I have always heard it said of Count Andrew Zamoyski that his name and the history of his family rendered it impossible for him to take part in any government of Russian origin in Poland—except, indeed, on such conditions as Russia will positively not accede to. Count Andrew Zamoyski was of course opposed to the insurrection; but he was also opposed to the only man who, had he been adequately supported, might have given a new direction to affairs, and have rendered the insurrection impossible. It is in vain, however, to struggle against a strong national feeling. The Poles would make no compact with Russia; and long

before the arbitrary conscription had been decided upon, the Marquis Wielopolski was hated because his constant endeavour was, on the one hand, to gain concessions from Russia, and on the other to get these concessions accepted by the Poles. Ultimately the Russians are believed to have said to him: 'The more we give, the more the agitation in Warsaw increases, and the more inevitable the threatened insurrection seems to become. The Emperor does not object to make the further concessions which you still ask for, but first of all we must have tranquillity re-established in the country, and towards this you make no advance.'

In the meanwhile a certain number of Poles, chiefly, if not exclusively, among the large landed proprietors, *did* enter into the Marquis Wielopolski's views, and endeavoured to give the government of the Grand Duke Constantine at least a chance. A full and, as I have been told, very admirable memoir, drawn up by M. Wenglinski on the condition of the kingdom of Poland, was submitted to the Grand Duke, who had afterwards several interviews with M. Wenglinski on the subject. M. Wenglinski was one of

the ablest members of the Council of State, and had previously been one of the most distinguished members of the Agricultural Society. He was opposed to all insurrectionary projects, and was spoken of by his countrymen as an 'arch Conservator'—which did not prevent General Berg from exiling him after the Grand Duke's departure,* without the slightest evidence and by a mere administrative order, as a member of the National Government!

With the exception, however, of the members of the Council of State, the chief functionaries and a certain number of the principal landed proprietors, the new system had very few adherents. The Marquis Wielopolski was completely misunderstood by the great body of his countrymen, as the Czartoryskis were misunderstood when they were pursuing a similar policy immediately before the first partition of Poland. In each case, however, it was necessary not only not to attack Russia, but to lean upon Russia for support; and to this the feeling of the country is as much and indeed more opposed now than it was a hundred

* Autumn of 1863.

years ago. The extreme party who, I fancy, *did* understand the Marquis's policy naturally detested it. Even among the moderate party there were many who disliked the Marquis personally, while others, who had nothing to say against his measures as far as they went, declared nevertheless that the Marquis was not the man to get them accepted by the nation. For in Poland it so happens that when a few concessions are asked for on behalf of the Poles (as at the Conference of Paris in 1856), Russia will not grant them. When Russia offers them (as in 1862), then the Poles will not accept them.

It also happened that the man who had at length succeeded in obtaining from the Russians reforms of a certain importance—of great importance when it is considered how they might have been developed, for give the Poles one inch of liberty and they will know how to stretch it to an ell—it so happened that this man was the very one who, above all others of the same rank, had no influence with his fellow-countrymen. He was unpopular among his own class, while the small nobility, the public functionaries as a body,

the Warsaw tradespeople, and the working men generally, mistrusted him—and indeed regarded him as nothing less than a traitor.

The Marquis Wielopolski was as ardent a patriot as any five-and-thirty years ago, and during the insurrection of 1830 believed it was possible for the Poles, aided by France and England, to recover their independence at the point of the sword. But are the Poles to expose themselves periodically to massacre, exile, confiscation, and all the horrors that are the sure consequences of an unsuccessful insurrection on the mere chance of France and England, or France alone, coming to their rescue? The Poles have long declared, and declare now, that the West of Europe will not and cannot abandon them. But what has the West of Europe done hitherto? When the insurrection of 1830 broke out, the Polish aristocracy (who were opposed to the movement as inexpedient until it was too late to stop it, and who then took the direction of it into their own hands) thought that Austria, England, and France might be induced to aid the Poles so as to raise up in Poland a barrier against Russia. This view may

have been based to some extent on general considerations, but was founded chiefly on the fact that in 1814 Austria, England, and France signed a secret treaty binding them to make war upon Russia, and to furnish each 150,000 men for that purpose in case Russia should persist in retaining *the whole* of Poland.

But Russia did *not* persist. In 1815, the Emperor Alexander accepted the frontier pressed upon him with so much earnestness by the three allies, and the Polish question, regarded as a European question, was looked upon as settled. In 1830, when it was again brought forward by the Poles themselves, the territorial settlement of 1815 was still all that the western powers really cared for. The Marquis Wielopolski had the opportunity of convincing himself of this when he came to London as the envoy of the Polish Government, and found that England would not go beyond diplomatic representations in favour of Poland, —while France was willing to go as far as England, but no further.

The only change in the attitude of England was that, whereas in 1814 and 1815 she had ob-

jected to the formation of a constitutional kingdom of Poland under the Russian sceptre, she now, in 1830, objected to the kingdom of Poland being deprived of its constitution, and with it, of its army, its national administration, and of all that since 1815 had given it at least the outward appearance of a separate state. It was feared in 1814 that the title of King of Poland would be a source of great strength to the Emperor of Russia, and that his Polish kingdom, with its diet, its army, its national colours, would form a centre to which the Polish subjects of Austria and Prussia would find themselves irresistibly attracted. Such at least was the opinion of Lord Castlereagh—though Prince Hardenberg, the representative of Prussia at the Vienna Congress, foresaw that a constitutional Poland would be a source of great trouble to a Russian despotic sovereign, and that his Polish would be hated by his Russian subjects on account of the exceptional privileges granted to them.*

Prince Hardenberg's anticipations were completely realised; and to me Russia's determination to withdraw a constitution which made the

* See Appendix, No. 4.

Russians jealous without conciliating the Poles seems natural enough. It is also very intelligible that England should not have cared to fight in 1831 for the maintenance of a state of things which she did not wish to see established at all in 1815, though the insurrection that had just broken out showed that the fears entertained in 1815 were not well grounded.

England wished well to Poland, no doubt; but not to the extent of going to war on her behalf. France wished well to Poland, and would go any length to assist her, provided always that England would accompany her—which she knew England would not do. Even Austria protested that she had never meant any harm to the Poles; and Count Andrew Zamoyski, who was sent to represent his country at Vienna when the Marquis Wielopolski was sent to London, had received assurances that Austria would always be ready to give up Galicia to an independent Poland, though never to a Poland governed by the Russians.

The Marquis Wielopolski seems to have lost all faith in foreign intervention in 1831, when, the opportunity presenting itself, no one could be

got to intervene. But there is no reason for supposing that he ceased to believe altogether in the possibility of a successful insurrection until after the total and immediate failure of the Galician attempt in 1846, when the Galician serfs, to the surprise of no one so much as of the Poles themselves, not only refused to join the projected national rising, but rose on their own account against their masters, whom they massacred to the number of many hundreds.* The serfs had been excited on the one hand by the emissaries of the Polish democratic party abroad, who promised them freedom and land as the price of their co-operation; and on the other by the Austrian officials, who represented the national movement as equally hostile to the peasantry and to the Austrian Emperor, and who rewarded the peasants in money for each proprietor killed or captured by them. It was then that the Marquis Wielopolski wrote his celebrated *Letter from a Polish gentleman to Prince Metternich*, in which, after setting forth in indignant terms the atrocious

* One thousand, according to the moderate computation of M. Bismarck von Schönhausen. (See Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Poland, part 1, p. 41.)

conduct of the Austrian Government, he called upon his countrymen to think no more of receiving assistance from the west of Europe, or of engaging in hopeless and ruinous contests with enemies who cared not what infamous means and what foul weapons they employed against them, but to extend the hand of friendship to Russia, when Russia, he maintained, would cease to persecute them, and would even aid them and help to rescue them from their German oppressors. Thus the *integrity* of Poland would be restored, and though Poland would not be independent, she at least would occupy an important position in the Russian empire, and would no longer be the most miserable and tormented country on the face of the earth.

The Marquis Wielopolski's letter met with a favourable response from the Galicia nobility—not that they loved Russia, but because they hated and abhorred the Austrian Government; and for some time afterwards there was a strong leaning on the part of the educated classes in Galicia towards Russia, and the idea of a united Poland under the Russian Government. In addition to the

political reason, it was imagined, I believe, that landed property was safer under the Russian than under the Austrian Government, which, after the murderous doings of 1846, had rewarded the Galician serfs by making them freeholders at the expense of the nobility. It was considered impossible, moreover, that a Russian sovereign could ever tolerate such scenes of anarchy and disorder as had been deliberately got up by the Austrian officials in Galicia;* and the Marquis Wielopolski had said that the Emperor Nicholas was 'too much of a gentleman' to inflame the passions of peasants against their proprietors.

On the whole, however, the Poles were not very anxious to throw themselves into the arms of Russia, and Russia, on her part, did not seem at all inclined to open her arms to receive them; indeed Russia has already more Poles in her embrace than she can conveniently hold.

In the meanwhile, the Marquis Wielopolski lived

* In Cracow, where the Poles, having the management of their own affairs, had abolished the peasants' task-work, and where, until the annexation of Cracow to Austria, there were no foreign officials, peasants and proprietors lived on perfectly harmonious terms.

in retirement on his own estate, appearing only in public from time to time to conduct a law-suit, of which he had several on hand, and in all of which he pleaded his own cause with remarkable energy and ability.

He thus required a litigious reputation—which, however, could scarcely have troubled him, as no one cared less than he seems to have done for the opinion of his fellow-countrymen. Probably no one in Poland has less of the ordinary Polish character than the Marquis Wielopolski. The Pole, generally speaking, is passionately fond of society; he is warm-hearted, demonstrative, and communicative even to indiscretion. The Marquis, on the other hand, shunned society. He was cold, haughty, reserved, and never conversed except with his most intimate friends. According to common report (which, however, always exaggerates), he scarcely received with ordinary politeness—certainly not with Polish politeness—the visitors who occasionally presented themselves at his house. He rarely, if ever, paid a visit himself, but lived shut up in his library, reading perpetually, and studying law, politics, history,

and at one time astronomy. He was so great a reader and mixed so little in real life that people said he was a mere theorist, and that he knew nothing of Poland or of politics but what he had learnt from books. That, after all, was something. He at least knew that the Poles ought not to count on foreign aid, and that even their own peasants would not help them in a struggle for national independence. He knew, moreover, that task-work existed in Poland, and that it was essentially necessary to abolish it; that there were no universities for the sons of rich Poles, and no schools of any kind for the children of the peasants.

At the same time, in a country where there is an immense deal of good-fellowship and where people do not willingly take offence, the Marquis certainly possessed the art of making himself disliked. This, as I have before remarked, in no way grieved him. Indeed, when immediately after his arrival in Warsaw with the last batch of reforms, he was told that he was at length becoming popular, he replied, with an air of surprise, 'What folly have I committed, then?'

Probably the Marquis Wielopolski talks as much as a great many Englishmen, but among Poles he passes for a marvellously silent man. On one occasion his countrymen relate in his favour that he kept silence for a quarter of an hour while some high Russian official read him a report in the Russian language. The report finished, the Marquis simply said, 'I do not understand Russian,' and turned his back.

It is also told of him that when he was at St. Petersburgh and was about to figure at a state reception, the master of the ceremonies was in some doubt as to what place ought to be assigned to him. The Marquis was not in the army. He was not in the Russian civil service, and held no official rank of any kind. How then, and in whose company, was he to enter the Imperial presence?

'Leave him to himself,' the Emperor is reported to have said, 'and he will know what to do.'

The Marquis, at the last moment, went gravely over to the body of foreign diplomatists, and appeared before the Emperor as if he, a Polish

minister, had no more to do with Russia than Lord Napier or the Duke of Montebello.

This last story is well known at Warsaw, but not at St. Petersburgh, and I have reason to believe that it is apocryphal.

But both the anecdotes that I have just told serve to exhibit the Marquis in a character in which he certainly did appear, and which convinced some of his countrymen that after all there were good points about him, and that a man who was so determined to have everything thoroughly Polish in the kingdom of Poland could not after all be a very fervent admirer of the Russians. Meditating on this matter, some went so far as to see in the Marquis a living repetition of the Lithuanian patriot, who, when his countrymen were suffering from the persecution of the Teutonic knights, contrived to enter the Teutonic order; and having arrived at length at the dignity of chief, led the army to certain destruction, and only at the last moment, and when he was about to die, revealed himself in his true Lithuanian character. But Mickiewicz's 'Conrad Wallenrod' is well known and thoroughly understood in Russia; and the

idea that the Marquis Wielopolski could only be supporting the Russian Government in order more surely to betray it was entertained there to a far greater extent than in Poland—where, indeed, it seems to have crossed the minds of only a very few. That the Marquis Wielopolski could be loyal to the Russian emperor and faithful to his own country; that he could seek to benefit Poland without wishing to destroy Russia—this is what scarcely any one in either country could be got to believe.

The first measure introduced by the Marquis Wielopolski was a very simple and excellent one for the abolition of task-work, by which a day's labour was made legally replaceable by its value in money. In other words, if the peasant did not like to work on the proprietor's land, he could pay a sum fixed by law instead; and thus the service ceased at once to be a hardship, for on very easy terms it could be avoided. Of the administrative and educational reforms which the Marquis introduced I have already spoken. These latter were scarcely noticed by the extreme party, but the law relating to the position of the

peasant was regarded by them as infamous, because it required him to pay rent.

The extreme party, as the reader is aware, proposed to give the peasants their holdings for nothing, by way of inducing them to join the insurrection; and some months before the insurrection broke out, emissaries were sent into the country to inform them of the favours that awaited their acceptance. The revolutionists showed the utmost liberality in giving away land that did not belong to them, and this caused the Marquis to declare that the movement which was in preparation, and which he had now resolved at all hazards to stop, was more of a socialist than of a truly national character. At least, however, it must be admitted, that it was not for themselves that the revolutionists wished to take the proprietors' land; and that according to popular tradition, as interpreted by Kosciuszko, and by Mickiewicz*—names to which no others need be added—the plots of land cultivated by the peasants

* See Kosciuszko's letter to the Emperor Alexander, and Mickiewicz's *Les Slaves;* quoted on this subject in the *Polish Captivity*, i. 311.

in Poland for their own use, are theirs inalienably. The problem the revolutionists had set to themselves was this: *How to make the peasant fight for his country*; and their solution was — *By giving him his plot of land in freehold, and telling him to defend it.* But if the peasants' task-work was to be, not redeemed, but absolutely abolished, would it not strike the peasant that it had hitherto been required from him unjustly, and by a usurpation of his rights; and was not such a doctrine, preached to him as it was by the emissaries of the Warsaw committee, far more likely to lead to a massacre of the landed proprietors, than to a general rising against the Russian Government?

It was a very fortunate thing for the kingdom of Poland when the insurrection did break out, that by the Wielopolski law of May 1861, the peasants' task-work had for nearly two years been convertible, on easy terms, into rent. Otherwise, with the revolutionists exciting them on the one side, and the Russians on the other, the peasants would in all probability have risen against their taskmasters, without in the least troubling them-

selves about the question of national independence, and of course without injuring the Russians, whose policy, up to a certain point, is identical with that of the revolutionists themselves.

To the extreme party, the Marquis's persistent endeavours to avert the insurrection and to crush the revolutionists who were bent on bringing it on seemed at last so comic, that a caricature was published, representing Wielopolski on horseback in the attitude of Sobieski—wielding a bundle of reforms in lieu of a sabre, and trampling under foot the Turks of revolution. The caricature expressed the truth. The Marquis Wielopolski did, indeed, wish to put down revolution by means of reforms. But the extreme party would not be trampled upon. They would have all or nothing; and the Marquis, knowing well that if they tried this alternative they would have nothing, and worse than nothing, resolved to anticipate the experiment, and seriously prepared, according to Lord Napier's expression, to 'kidnap the opposition.' It was not an ordinary opposition, however, that he meant to kidnap. It was an armed opposition which had already published its plan

of campaign, and which was about to draw down upon an unfortunate and unprotected country the most terrible calamities.

At that time, say a few weeks or even months before the conscription was executed, it was probably quite impossible to avert the catastrophe that had long been approaching. This was the situation. On the one hand was a powerful tyrant, who had been greatly, however deservedly, provoked, and could bear no more provocation. On the other, a helpless victim who had been injured and insulted even while attempts were being made to conciliate her, and who, it was evident, would not be conciliated, and would never be consoled for her loss of freedom. There was a mediator also, who had not the entire confidence of either side, and whose chief object now, for the sake of the weaker, was at all hazards to prevent an open rupture between the two.

The measure resorted to by the Marquis Wielopolski in this difficult position is well known, and has been universally condemned. It is not for me to justify it, but I think it is possible to explain it. To begin with; it is unintel-

ligible, and cannot be admitted, that the Marquis Wielopolski was careless about the sufferings of his own countrymen. His aim was to save his country from ruin — from the natural consequences of a hopeless contest with Russia. To prevent the beginning of a conflagration which, when the torch had been once applied, it might be impossible to check, he determined to seize the incendiaries. They were about to set the house on fire in order to clear it of vermin. If there had been the least reason to hope that by this measure the vermin could be driven away never to return, then it would have been the work of a bad inmate to stop its execution. But all that was certain in the matter was, that the house would be terribly, perhaps irreparably, injured, and that the vermin would remain, and would be irritated to fury by the flames.

We all know what the Marquis Wielopolski ought *not* to have done. Now what *ought* he to have done? A British minister finding his position untenable, resigns; but for the Marquis to resign would have been to confess that his scheme for governing Poland by means of the

Poles was impracticable. It would have been to deny his own ideas, and to desert the Grand Duke, who had come to Warsaw to see them carried out. It would have been an invitation to the Russians to return at once to their old system of military rule.

Ought he to have let things continue as they were going on? That, undoubtedly, was his proper course. The outbreak still would have come, but the entire responsibility would have been thrown on the revolutionary party, and the world would have seen that, at least, the Marquis had not struck the first blow. The Russians, however, were making him promise that there should be no insurrection, just as the intending insurgents were receiving promises from the Central Committee that there should be no conscription, and that it should be rendered impossible by a general rising.

The conscription had long been threatened, and since the beginning of October had been officially announced with full details as to the manner of carrying it out. The law of conscription by lot, published in 1859, was declared not yet in

vigour, and on this occasion, and by exception, the old system of conscription by designation was to be followed. Under the old system, every man in town or in country who did not belong to the nobility was liable to be taken for a soldier. If he belonged to the nobility, he was liable of course to be sent to Siberia. Everybody, in fact, was liable to every kind of arbitrary punishment at a moment's notice, on suspicion of any sort of political offence. Nevertheless, and though suspicious or suspected persons were seized wherever they were found, yet as a rule, so many recruits were taken from the country, and so many from the town districts.

In making the recruitment of 1863, it was resolved to take as many townspeople as possible, and to take, above all, those who were known to the police as active members of the extreme party, or in other words, as intending insurgents. The Marquis on assuming office had formally promised that, whatever might be done under his administration, at least nothing illegal should take place; and he now endeavoured, in the true

spirit of a lawyer, to give to an illegal measure a legal form. Instead of saying that the conscription was to fall exclusively on the inhabitants of towns, he announced that all landed proprietors (as of old) were exempt; and that the privileges of the territorial nobility in regard to recruitment were extended for the present, and in consideration of the changes introduced by the new rural law, to the newly-formed class of peasant proprietors.

The Marquis had further insisted (still for the sake of legality) that the manner in which the conscription was to be effected should be announced in the official journals of Warsaw; and the modified law, or rather the new edict, was published some months before any attempt was made to put it in force. No one approves of the measure now; but there were plenty of Poles at Warsaw who, when it was about to be executed, thought, by reason of the pressing danger, that it was unavoidable, and only wished that, having been finally decided upon, its execution might provoke no resistance. There was something not by any means noble, without doubt, in Poles

consenting to seize and hand over to the Russians other Poles, whose crime consisted in a determination to attack the Russians. But as a matter of calculation it seemed better to give up a few thousand Poles to serve in the Russian army, than that through their rashness and recklessness the whole country should be given up to fire and sword. This sort of argument served very well with a number of rich Poles, Poles who had lost all illusions, and Poles who reasoned more than they felt. But Poland is not a rich country. It has more poetry than prose in its literature; and the Poles, as a nation, are far more remarkable for strong feeling than for reasoning power. Accordingly, the execution of the arbitrary measure of conscription was followed by one general cry of indignation, in which the voices of a few apologists, and a still smaller number of advocates, were soon drowned; and the fact of having put such a hateful measure in execution, seemed to show that the Marquis Wielopolski, if he knew his country, did not indeed know his own countrymen.

The great mistake in the Marquis's calculation,

was that he looked upon men of flesh and blood as though they were wooden pawns or arithmetical figures. 'I have so many for me, so many on neither side, and so many against me. Take away so many against me, and so many will remain with whom I shall be able to work.' The political algebraist had counted without human nature, and in endeavouring to solve his problem found his figures all going over to the wrong side, and all his positives turning in the most inexplicable manner into negatives. If he had allowed the problem to find its own solution, or go unsolved, this would not have happened. The problem was to prevent the insurrection. All the Marquis did was to give the intending insurgents a legitimate excuse for taking up arms, and to cause the whole country to sympathise with them.

Believing that the time for action had now fully arrived, eleven of the most advanced members of the extreme party held a meeting on February 1st, at Gluchowek (an estate near Warsaw, belonging to Count Stroynowski), at

which it was resolved to commence the insurrection on the 15th. The Central Committee, which, since the exile of Count Zamoyski, had been strengthened (or as some thought weakened) by the adhesion of a certain number of men who had previously belonged to the moderate party, was opposed to precipitate action, and wished to postpone the rising until the preparations for it were more complete.

The moderate party, as represented by the White Committee, had long been losing ground; and as the crisis drew near its attitude of indecision became impossible. Many of the members declared themselves in favour of the Marquis Wielopolski's government. Others inclined to the views of the extreme party as represented by the Central National Committee. The plan of the moderate party, the party of landowners, had been to maintain an attitude of reserve towards Russia; to accept whatever concessions might be offered to them, but to accept none as final; and not to break with Russia until some really favourable opportunity presented itself, and the co-operation of some foreign power

could be secured. The time, however, was coming when circumstances would oblige it to take part either for or against the Russian Government.

Among the eleven men who were in favour of an immediate appeal to arms, and who held that the delay which had already taken place had been far more profitable to the Russians than to the Poles, were some members of the first committee formed by the extreme party in October 1861, and which was afterwards reconstituted under the title of 'Central National Committee,' and some officers of the 'Central National Committee' holding mandates as provincial commissioners. I may mention by name among the eleven Ladislas Yeska, Count Ladislas Stroynowski, Edward Rolski and Leon Frankowski. The name of Yeska has already been published as that of one of the envoys sent to Paris to offer the dictatorship to Mieroslawski, at the very beginning of the insurrection. Stroynowski, Rolski, and Frankowski are all beyond the reach of harm. The first fell into the hands of Cossacks when he was already mortally wounded. The second was killed in action. The third,

wounded and disabled, was taken prisoner, and as soon as he was convalescent, hanged.

At the meeting of January 1, an address to the Central National Committee was adopted, in which an endeavour was made to impress upon that body the necessity of hurrying on the warlike preparations, and 'of not allowing the country to fall into a state of calm, which would enfeeble, if not its patriotism, at least its actual disposition to make a supreme effort to drive out the invader.'* It appears, then, that there were only eleven men in all Poland who were absolutely determined, in January 1863, to decide the fate of their country by an immediate appeal to arms. The revolutionary eleven were ready to play a match against all Russia. If it had been cricket, they would have taken care to be provided beforehand with bats and balls; but as it was only war they were about to engage in, the question of instruments and means did not trouble them much.

Nevertheless, they 'begged' the Central National Committee to present themselves in a body to discuss the situation of the country.

* Stroynowski's Memoirs.

They 'invited' the committee to make known the military and financial resources at its disposal.

Firstly, they 'demanded' from the committee a reply as to whether it approved of the insurrection being commenced on the 15th; and they added that the insurrection would be commenced on the 15th whether the committee approved of it or not.

There were still, then, at the last moment, four parties in Poland, of which the one that went furthest ultimately took the lead. First, there was the Committee of Eleven, who wanted to begin fighting on the 15th; secondly, there was the Central National Committee, who wanted to wait until a large supply of arms had been procured; thirdly, there was the moderate and undecided party who neither favoured the insurrection nor supported the government; and fourthly, there was the party that supported the Marquis Wielopolski.

On the morning of the 3rd, the address from the Committee of Eleven was presented to the Central National Committee by three of its own

commissioners—Leon Frankowski and two other delegates. After a discussion which lasted all day and until midnight, the delegates came away without having gained their point. Sigismund Padlewski (afterwards taken prisoner and shot) was the only member of the Central National Committee who approved of the proposition made by the Committee of Eleven to commence the insurrection at once, and without waiting for the conscription to carry off some thousands of their best men. Some of the other members blamed the Committee of Eleven very severely for wishing to act without the permission and authority of the Central National Committee, and threatened to withdraw the powers with which many of them, including the three delegates, were entrusted.

Finding their pressure was useless, and that the Central National Committee would not give the order for commencing the insurrection on the 15th, the Committee of Eleven were hesitating what to do, when, on the night of the 14th, the forced levy was executed at Warsaw, about 2,000 men being taken.

The Russians, the Poles of the moderate party,

and, generally, those who knew nothing of the projects of the Central National Committee, thought the next morning that the danger had passed. The conscription had been executed at Warsaw, and there had been no resistance.

But in the evening the Central National Committee held a meeting, at which it was decided to order a general rising for the 22nd. Couriers were sent out in every direction, and in spite of the great number of persons engaged in preparing the outbreak, the secret was so well kept that on the night of the 22nd it took place simultaneously in all parts of the country. At Warsaw the soldiers were to have been surprised in the guard-houses and barracks, and with the arms taken from them the citadel was to have been attacked. This plan of action was attended with success when tried on a small scale in some of the little country towns, but it could not be carried out in the capital, though, according to the Russian official journals, the attempt was made. Persons who were living in Warsaw at the time can tell me nothing about it, nor do the official reports from the British Consulate say anything on the subject. If the

attempt was ever made at all, it must have been in some of the less frequented quarters of the city, or more probably still, in the suburbs. In any case, the plan could not possibly have been executed. There were now some 50,000 soldiers in and about Warsaw.

The most advanced members of the party of action thought with regret of the time, nearly two years before, when they had first proposed to commence the insurrection, and when the Warsaw garrison numbered only 5,000.

CHAPTER VII.

DIFFICULTIES AND HESITATION WITHIN. ENCOURAGEMENT FROM WITHOUT.

THE Polish insurrection of 1863 was, then, originated entirely by the extreme party. The men of property and men of intelligence were, as a general rule, quite opposed to it—perhaps because they did not want to be ruined themselves, but also because they did not want their country to be ruined. The men who had nothing to lose, and also a few of ardent enthusiastic men who had a good deal to lose and did not mind losing it, were the real authors of the insurrection. The large landed proprietors did not, as a class, support it, even with their money (they never assisted it in person), until it had been going on for many weeks.

The Russians called the insurrection an aristocratic movement, because they wished to deprive

it of the sympathy of the liberal party throughout Europe. But it was in its origin a democratic and revolutionary movement, and the first public act of its directors, after the appeal to arms, was to give the peasants their holdings in freehold without the consent of the proprietors, to whom they were legally bound to pay rent.*

One of the first insurgents to learn practically how far the peasants could be counted on to assist the insurrection was Count Ladislas Stroynowski, who, with the other members of the party of action, held that the co-operation of the whole mass of peasants must and could be obtained. On the morning of the 23rd, Count

* Many French writers have said, that the decree of the Central National Committee on the peasant question was based on the resolution passed on that subject by the Agricultural Society. I find a passage to the same effect in Prince Czartoryski's 'Statement of Polish Affairs, &c., addressed to the Members of both Houses of Parliament.' According to the resolution of the Agricultural Society, however, the peasants were to pay, by a series of instalments, four-fifths of the value of their land. According to the decree of the Central National Committee (which had no regard whatever for the decisions of the Agricultural Society), they were to pay nothing for it. The difference must have seemed important to a Polish landed proprietor.

Stroynowski, who had received from the commissioner of the central province or palatinate of Mazovia the command of three districts, assembled a band of volunteers and started with Count Tyszkiewicz * to attack the town of Rawa. Tyszkiewicz, however, was called away by a direct order from the Central National Committee to assist Colonel Czachowski; † and Stroynowski, before making his attack, was obliged on his part to seek reinforcements. Riding along he overtook a carriage in which sat a priest, with whom he entered into conversation. 'The priest was a patriot, and the count rode by his side until, in passing through the village of Rokitno, they were

* 'As we passed the churchyard, I observed busy preparations being made for the interment of several of those who had already died of their wounds [after the battle of Kobylanka, fought May 6 on the Galician frontier]. In one house a *chapelle ardente* was just being lighted up in a room where the body of young Count Tyszkiewicz was lying in state. I shall not easily forget the calm beautiful expression of his face, on which not the faintest trace of his having passed through the death-agony could be read.' *Polish Experiences*, by W. H. Bullock.

† Afterwards killed in the Lublin palatinate, near a hilly position, where he had held out for many months.

assailed by eleven peasants, who had been gorged with brandy by the Russian agents in order to excite them against the patriots. Some of them had received guns from the police of the district, who told them to kill the insurgents, or that they themselves would be slaughtered by them. The peasants were completely duped by this calumny. Excited by the fear of being slaughtered as much as by the alcohol, they wished to kill the two travellers, beginning with the priest. An old woman came by chance to the rescue of the latter. The count now remained alone. He had been knocked off his horse and could not escape, and he was without arms.

To save himself from the bullets of the peasants, Stroynowski seized one of the party and held the man before him as a shield. Ultimately, after a desperate struggle, he got away from the village without being hit, ran after the priest, who had escaped with his carriage, but was unable to overtake him, and at last fell down exhausted from fatigue. Three of the peasants who had attacked him in the village found him lying in a field by

* Stroynowski's Memoirs.

the side of the road, and beat him and wounded him with their heavy sticks 'until at last they left him bleeding, unconscious, and almost without life.'

So much for the patriotism of the Polish peasantry, even in the kingdom of Poland. The man who was thus attacked was their friend, their partisan, and would have made any sacrifices for them; yet it required only the word of a Russian agent and a glass of brandy to make them believe that he wished to 'slaughter' them. The peasants were still more ready to believe this absurd accusation in other parts of Poland; and throughout Polish territory the peasantry have so little confidence in the proprietors and all who have to do with the proprietors, and indeed so mistrust them, that to count upon their aid in the year 1863, was a mistake so grave as to be almost criminal.

Another lamentable thing in this, as in all Polish insurrections, was that even the civilised portion of the nation could not decide whether to fight or to leave it alone. That the Poles love their country, and with no ordinary love, is not to be disputed. They are bound together by a com-

mon bond of suffering, and they would be wanting in all the most essential qualities of manliness if they did not hate the foreigners who have broken into their home and marked their presence there by robbery, insult, and murder. The Poles, with the exception of their truly uncivilised peasantry (for they are not citizens, and have no notion of the duties of citizenship), are unanimous in detesting foreign rule; but they are not at all agreed as to the best mode of escaping its hardships. They all 'row in the same boat;' but some pull in one direction, some in another, and naturally they don't make much progress. The moderate party, of course, blame the party of action for having precipitated the country into the last contest. The party of action, on their side, throw the whole responsibility of the failure on the moderate or 'reactionary' party; arguing that if the landed proprietors had prepared their peasants for the insurrection, and had themselves, individually and in person, given to the peasants their holdings in freehold, instead of taking no notice of the decree to that effect issued by the Central National Committee, they might have led them,

armed only with their scythes, against the enemy, and have made short work of the Russians in the kingdom of Poland.

The landed proprietors certainly placed themselves in a dilemma on one point. They accepted or appeared to accept the decree endowing the peasants with their holdings. They thus lost the peasants' land (for it was certain that the Russians would not, and indeed could not, take it back from them); while, at the same time, the support of the peasants was not secured.

But *could* it have been secured? The members of the party of action maintain that it could; and if every landed proprietor had occupied himself as a sort of political missionary for some years before the insurrection; if he had agreed of his own free will to receive no rent; and if at the last moment he had called the peasantry on his estate to arms, then who can say but that the peasantry might not have been got to fight for their native land?

Under the actual circumstances of the outbreak, however, the support of the peasantry could not be counted on. Their neutrality was the most that could be expected, and this may be said, as

a general rule, to have been secured by the gift of land, and by the consequent refusal of the proprietors to receive rent. But the comparatively favourable, because neutral, attitude of the peasantry may also be regarded as the natural result of the *corvée* having been put an end to two years before by the Wielopolski law, and to some extent also by the fact that in this part of Russian-Poland the peasants for upwards of a half a century have been free, and have only performed task-work in virtue of their own agreement to do so.* The peasants, moreover, in the 'kingdom' are of the same religion and race as the proprietors; and the insurrection, too, was a much more serious and formidable affair in the kingdom than in any other part of Russian-Poland, and was therefore less likely to be resisted by the peasants. Finally, in the 'kingdom,' the administration, from the civil governors downwards, was exclusively Polish,

* They were liberated when the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was formed by Napoleon out of Prussian Poland in 1807. But the law which rendered them free to leave the proprietor's estate at the end of each year, gave them no land; and, practically, their position was not much improved.

and the officials, naturally, would do nothing to excite the peasants against the insurgents.

In Volhynia and the Polish Ukraine, where the peasants, at the instigation of government agents, behaved with the greatest ferocity to all insurgents who fell in their way (after the armed bands had once been dispersed by the troops), the *corvée*, though convertible since 1861, had not been generally converted into rent. There, too, the inhabitants are of Little Russian or Ruthenian race, and with the exception of a small educated class (perhaps a tenth part of the whole population) speak a Little Russian or Ruthenian dialect, which, though intelligible to the Poles, is yet not Polish. Moreover the majority of the population, and indeed all except the aforesaid Polish tenth and the Jews, profess the Russian religion. The peasantry of Volhynia and Podolia were, it is true, converted to it by force; but the conversion of a portion of them took place so long ago as the reign of Catherine.

In some parts of the kingdom of Poland the peasants, in spite of the endeavours made to gain them over to the national side, were induced or terrified into assisting the Russians. This hap-

pened often enough to make the national government decide at last to form bands of gendarmerie, who were sent into the villages to apprehend and hang the worst of the offenders ('to encourage the others'); and some of the very men who talked so much beforehand about the possibility of getting up a peasants' insurrection, were among those who afterwards appointed these hanging bands, or who, as chiefs of detachments, distinguished themselves by their revolutionary severity towards peasants as well as proprietors. I think it may be admitted that a Polish government representing national interests and willingly obeyed by the greater part of what really constitutes the Polish nation, has a right to punish isolated acts of treachery or of simple hostility to the national cause. But if it finds itself called upon to exercise this right, very often the propriety of such a government existing at all becomes more than questionable.

When the great step had been taken and could not be retraced, some of the members and agents of the Central Committee (such as Padlewski,

Frankowski, Lelewel, &c.) went into the country to take the command of detachments; emissaries were sent to Paris—not to solicit French intervention, which was never counted on by the *originators* of the insurrection, but to offer the dictatorship to Mieroslawski; and three members remained at Warsaw to watch and direct the progress of affairs. Overtures were now made to the moderate party, or, in other words, to the landed proprietors, without whose aid very little could be done. But they were still positively opposed to the insurrection, above all now that the revolutionist and reputed socialist * Mieroslawski had been invited to

* A man is not a socialist because he holds with Kosciuszko and Mickiewicz, that the Polish peasant has an inalienable right to his patch of land. But he is a revolutionist if, like Mieroslawski and his adherents, he wishes to dispossess the *legal* proprietor by threats, by force, and by raising up the peasantry against him. The poor peasant, if he was courted on both sides, was bullied on both sides also. If the Polish National Government and the Russian Anti-national Government vied with one another in making him presents of land at the expense of the proprietor, there was also a struggle between them as to which should give him the severest lesson with the view of keeping him on the side which each thought became him best. Ultimately the peasants, as a class, were enriched by the insurrection,

place himself at its head; and, speaking generally, they would have nothing to do with it until some time afterwards, when all Europe had encouraged it by its applause, and prospects had been held out of foreign intervention. The whole country, however, had long been playing with revolutionary fire, and among the moderate party there were many who had helped to prepare the conflagration, though they were alarmed by the flames when they actually burst forth.

I have endeavoured to show that there were scarcely a dozen men in Poland who really wanted and ardently desired an insurrection in January 1863. The Russian Government, the Grand Duke Constantine, and the Marquis Wielopolski could not want it at all. The party of action, as a body, wanted it in the spring, and not before they had introduced a sufficient supply of arms into the country. The moderate or aristocratic party wanted it in two or three years, or still later; but,

for through it they became landed proprietors; but they had a bad time of it while it lasted, and large numbers of them, certainly many hundreds, were hanged by the Poles. Many also were sent to Siberia by the Russians.

at all events, not until the fullest preparations had been made, until the peasant question had been settled definitively, and until the state of affairs in Russia and abroad should seem to give the rising a fair chance of success.

The insurrection was not desired by the French Government, which was allied with Russia at the time, and which had just proved its Polish sympathies by arresting Polish agents in Paris, and stopping the supplies of arms intended for the future insurgents.*

As for the English Government, its representative at St. Petersburgh heartily approved of the system introduced by the Marquis Wielopolski,

'The Central National Committee had prepared everything to prevent the recruitment, but it met with impediments that it was impossible to foresee; especially on the part of the French Government, which condemns our movement and opposes to it the same kind of obstacles that are thrown in its way by the Russian gendarmes. It prevented the importation of arms in sufficient numbers to enable us to effect an immediate rising. The Committee, not allowing itself to be stopped by these obstacles, was thinking of other means, when the recruitment suddenly took place in the middle of the night.'—*Proclamation of the Central National Committee,* dated January 16, 1863, the day after the recruitment.

which, indeed, could only be objected to by Prussia, Austria, and such Poles as were resolved at all hazards to prevent even a temporary reconciliation between Poland and Russia. 'The humane and intelligent order of things recently inaugurated in Poland,' Lord Napier calls it in a despatch dated January 26, 1861. In a later despatch (February 27) he writes—'Ever since I made the acquaintance of Marquis Wielopolski I had been firmly persuaded of the sincerity and patriotism of that statesman, and all my aspirations were for his success in the arduous task of improvement and conciliation.'

The English Consul-General and Vice-Consul at Warsaw were also of opinion that the Poles would best consult their own interests by accepting the reforms introduced by the Marquis Wielopolski, and they have been severely censured by persons who knew nothing of the real state of affairs or of opinion at Warsaw for the blame cast by them in their despatches of the month of January on the projects of the revolutionary party.

A full month after the insurrection had begun,

it appears from a despatch of Colonel Stanton, dated February 25, that 'a paper purporting to be a programme of the moderate party had been promulgated, which calls upon the insurgents to disperse and return to their homes, as at present it is impossible for them to obtain any permanent advantages over the superior forces of the Russian empire, and stating that it is the duty of the aristocracy of the kingdom to abstain from taking part in the insurrection, so as to be in a position to act as a mediator between the government and the insurgents.'

The government cared nothing for such mediation, which, if given at all, should have been offered in support of the government measures when they had a conciliatory character, and before the outbreak had become inevitable. But the moderate party (which, however just in its demands, was yet not 'moderate,' though it was opposed to violent action as a means of obtaining them) had declared itself unable to support the government unless it united the Russo-Polish provinces to the kingdom of Poland, and granted to the new Polish state a national administration

and a free constitution. This party had been earnestly appealed to for support by the Grand Duke the day after the attempt was made on his life by a fanatic put forward by the extreme revolutionary faction, and its *non possumus* had been duly pronounced.

One month, then, after the insurrection had broken out, the moderate party, including all the men who, from their possessions, their social position, and their superior education, ought to exercise influence in the country, were isolated and powerless—unable conscientiously to join the insurrection, which they still regarded as a fatal movement; unable to check it, and unable also to make terms for the insurgents. Prince Gortchakoff had complained to Lord Napier on February 19th, that the moderate party 'dared not give the government any active support;' and Colonel Stanton wrote to Lord Russell on March 4th, that the pressure applied by the revolutionary committee on the nobles and others of the moderate party had become so great, that 'the utmost firmness was required by them to resist joining the movement openly.'

It had been expected that the anniversary of the accession of the Emperor (March 3) would be made the occasion of offering a general amnesty; but, although the Polish members of the Council of State, and among them the Count Poletylo, whose mansion had been pillaged by the troops a few weeks before, attended the Grand Duke's levée, not the slightest notice was taken of them. It was in spite of 'the most violent opposition of many, even of the moderate party,' that the members of the Council of State had taken this step at all, which proved as useless as it was humiliating.

In the meanwhile the official journals of France had declared that the signing of the Prussian convention gave the Polish question a European character, and France and England had already remonstrated with the Prussian Government on the subject. It was known, too, that combined representations were about to be made to the Government of St. Petersburgh by England and France, if not by England, France, and Austria. What effect could such representations have if the Polish nobility kept aloof from a movement

which, once proved not to be national, lost all importance?

The Russian ministers maintain that the 'cosmopolitan revolution' caused the Polish insurrection. It would be more correct to say that the diplomacy of France and England (and not of France alone) first gave it a serious character. The impatient, desperate, reckless men in Poland planned the rising. The execution of the plan was definitively provoked, or at least hastened, and in the eyes of the whole world justified, by the conscription; a shameful measure, no doubt, but in extenuation of which it may nevertheless be said, that it had already become a mere question of time as to whether the revolutionists should attack the government or the government the revolutionists. I mean by 'revolutionists' those unscrupulous agitators, who, by violent and revolutionary means, were resolved to force their country into insurrection in spite of itself. The insurrection grew by the enthusiasm of the townspeople, and of the young men of all classes; but the general sanction and cooperation of the landowners, without which it could not

possibly have lasted, were not secured until the intervention of Poland's traditional friends (and also traditional betrayers) took away from the struggle that character of utter hopelessness which it had at first presented.

An order published in the official journal of Warsaw on March 6th, calling upon the peasantry to assist in re-establishing tranquillity, and empowering them to arrest all 'suspicious' persons living in or passing through their villages, looked too much like an invitation to commence a jacquerie for the most moderate of the moderate party to give their countenance any longer to the acts of the government. The independent members of the Council of State (that is to say, all except the members sitting *ex-officio*) resigned their seats, and the one institution of political value that had been granted to the Poles in a scheme which contained important administrative and educational reforms virtually ceased to exist. 'Of what use were the reforms,' asked Lord Russell, looking at the question very practically, 'if under them such a measure as the recruitment could be put in

force?' They had their value nevertheless, as a crust of bread and a ragged coat have their value to a famished and frozen man.

The independent members of the Council of State resigned on March 10th, partly for the reasons above given, and partly, I believe, in consequence of a direct recommendation received from Paris. Negotiations between the representatives of the moderate and those of the extreme party had (as we shall afterwards see) been entered upon some time before, and their termination in a complete union was coincident with the publication of the appeal to the peasantry in the Official Journal. On the 10th the two great parties in Poland were united for action, and the publication of Langiewicz's manifesto as dictator on that day caused a thrill of delight through the entire nation.

CHAPTER VIII.

EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE DICTATORSHIP OF LANGIEWICZ.

Long before the insurrection broke out, the extreme party, as represented by the Central National Committee, had been in correspondence with Mieroslawski, who offered to place himself at the head of the movement, on one condition. He demanded the absolute and entire direction of affairs.

The Warsaw Committee, however, thought it inexpedient to place so much power in the hands of a man who knew so little of Poland by his own personal experience. It resolved, therefore, while confiding to Mieroslawski the chief military command, to reserve to itself the political supremacy. To this Mieroslawski would not consent; and all relations between him and the Central Committee were for a time broken off, though he appears to

have still remained in communication with some of the members.

At this time much was expected from the promised co-operation of an indefinite number of Russian officers who had signed an address to the Grand Duke Constantine, complaining of the treatment to which the inhabitants of Warsaw were subjected, and pointing out that the time might soon come when they, the Russian officers, would be unable to execute the orders issued to them. These officers did not speak of resigning their commissions, nor, indeed, could they have done so without compromising themselves very seriously. Of course, the address was not sent to the Grand Duke. It was forwarded for publication to Mr. Herzen, the editor of the Russian paper published in London under the title of the *Bell*, and was in due time printed in that journal—as may be supposed, without signatures.

The projects of the revolutionary party in Poland were warmly supported by the contributors to the *Bell*; and the Central National Committee despatched an agent to London for the purpose of arranging a plan for Polish and Russian revolu-

tionists to carry out in common. I can scarcely believe that the Central National Committee ever expected to receive much aid from Russians against the Government of Russia. But such support as was offered to them they of course would not reject. The Polish agent in London informed the editors of the *Bell* that Mieroslawski, who had already entered into correspondence with them on his own account, had no authority to speak in the name of the Central Committee; and the letters interchanged on the subject between Mieroslawski on the one hand, and M. Bakounin, as representative of the *Bell*, on the other, were published in London in the Russian language towards the end of 1862. It appeared from the collected letters that Mieroslawski still claimed the right of speaking in the name of the Central Committee. Bakounin, on the other hand, declared that the Central Committee had disavowed him, and that it had requested the editors of the *Bell* to treat with some one else.

However, when the insurrection prematurely broke out, the insurgents found themselves without a head. In this difficulty the directing Committee

despatched two of its members or associates, Yeska and Danilowski, to Paris, empowering them to offer the dictatorship to Mieroslawski, on the understanding that he at once entered Poland at the head of a large band. It was also stipulated that he should make a position for himself before the 10th of March. If by that date he had done nothing to justify his appointment, the entire direction of affairs was to be resumed by the Central Committee. When, towards the end of the insurrection, Mieroslawski published what was put forward as an explanation of his conduct and position, he omitted to explain this, and replaced the conditional clause by a line of asterisks.

Towards the end of February, Mieroslawski arrived at Posen, disguised as a commercial traveller in the champagne line. Several officers, some of them foreigners, the others and the greater part Polish refugees, were waiting for him near the frontier; and a band was soon formed in the woods on the other side. While Mieroslawski was preparing for action, he fell in with the detachment of Mielencki, which had already been

some time on foot. The commander-in-chief wished to unite Mielencki's band to his own, but the latter refused to surrender the leadership of the detachment which he himself had formed. Mielencki was a proprietor from Posen, where Mieroslawski is said to be very popular with the peasantry, but where it is far more certain that he is detested by the landowners. Moreover, Mielencki had heard nothing of Mieroslawski's appointment, and did not choose to recognise his right to take the command of every detachment he met with. Either Mieroslawski or Mielencki was wrong in this affair, and perhaps both were to blame. As regards Mielencki, however, if he did not acknowledge the authority of the Central National Committee, why did he join the insurrection at all—*que diable allait-il faire dans cette galerè?* It was the Central National Committee that set it going; and to refuse obedience to its commands was to establish, not empire within empire, but anarchy within anarchy.

Mieroslawski was beaten in his first battle, fought at a place called Krzywosondz, and imme-

diately afterwards recrossed the frontier. According to an account published in the *Ruski Invalid*, the insurgents, under his command, possessed a certain organisation. They manœuvred regularly, and threw out their sharp-shooters skilfully. They, moreover, knew how to form in squares and repulse the charge of the Cossacks. 'Nevertheless,' says the writer, 'they cannot resist the charge of our infantry, although their knowledge of the ground gives them a decided advantage. I must in justice say, however,' he adds, 'that their deficiency in resistance does not arise from want of courage or energy; for withstanding the incessant firing of our riflemen, the insurgents approached within thirty yards of our line of battle. Their great want is fire-arms; the greater number being armed with scythes only.'

From the frontier of Posen, Mieroslawski made his way to Cracow, where, according to the extreme party, are the head-quarters of the aristocratic and reactionary Poles. At all events, Cracow was not the place for Mieroslawski, and the attempts he made there to form a new detachment on a large scale ended in nothing.

In the preceding chapter I have endeavoured to show how after a time several causes combined to induce the moderate party to support the insurrection, which at the outset they had regarded as a hopeless and ruinous experiment. But, weak as it might be, the insurrection was yet so strong that the Russians seemed unable to suppress it. Moreover, instead of seeking to conciliate the landed proprietors who had, as yet, held aloof from the movement, the Government issued instructions to the peasantry giving them power to watch and arrest at their pleasure anyone whom it might suit them to regard as a suspicious personage. Finally, the insurrection, not much admired by good judges in Poland, was exciting the greatest enthusiasm abroad, while the signing of the Russian Convention had caused the official journals of France to declare solemnly that the Polish question had now become a European question. The situation was such, that if the Polish aristocracy and the moderate party generally had abstained any longer from supporting the insurrection, they might afterwards have had to reproach themselves with having by their ex-

cessive prudence caused an important national movement to miscarry. But the movement still owed its importance to the fact that it had elicited expressions of sympathy from men in power in England and in France. It was certain that an intervention of some kind would take place, and owing to the indignation caused by the signing of the Prussian Convention, it seemed likely enough that it would be an intervention of a very serious character.

The *Constitutionnel* published its article declaring that, through the signing of the Prussian Convention, the Polish question had become a European question, on the 17th February; and three days afterwards, February 20th, Prince Ladislas Czartoryski telegraphed* from Paris to Warsaw that the insurrection must be kept up. The word *qu'il fallait durer* passed from mouth

* Telegrams in cipher are not received in Russia, except from Embassies and Consulates; nor was it likely that they would be received in Poland during an insurrection. The Poles, however, by a system of corresponding words, contrived to telegraph to and from Warsaw whatever they wished, until at last private persons in Poland were forbidden the use of the telegraph altogether.

to mouth, and it was understood that, if the insurrection lasted long enough, France would support it by force of arms. A positive promise to that effect would beyond doubt have caused every Pole above the position of a serf to join the insurgents. As it was, thousands of young men who had nothing to do with the extreme party, and who, in the first instance, had regarded the appeal to arms as a deplorable error, were now ready to sacrifice their lives in order that there should, at least, be no pretext for saying that the Poles were too lukewarm in their own cause to deserve assistance from foreigners.

'How long?' is a question the unhappy Poles have often to ask. How long are they to suffer without rising? How long, when they have risen, are they to continue fighting against overwhelming odds, while their friends in the West of Europe are considering whether to help them or not? The longer the insurrection lasted, the worse would it be for the country if, in the end, the Russians gained the victory. On the other hand, a competent authority had declared that

French aid might be expected, the one condition being that the insurrection should not be allowed to collapse.

During the Crimean war, the chief of the Polish emigration in Paris had declined to be instrumental in getting up a diversion at Warsaw, unless positive assurances were given that at the making of peace the Poles would not be abandoned to their fate.* A distinct promise should also have been required in 1863. A promise, however, was at least implied in the recommendation, transmitted by Prince Ladislas Czartoryski—transmitted *through* him I may as well say—to maintain the struggle; and the Emperor Napoleon certainly wished to help the Poles at the time, provided always that he could secure allies for that purpose. 'Keep up the fighting, and I will do my best for you,' was what the advice given to the Polish leaders in Paris really amounted to; and considering all the circumstances; considering that the insurrection was growing naturally of itself; that the Russians were behaving most feebly though at the same time very cruelly in their

* Page 10.

attempts to suppress it; that the Austrians were scarcely guarding their frontier at all, and were allowing detachments to be formed in the Galician woods, and arms and ammunitions to be conveyed from Galicia into the kingdom of Poland; that sympathy for the Poles was being loudly expressed in England as well as in France, and that both the English and French Governments were about to engage in diplomatic representations on behalf of Poland: considering all this, the moderate party could scarcely hold back any longer without causing their moderation to be mistaken for want of courage and want of patriotism.

The white or moderate party were, at the last moment, obliged by circumstances, and induced by the hopes held out to them, to join the insurrection. Some of the more moderate of the red or extreme party had already made overtures to them with the view of obtaining their co-operation, and on the 4th of March a meeting was held at Cracow, at which a union between the two parties was brought about.

It was effected in this manner. The white party of the kingdom of Poland had sent a de-

puty to Cracow to enter into relations with the local committees of Posen, Cracow, and Lemberg. A deputy had also been sent to Cracow by the red party; and on the 4th of March a meeting took place, at which were present Count Adam Grabowski, representative of the Central National Committee; a representative of the White Committee; a representative of the Posen Committee; a representative of the Lemberg Committee; two members of the Cracow Committee; and a representative of General Wysocki, who had been appointed by the Central National Committee to command on the right bank of the Vistula.* The object of the meeting was to unite the forces of the two parties, to abolish the white and red committees, and to place the direction of the movement, now about to assume a national character, in the hands of a central power. It was agreed to establish a dictatorship, and to

* Mieroslawski's nominal command included the kingdom as far as the Vistula. Wysocki commanded (or was to command) the insurgent forces in the palatinate of Lublin (kingdom of Poland) and in Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine—where, however, no insurrection of any importance took place.

appoint to it the man who had distinguished himself most in the field. The representative of the Posen Committee said that this question had already been discussed at Posen; and that Langiewicz, who had been in the country since the beginning of the insurrection, was there looked upon as the man best fitted to take the chief command.

Langiewicz was naturally a member of the party of action. He was a Garibaldian, and had held a professorship at the Polish military school of Cuneo—which was broken up when the Emperor of Russia made its dissolution the condition of his recognising the newly formed Italian kingdom. It could scarcely be said, then, that in appointing him to the dictatorship the white party were naming one of their own men. As to his fitness in a military point of view there could be no question. By this time (March 4th) he had acquired a name throughout Europe, and Europe would certainly have been astonished if anyone but Langiewicz had been placed by his countrymen at the head of the insurrection. He had made himself the chief man in Poland by his own exploits.

The proposal to nominate Langiewicz to the dictatorship was unanimously agreed to. Count Adam Grabowski, however, as representative of the Central National Committee, explained that Mieroslawski had been appointed dictator for a term which did not expire until the 10th of March. Thereupon it was decided that Langiewicz should be asked to assume the dictatorship from that date. A deputation was sent to Goscza, near the Galician frontier, where he was then encamped, to make the proposal; one member of the deputation being Count Adam Grabowski, whom Langiewicz recognised as having belonged to the Central National Committee. He did not hesitate to accept the position offered to him by the united whites and reds. This position was not that of absolute dictator. Langiewicz was to command only in the field, and the general direction of affairs was to be entrusted to a civil government, which was to act in his name and under his responsibility. Two secretaries of this government were to be attached to Langiewicz's person, and were to countersign all decrees submitted to and approved of by him. Thus when the insurrection

first assumed an important character, there was no thought of directing it by means of an anonymous and irresponsible body. At least the dictator and the two secretaries of the government would have been public agents.

It had been decided that the civil government acting in Langiewicz's name should be composed of four departments—war, interior, finance, and foreign affairs. Each department was to be directed by a chief and a general secretary, capable, if necessary, of replacing him. All these officers, as well as the two secretaries attached to Langiewicz's person, were appointed by the representatives of the various committees at the meeting held in Cracow on the 4th of March. General Wysocki, who had already been appointed by the Central National Committee to an important military command, was made chief of the war department. A member of the Central National Committee was entrusted with the department of the interior. An active member of the extreme party (which the Central National Committee, when it was first formed, represented exclusively) was appointed to the direction of the finances; and the only depart-

ment which was placed in the hands of the moderate party was that of foreign affairs.

This, it may be observed, was a department which the extreme party had never cared for. They had no belief in the intervention of foreign powers, and the mere notion of entering into relations with foreign courts was distasteful to them. The moderate party, otherwise the aristocratic and reactionary party, is also known among the reds as the 'diplomatic' party; and the reds maintain that diplomacy has been the ruin of Poland—the object of foreign powers, in face of a Polish insurrection, being, as they allege, to keep it within bounds until at last, unaided from abroad and paralysed at home by the very endeavours made to deserve foreign assistance, it naturally dies out. Indeed, if the Poles say they are fighting for their independence, they are told that there is nothing about their independence in the Treaty of Vienna. If they merely demand that the stipulations of the Treaty be fairly observed, it is explained to them, after an agonising period of delay, that the Western Powers have the right to enforce their observance, but that a right is not an obligation.

The foreign department, then, was abandoned to the moderate or aristocratic party. The Director belonged to the kingdom of Poland, the General Secretary to Posen. Both were men who might have occupied similar positions in an independent Polish state.

Of the two secretaries attached to Langiewicz's person, one was a member of the Berlin Parliament, the other a member of the Central National Committee.

After the formation of the civil government for the maintenance and guidance of the insurrection, a commissary was chosen from each of the local committees of Posen, Cracow, and Lemberg, whose duty it was to correspond with and receive instructions from the central government. The local committees, while retaining the management of their own internal affairs, supplied the central government with funds, and formed and directed the entry of insurgent bands in conformity with its orders. A resolution was passed at the meeting of May 4th discountenancing all suggestions for extending the insurrection to the Polish provinces of Prussia and Austria.

All was going well at Cracow and at Goscza, and the day for proclaiming Langiewicz as dictator was approaching when, on the 9th March, an agent of the Central National Committee arrived at Cracow to protest against the appointment. He went to Goscza, where he had an interview with Langiewicz, who maintained, however, that Grabowski had been empowered to act as the representative of the Central National Committee, and that the decisions of the Cracow meeting must be carried out.

This visit had been caused by the representations of Mieroslawski, to whom the proceedings at the Cracow meeting had been reported, and who had sent alarming accounts to Warsaw of what he called the 'reactionary intrigue,' having for its object the replacement of Mieroslawski by Langiewicz.

On the 10th, however, the proclamation nominating Langiewicz Dictator of Poland was issued in the camp and reprinted in the journals of Cracow, Lemberg, and Posen. The same day the general secretary of the foreign department sent a despatch to Prince Ladislas Czartoryski, at Paris,

enclosing the proclamation, commenting upon it, and giving a full explanation of the cause and purpose of the insurrection. Prince Czartoryski had, at this time, no official relations with the Polish insurgents. Nevertheless, he took the despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, read it to him, and *left a copy* in the recognised official manner, as between Government and Government. Some passages from this despatch combating the assertion of the Russian Government that the Polish insurrection was a socialistic, and not a national movement, were quoted by M. Walewski (of course without formal acknowledgment) in the debate on Polish affairs, which took place in the Corps Legislatif in March 1863. The despatch itself has never been published.

In spite of this formal union between Whites and Reds, news of which was at once telegraphed to the journals of France, England, and Germany (where few people knew who the 'whites' and the 'reds' were), a great number of the reds were by no means satisfied with the arrangement, and persisted, like Mieroslawski himself, in regarding it as the result of a 'reactionary intrigue.' The

'aristocrats,' it was said, had now got the direction of affairs into their hands, and Langiewicz had been made dictator under conditions which would prevent him from displaying that 'revolutionary energy' essential to the success of the Polish insurrection. The immediate followers of Mieroslawski never ceased to speak in this strain; and when Langiewicz, hemmed in by Russian troops, broke up his army, and on passing the Galician frontier fell into the hands of the Austrians, the extreme party generally took up the cry. All the harm, it was said, had come from appointing Langiewicz dictator; while some fanatics asserted that the 'aristocrats,' fearing the effects of a popular insurrection, had nominated him for no other reason than that he might be defeated. Who, it was asked, had ventured to sanction his appointment on the part of the Central Committee?—and all sorts of charges were made against Count Adam Grabowski, who had acted as its representative.

Stephen Bobrowski, already known to the reader as one of the first and most active promoters of the insurrectionary movement, and who after the fall of Langiewicz signed the order by which

the Central Committee took back the power that had been confided to the dictator, was foremost among Grabowski's accusers. Grabowski, under these circumstances, applied for the appointment of a court of honour to inquire into his conduct, and the result was his complete exculpation from all the charges made against him. He then offered his hand to Bobrowski, requesting him, at the same time, to retract all that he had said to his disadvantage, and to express his acquiescence in the decision of the court. Bobrowski refused to do anything of the kind, upon which an altercation of so serious a nature took place that, although every endeavour was made to avoid it, a duel became inevitable. The meeting took place in Silesia, and Bobrowski was mortally wounded.

It was now for the 'Central National Committee, acting as the National Government,' to carry on the insurrection. There was no question of appointing a new dictator. On the contrary, any person venturing to assume dictatorial power was declared beforehand to be a traitor, and the direction of affairs was left entirely to an anonymous body. It had been recommended, I believe, at Paris, that a

Pole whose name would have inspired his countrymen with full confidence should place himself at the head of the movement; and it, of course, was remarked, as the insurrection went on, that, as far as could be seen, the men of illustrious family in Poland kept well out of it—until, at last, its direction fell entirely into the hands of the extreme party. But as no formal promise of recognition and aid could be obtained, the men who had most stake in the country were not disposed to risk everything upon a mere chance. If the Polish agents in Paris and London had been told plainly that under no circumstances would war be undertaken on behalf of Poland, the insurrection would probably have collapsed after the fall of Langiewicz. As it was, the aristocratic class gave money, and here and there a victim, though their general attitude was still one of reserve. They waited to see whether there was to be a foreign intervention. If no intervention took place, all they had to hope was that the Emperor of Russia might be induced to grant important political reforms; and in that case it was necessary that they should not have compromised themselves personally, or they would

be unable to take any part in carrying them out. In any case it was better that the burden of fighting should, for the present at least, fall upon those who had little more than their lives to lose; for it is not by killing off the Poles, it is by seizing and confiscating Polish estates that the most irreparable injuries are done to Poland.

This abstention on the part of the landowners, as far as actual fighting was concerned, was sanctioned by the National Government, and indeed expressly recommended by it. It had one good effect which, I believe, was not thought of at the time. It quite convinced the peasantry in the kingdom of Poland that the contest against Russia was not being carried on, as the Russians asserted, with the view of re-establishing the corvée. On the other hand, it might be said (and the argument was often made use of by members of the democratic party), that if the territorial nobility had not a sufficiently good opinion of the national movement to join it in person, it could scarcely be expected that the peasants would prove themselves more patriotic than their masters, and rush into the field in defiance of the example set them

by their natural leaders. It seems to me certain that the only thing to do was—what was done—to leave the peasants alone. If their masters had called upon them and urged them to fight, they would have felt obliged to declare for or against the Government; and their natural timidity might have led them to take part with the stronger side. But there was little or no chance of any such experiment being made. The landowners well knew that their *only* chance of beating the Russians lay in the intervention of foreign Powers.

CHAPTER IX.

THE FRIENDS OF POLAND.

How did the fall of Langiewicz affect the intention of Poland's friends in the West of Europe? In no way. Langiewicz was made prisoner by the Austrians on the 19th of March. But before the news of the capture reached either Cracow or Warsaw, the 'Moniteur' of March 16th had been received in both those cities, containing M. Drouyn de Lhuys' first despatch to the Duke de Montebello in reference to the Polish question. The same paper contained a despatch to the Baron de Talleyrand on the subject of the Russo-Prussian Convention, a despatch to the Duke de Grammont on the attitude of the Austrian Government in Galicia, and a circular to the French diplomatic agents, setting forth that the signing of the Russo-Prussian Convention being an international act, had given to what was at first

but a local question a general European character.

This was quite enough to convince the Poles, what they were already so eager to believe, that France had taken up their cause. It was known also, that Lord Russell had sent a despatch (dated March 2nd) to St. Petersburg, reminding the Russian Government through Lord Napier that the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna in respect to Poland had long ceased to be observed, and advising that a national Diet and a national Administration be introduced into Poland, as the best means of pacifying the country. Lord Russell had addressed a circular to the English representatives abroad (dated March 5th), enclosing a copy of his despatch, and directing them to recommend 'a communication of similar views by he representatives at St. Petersburg of the Powers who were parties to the treaty of June 1815;' and of this the Poles were also aware. To endeavour to procure them 'a national Diet and a national Administration' was not much, especially as they had a national Administration already. But to propose such a thing at all was,

at least, a good beginning; for as it was not likely that the proposition would be acceded to, there was no saying to what it might not lead at last. Indeed Lord Russell would seem to have foreseen, at this very time, the effect which his despatches, if persisted in, could not fail to produce on the Russian Government. 'It is fortunate,' he wrote to Lord Cowley, on March 5th, in reference to the Russo-Prussian Convention, 'that the Governments of France and England have not roused in the Prussian Government a spirit of offended dignity, and thus created obstacles to their own success by presenting formally an identic note requiring a formal reply.'

'Her Majesty's Government are of opinion,' he continues in the very next sentence, 'that the next step to be taken is to invite all the chief Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna to concur in advising Russia to recur to the stipulations and to revert to the policy of the Treaty of Vienna in regard to Poland.' In other words, to rouse in the Russian Government that 'spirit of offended dignity' which it was so fortunate not to have roused in the Government of Prussia.

The first representations, however, that were made to Russia did appear to have produced some good effect. Prince Gortchakoff gave only a verbal reply to Lord Russell's despatch of March 2nd, but it was a far more satisfactory one than the written reply elicted four months afterwards by the presentation of the celebrated six points. Moreover, though not given in writing, it was written down by Lord Napier, and the draft of the despatch containing it submitted to Prince Gortchakoff at his own request, when, after a few alterations, it became, in Lord Napier's own words, 'an authentic record of His Excellency's expressions.' It promised the maintenance of the institutions recently granted to Poland (which Prince Gortchakoff dignified with the name of a 'Constitution'*), and without promising an amnesty, as if in consequence of Lord Russell's recommendation to do

* He said truly, however, that 'the kingdom of Poland enjoyed an absolute administrative independence. Even the department for Polish affairs in the Russian capital had been abolished. The only institution common to the two countries now was the army. . . . The Imperial Government, in restoring the educational establishments of the kingdom, had offered to the people the resources of intellectual culture and satisfaction.'

so, yet announced that 'it had always been the intention of the Emperor to grant a large measure of amnesty to his revolted subjects after the cessation of resistance.'

On the 12th of April, three weeks after the defeat of Langiewicz, and five days before the presentation of the first set of despatches from the Governments of France, England, and Austria, an amnesty was in fact published, in which the Emperor offered 'a free pardon to all those of our subjects in the kingdom implicated in the late troubles, who have not incurred the responsibility of other crimes and misdemeanours committed on service in the ranks of our army, and who may before May 13th (new style) lay down their arms, and return to their allegiance.' As to the new institutions, 'while still maintaining these institutions in all their integrity, we reserve it to ourselves' (said the manifesto), 'when they have been tested by practice, to proceed to their further development in accordance with the requirements of the time and those of the country.' To have obtained for the Poles nothing but an amnesty, and the maintenance of the Wielopolski system, would have

seemed at the time a very poor result, though M. Klaczko, writing two years afterwards on the subject in the 'Révue des Deux Mondes,' points to this as a minimum which the Western Powers might and ought to have insisted on. It would not have satisfied the Poles in 1863, who regarded the Marquis Wielopolski with the same distrust and animosity with which he had also inspired the Russians; nor would it have quieted public opinion in France and England. But it would have secured to the Poles an administrative autonomy, which there is no prospect of their regaining now; and it would have saved them from the horrible vengeance of the Russians, who, in striking at Poland, felt that they were also striking at the Powers who, through Poland, seemed to be menacing Russia.

Poland's chance of retaining a national Administration did not last long. The amnesty had scarcely been published when the Russian nobles began to vote addresses to the Crown, promising unbounded support, but asking at the same time that no concessions be made to the rebellious Poles at the dictation of foreign Powers. When Count Berg arrived at Warsaw, in April, to take

the command of the army, he became convinced that Russia could not govern Poland through a national Administration. He wrote a private letter to the Emperor declaring (in contradiction to the official theory on the subject) that Russia had not one supporter in the kingdom, but that all the Poles, whether in the Government service or not, were leagued together against the Government; and he ended by declaring that the system of autonomy introduced into Poland was quite a mistake, and could never be tried again. When the tone of the foreign despatches had become sharper, when the insurrection had become formidable in the old Polish provinces, and when the national feeling of Russia had been fully roused, then for the Russian Government to make terms with the Poles was really impossible.

Some months afterwards the notion was started, and was generally adopted in Europe, that the utter failure and worse than failure of the negotiations on behalf of Poland was attributable in a great measure to Lord Russell's having prematurely declared that England would not under any

circumstances go to war for Poland. But when Lord Russell, in answer to a question from Lord Grey, who thought it cruel to delude the Poles with false hopes, stated positively, that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of declaring war, the negotiations were already virtually at an end. Prince Gortchakoff's reply to the proposition of the six points had already been drawn up, approved by the Council of State and sanctioned by the Emperor. The debate in which Lord Russell stated that England would not go to war for Poland, took place on the 13th July, when Lord Russell knew that Prince Gortchakoff's reply had, after much deliberation, been finally decided upon, and that it would leave St. Petersburgh the next morning. It was delivered to Lord Russell in London on the 18th July. If Lord Russell had waited to make his declaration until the reply had reached him, it might have been said that it had influenced him in arriving at his peaceful determination. If, too, he had needlessly delayed it he might have been accused, and at least would have had to accuse himself, of having allowed the Poles to believe in the possibility of receiving assistance from Eng-

land, when there was no longer any reason for concealing the fact that no such assistance would be forthcoming. When Prince Gortchakoff's despatch, rejecting the six points, and advising his counsellors to attend to their own affairs, was resolved upon, a new levy of ten per thousand was ordered throughout Russia, and every preparation was made for war. There was indeed nothing left for England to do now but to press her demands at the point of the sword, or escape from the negotiations in as little undignified a manner as, under the circumstances, was possible. The evil was in getting into the quarrel at all, since no intention was entertained of 'bearing' it in a becoming manner.

What the Russians thought of the Polish insurrection and of the interference of the Western Powers on behalf of the Poles is a question about which we did not trouble ourselves much in England in the spring of 1863. If by abusing the Russians (I of course am not speaking now of the Government) we could have liberated the Poles, Poland would now have been free. The Russians, no

doubt, deserved a great deal of the harm that was said of them, but their great fault, after all, consists in this, that they hold Poland; and with the exception of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in the House of Lords, and Mr. Horsman in the House of Commons, no one occupying a political position in England has proposed that they should be driven out of it.

I can understand a man admiring the Russians for such merits as they really possess, and yet thinking it intolerable that the Poles should be the only people in Europe to whom all national life is denied, and to whom it often happens that in the same family one member is required to be a Prussian, a second an Austrian, and a third a Russian. Some exaggerations have, perhaps, been published as to particular acts of cruelty committed in Poland, but I do not think that anyone who has not lived in the country can have anything like an adequate notion of the humiliation to which the Poles are constantly and systematically subjected in every part of their native land. Their material sufferings are only the natural consequences of the moral sufferings which prompt them at every

possible opportunity to rise against the foreign Governments imposed upon them.

'Why cause them these moral tortures?' it may be said; but if they are not subjected to cruel restraints they will be still more certain to rebel, and will have more chances of success in their favour. If a horseman is quite convinced that he cannot ride his horse without a very severe curb, he had better use one at the risk of making the animal rear now and then, than leave it comparatively unchecked and get run away with. Such, at least, is the principle on which the three partitioning Powers have governed Poland, above all since 1830; and we all saw, at the time of the Crimean War, that Poland was powerless in their hands. We have also seen that when the Russian rule was relaxed, after the accession of the Emperor Alexander II., the Poles profited by it to organize demonstrations against the Russian Government, to which the invariable musical accompaniment was a hymn praying for the restoration of Poland; and that the end of all this was an insurrection in that very part of the country (i.e. the kingdom) where alone the civil government,

from the chief to the smallest official, was exclusively Polish, and where serious endeavours had been made to conciliate the inhabitants by means of concessions, which were perhaps insufficient, but which are now regarded by all Russians as having been excessive.

If, then, the Poles are really to be assisted, they must be rescued; and there are plenty of good reasons, moral and political, for wishing to raise up Poland. But no representations on the part of Western Europe can induce Russia to give the Poles increased facilities for rebellion, and the Russians are convinced that, for the present at least, and for a long time to come, it will be impossible to conciliate them. Consult any Pole on this latter point, and he will, willingly or in spite of himself, bear testimony to the correctness of the Russian view.

Those friends of Poland who when the Poles ask for arms give them speeches against Russia and diplomatic notes based on the Treaties of 1815, are unjust to both sides; and they might be ranked among Poland's worst enemies were it not for their undeniable 'good intentions'—with which,

as M. Klaczko well observes, '*le véritable enfer*' now existing in Poland is paved. They give the Poles what they call 'moral support'—than which nothing can be more immoral; for after irritating the tyrant against the victim and urging on the victim against the tyrant, they look on, while the murder they have themselves helped to provoke is being committed. Nor do they get more credit by their feeble conduct than they deserve; for while the Poles despise them for their hesitation—which to a small nation fighting almost without arms against a great military Power must in this latest instance have appeared surprising—the Russians do not believe in their sincerity. The Russians looked upon the intervention on behalf of Poland much as we should regard an intervention on behalf of Ireland. They considered that it was prompted not by any real sympathy for the Poles, but simply by a desire to weaken Russia. If our object in intervening was simply to keep up the diplomatic tradition as to Poland's legal position under the Treaties of 1815, was not a formal representation on the subject made to Russia in 1831, and would not a renewal of that representation, or indeed a

mere reference to it, have been sufficient in 1863? If the aim, however, was to benefit the Poles, we had nothing to do but to get such terms for them as the most friendly recommendations in their favour might procure, or go to war on their behalf.

If then an inquest could be held on the mangled body of Poland, what would the verdict of an impartial jury be? That she has committed suicide, or that Russia has murdered her? And what opinion would the jury express as to the conduct of the by-standers who made no effort to restrain Poland, but on the contrary did their best to encourage her in a perfectly hopeless struggle, and then abandoned her in her despair to take her chance of breaking her own head, or getting her head broken by her enemy? If it be suicide for an unarmed man to attack armed soldiers and throw himself headlong upon their bayonets, it was something very like self-murder for exhausted Poland, alone, unarmed, and without force of any kind, to provoke a conflict with the army and people of the whole Russian empire. But it was only a wild—a maddened—minority that com-

menced the impossible struggle, and but for prospects of foreign aid, the majority of the nation would have kept out of it. Or I should rather say the majority of the educated classes, for the majority of the whole population took no part in it as it was.

Once roused, Russia most certainly sought, and is now seeking, to destroy Poland—not merely to crush the insurrection, but also to break up the social organisation of the country, and so to weaken the civilized element as to do away with all possibility, at least for some considerable time to come, of any fresh movement of a patriotic kind taking place. But with all her ferocity it is not Russia alone that should be held answerable for the present sufferings of the Poles. The West of Europe entered into a combined diplomatic demonstration the object of which was to terrify Russia into making concessions to Poland. Russia was *not* terrified, but she was alarmed. She stood upon her guard, prepared to defend herself, and in the meanwhile hastened, no matter by what barbarous means, to root out from the heart of the country the rebellion which seemed to have been

made the pretext for threatening her with a European invasion.

'Who knows,' thought the Russians, 'but that this time the friends of Poland will *not* desert her at the critical moment? In that case we shall be attacked at all points, and just at a moment when, bent only on accomplishing a great internal reform, we have neglected our military establishment, and allowed our army to dwindle down to less than half its regular numbers. We are called an invading people, but Russia, of all the European Powers, is the only one that for six consecutive years has made no recruitment, and has kept her army on the lowest possible peace-formation. Now we have our reward. Poland rises, and the Western Governments, speculating on our supposed inability to fight, call upon us to make concessions which not one of them would dream of making to subjects of its own in a state of revolt—concessions, moreover, which, for the most part, we had actually made before the insurrection broke out, and without which it, perhaps, would not have broken out at all.'

'*Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*' is a

saying (of Chateaubriand's, I believe) which, like other witty sayings, is true only up to a certain point. Nevertheless, a vast deal of blame is always misapplied, because it is so much easier to condemn an offender outright than to study the actions by which he has offended, together with the motives that may have prompted them, the provocations that may excuse them, and the circumstances of various kinds that, from *his* point of view, may have rendered them necessary. 'I must live,' said the thief in the very old anecdote, when he was called upon by the tribunal for his defence. 'I don't see the necessity,' replied the judge who condemned him to death; and in the same way Poland does not see the necessity of Russia, as now constituted, continuing to exist, and, could she act as Russia's judge, would have her executed forthwith. It is intelligible enough, however, that Russia should not wish to die; and I do not think this point has been sufficiently considered in connection with the recent Polish insurrection. I do not say that Russia does not herself richly merit the fate she seeks to inflict upon others, but only that it is quite natural she should desire to

avoid it. Lord Russell thought he could tell the Russian Government how to pacify Poland and satisfy the Poles without destroying the Russian empire. Give them a few things that they already had, and a few more that they didn't want, and not one particle of what they asked for, and Lord Russell was quite sure that they would be contented.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Count Rechberg were, or affected to be, of the same way of thinking as Lord Russell, and all three drew upon themselves the replies addressed to them by Prince Gortchakoff—justifiable rebukes as they were, addressed to mediators who in the name of peace encouraged a hopeless insurrection which the Prince knew that they would abandon, and that he would crush. The Prince was at least in earnest, and could not fail to adopt a tone of superiority in replying to counsellors who, in an affair of life and death, must have seemed to him to be enacting either a mere farce or a very immoral 'comedy of intrigue,' and who, considered merely as advocates, had undoubtedly not given themselves the trouble to study the case of the client whom they ultimately betrayed.

I had heard when I was in Poland of Prince

Gortchakoff's popularity among his countrymen, but it was not until I went to St. Petersburg and Moscow that I discovered how great it really was, and understood on what it was based. In the West we all thought that since every State in Europe of the least importance (with the single exception of Prussia) had written a few lines to St. Petersburg in favour of the Poles, the least Prince Gortchakoff could do in reply was to testify some respect for European opinion—or, in other words, show that he was really sensible of the 'moral pressure' that was being exercised upon him. He showed, however, that he did not care one jot for the 'moral pressure' of Europe, knowing very well that he had only to resist it for a moment to feel it no more. Now, cruel and cynical as the Prince may seem to us from our point of view, he appeared to his own countrymen in the light of a struggling man suddenly menaced by three big bullies with a number of lesser bullies in their train, none of whom had any right to interfere with him, and all of whom he utterly disconcerted, first putting them off with evasive replies and requests for further explanations, and at last, when

he had made his preparations, telling them, with a plainness which irritated them and delighted all Russia, to do what they pleased.

In our eyes the Prince was guilty of duplicity, and it seems to be thought that if he meant to do nothing for the Poles he should have said so at once, so as to give the intervening Powers an opportunity of attacking Russia before she was in a position to defend herself. In Russian eyes his conduct was that of a prudent and brave traveller, who, being suddenly called upon to stand and deliver, hesitates, gets up a conversation, fumbles in the meanwhile in his pocket, and ends by producing a pistol, which at once frightens off his assailants. One thing is quite certain, that Prince Gortchakoff, speaking in the name of Russia, said precisely what Russia desired him to say, and that in his celebrated replies he represented the Russian people quite as faithfully as he did the sovereign to whom alone he is responsible. Accordingly in every Russian print shop, under every archway where 'pictures for the people' are to be found, at every railway book-stall where photographs of living celebrities are offered for sale, there the clever, intelligent,

by no means unamiable but decidedly not frank physiognomy of Prince Gortchakoff is to be seen. Let us be just to him. If I were a Pole I should detest him. As an Englishman, I wish very much that our policy had not been formed only for disgraceful failure, and that the Poles could somehow or other have profited by the representations made to Prince Gortchakoff in their favour, though I never could see how that was possible. But as an Englishman I must also admit that our opponent fought skilfully and well when he was attacked by greatly superior numbers. It was not his duty as a Russian minister to encourage the Polish insurgents by making concessions which the Poles had never asked for, and which their intervening friends only proposed because they felt ashamed not to propose something, and could think of nothing better.

It is unfortunate for the Poles, for Russia, and even for the two Powers who come forward on every possible occasion as the friends of Poland, and who desert their protégé as soon as they are plainly told to attend to their own affairs, that the international obligations of Russia in respect to Poland are not clearly defined, and that there is

no thorough understanding between England and France as to what the future position of Poland ought to be. It is a popular fallacy in France and England that these two Powers, in 1814 and 1815, finding they could not save Poland from the grasp of Russia, stipulated that at least a portion of Polish territory should be formed into a kingdom* —under Russian sovereignty, since that seemed unavoidable, but with a Constitution, a distinct Administration, and a national army.

Russia, it is true, bound herself to these conditions, but they were never stipulated for—except indeed by Russia herself. Russia, at the Congress of Vienna, desired most ardently not only that the kingdom of Poland should enjoy a Constitution, national institutions, and all possibl advantages short of complete independence, but also that this novel position for a conquered people should be guaranteed by the whole of Europe.

To understand the real meaning of a treaty, as of an ordinary contract, it is above all necessary to understand under what circumstances it was

* See Appendix IV.

concluded. Now, anyone who will take the trouble to turn to the 'Castlereagh Correspondence,' or to the papers relating to the negotiations at the Congress of Vienna that were laid before Parliament last year, will see that the British representative at the Congress did not at all object to Russia's annexing to her empire the greater portion of the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw *as a province*, but that he objected most positively and persistently, until the very last moment, to Russia's creating the newly acquired Polish territory into a 'kingdom' with or without a Constitution. Ultimately, Russia having consented to the territorial arrangement proposed to her, the other Powers represented at the Congress consented, most reluctantly, to the formation of a constitutional kingdom of Poland under the Russian Crown. The last thing Lord Castlereagh did in the matter was to enter a species of protest predicting terrible misfortunes to Europe from the reunion of such a warlike nation as Poland to such a powerful empire as Russia. It was feared at the time that Russians and Poles would become friends. Now that it appears very im-

probable indeed that they will ever cease to hate one another, the forced union of Poland to Russia may be a disgrace, but it is certainly not a danger to Western Europe—at least not for the present.

Probably the West of Europe would still fight Russia on the territorial question—the question on which England, France, and Austria prepared to go to war with Russia in 1814, when the Emperor Alexander seemed resolved to annex the whole of Poland to his dominions. The absorption of Cracow by Austria in 1846 was an evident breach of the Treaty of Vienna, but neither France nor England cared very much about it (though both protested as a matter of form), because it did not increase the power of Russia. If, however, Russia should attempt in earnest to carry out a Panslavonian policy, and should begin by endeavouring to get possession of Eastern Galicia, which is inhabited by a Ruthenian peasant population, and seems to be regarded now by all true Russians as legitimately belonging to Russia, then, perhaps, the West of Europe would have something serious to say on the Polish question. But the object of the Polish arrangements of 1815 was to keep back the

Russian frontier,* and as long as no attempt is made to push it forward, the Poles may be certain that the West of Europe will not quarrel with Russia for omitting to grant them a separate Constitution, which, until it was found very difficult to maintain it, no one except the Russian Emperor wished them to possess.

What, then, will be the future of Poland? Will it be crushed between Germany and Russia? If not, it can only be raised up by Germany in opposition to Russia, or by Russia in opposition to Germany. A small party in Poland believes that the fate of the country, for many

* If the European Powers had thought of the interests of Poland alone, in 1814, instead of considering the interests of Europe, they would have consented to the Emperor's project of uniting all Poland, as a constitutional monarchy, to the Russian empire. But even the stipulations in favour of the nationality of the Poland of 1772 were not inserted in the Treaty of Vienna for the sake of the Poles, but from a well-grounded fear that Prussia would endeavour to Germanize her Polish subjects (an attempt she had already made even in Warsaw, between 1795 and 1806), and that by doing so she would drive them into the arms of Russia. We must remember that, in 1815, Russia was regarded, not as the oppressor, but as the tempter of Poland.

years to come at least, is indissolubly bound up with that of Russia; while another party believes that a union between Russia and Poland is impossible, and that, sooner or later, Austria, assisted by France, perhaps even by France and England, will liberate Poland, and raise up the old barrier between the West of Europe and the invading 'Muscovites.' As long as Germany and Russia remain united there can be no hope for Poland; and considering that the Poles, as a nation, hold Russians, Prussians, and Austrians in about equal aversion, it cannot be supposed that they will, of their own accord, incline towards either of their persecutors, except as circumstances may seem to render it politic to do so.

In Poland we find not only political, but also historical, and, above all, ethnological theories changed from period to period to meet the views of the moment. At one time it is evidently Poland's destiny to unite with Russia and to oppose the Germans, the eternal enemies of all Slavonians. At another, the Russians are not Slavonians but Mongols (as during the last insurrection), and Poland being connected by history,

religion, and race with the Aryans on this side of the Dnieper, can never have anything to do with the uncivilisable Touranians on the Muscovite bank.

The Czartoryski family was opposed to the Napoleonic influence when the Duchy of Warsaw existed, and held with Russia until 1830.

The Marquis Wielopolski was himself opposed to Russia in 1830, and it was not until after the Galician massacre of 1846 that he became pro-Russian, simply because the cruelty and perfidy of Austria had made him violently anti-Austrian.

General Dembinski, who played such a prominent part in the Hungarian insurrection of 1848, wrote a letter while the last Polish insurrection was going on, counselling the Poles above all things to abstain from trying to incite the Hungarians against the Austrian Government.

Circumstances change, and the Poles change with them; but in whatever direction they move, it should be remembered that they have always the same ultimate goal in view.

There are so many ways of solving the Polish

question, that it is evidently a very difficult one indeed to solve. Ultimately it may solve itself in an unexpected manner. In the meanwhile, seven distributions and redistributions of Polish territory have been made since 1772, and there have been about as many Polish insurrections great and small, and the Polish question is by no means at an end. I have contented myself with observing it as it stood when the Polish insurrection of 1863 broke out—of which the most important internal effect has been to create a new middle class of peasant proprietors, who, I believe, understand that they owe the free possession of their farms not to any love that the Russians feel for *them*, but simply to a determination on the part of the Russian Government to injure and weaken the Polish nobility.

In the next volume a somewhat confused account will be found of the very confused state of things existing in Poland while the insurrection was going on.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.

[The following is an official version of the circumstances which led to the rising, and of the manner in which it was kept up, prepared for the instruction of the peasants in the Ruthenian provinces (Kieff, Podolia, and Volhynia), and read to them in all the churches. It was intended as a reply to the proclamations of the Polish National Government offering land, liberty, and (I am sorry to say) cheap brandy to all peasants in these provinces who would take up arms on behalf of Polish independence:—]

I have long desired to talk with thee, thou good orthodox Russian people (*Ruski**) living in these countries and communes, but I knew not how so that you might all hear my speech. Now I have determined to talk with you in a manner by

* The epithet *Ruski* is applied by the Russians to the Russian race everywhere. The Poles confine it to the Russians, or 'Ruthenians,' inhabiting Poland and Hungary.

no means strange; that is, I will utter all that God may put into my heart and mind, and share with you all that I know and that may be profitable and necessary for you to hear. But where shall I begin my talking with you, my good people? My soul is burdened with much that I would gladly say to you; but I must adjourn doing so till other and more peaceable times. By God's help we shall soon be able to talk about these matters at length; but now we will discuss what at the present moment old and young, learned and simple, men and women, what all Russians, in short, are thinking of. The people's proverb says, —'Always on the tongue is the cause of grief,' and to-day we all feel but one grief, from the Czar to the subject. What pain is that? you will ask. It seems to me that many must already suppose what I am going to speak about. They guess the grief; but lest any should have failed to imagine the nature of the sore, I will call it by name. It is the revolt of the Poles against our father, the Czar, our deliverer, our defender, our benefactor. Of this I intend to speak to you, my good fellow-countrymen, and I feel it my duty

to speak to you about it because this revolt is now in the mind and mouth of everyone in all parts; among Russians, and also among the French and Germans; and it is my desire to show you some means by which we may get rid of that disease—that is, of the Polish revolt.

This very country of Russia had from time immemorial been under the rule of Russian princes descending from St. Wladimir, and formed one great family with the Northern, so called Great Russia. But after the invasion of the Tartars this orthodox Russian country, together with Lithuania, fell under the sway of the Poles, from which Chmelnicki first of all delivered Little Russia. The rest of our Russian countries were restored to our Russian family by the Empress Catherine II. How much suffering your forefathers had to endure, how our faith, our language, were oppressed by the Catholic Poles, I will tell you in detail another time. The Poles hated the Russians of old because they were Russians and orthodox; and since the never-to-be-forgotten Czarina Catherine recovered this country to Russia, they have lost no opportunity

of doing ill to Russia, and have sought to tear away this country from the government of the Russian czars, and to bring it under the old tyranny and extravagance of the Polish lords. Since then, whoever has been at war with Russia has been aided by the Poles. But special assistance was given by them to Bonaparte, the French Emperor, who in 1812, without any cause, invaded our orthodox Russia with all his subject nations. After the fall of this Bonaparte, and his dismissal into banishment in the Island of St. Helena, Poland's neighbours, to whom she had done many evils, divided her into three parts among themselves. To Russia fell Poland Proper, or the Polish kingdom. Hence that chief nest of the restless and rebellious 'Lechs.' Since that time nearly fifty years have elapsed. In the course of that half-century the Poles might have lived in peace, and more happily than they ever lived before. The protection of the Czar saved them from their neighbouring enemies, checked them in their own domestic disorders, filled their poor land with Russian bread and gold, introduced order into their administration, and defended the weak

among them against the mighty. It would seem that nothing more could have been wished for.

But no; the Pole was never fond of peace and order, and he gnashed his teeth at being obliged to obey the Czar, and at not being allowed to maltreat the serfs like beasts, to mock the orthodox religion; to let the Russian churches on lease to Jews, as the Poles did formerly; to take away poor men's property at will, to hang or shoot with impunity—in a word, to live here on Russian soil like a savage in the woods. Having been unrestrained by the excessive mildness of the Emperor Alexander I., and having gained strength under his gracious protection, the Poles revolted in 1830: but the late Emperor Nicholas I. punished their outbreak as it deserved—destroyed their bands, took their capital by assault, delivered them over to Russian law, divided Poland into governments, diminished the power of the lords over the peasants, and established in Poland half the order that reigns in Russia. The Poles bowed before him, but the more proud, extravagant, and unmanageable among them retired into foreign countries, telling lies and calumniating Russia,

and the orthodox Russian Czar, as they alone can do, and stirring up envy and hatred against him and against all Russians. And although the Poles had deserved no mercy, nevertheless the boundless grace of our Czar, Alexander Nicholaievitch, the most kind father of all his subjects, dismissed the past in Christian forgetfulness, and gave to Poland many rights and privileges, thinking, 'Perhaps by grace I may bring them to live in brotherhood with me and with Russia; I will overcome their hatred by love, compassion, and great-heartedness.' By no means! The more the grace of the Czar was multiplied, the more were the 'Lechs' ungrateful and seditious; and when the tender Czar, loving his subjects as his children, and considering them as his brothers in Christ, granted the Polish peasants freedom from the arbitrariness and oppression of their lords, then their anger against him grew greater than ever. As they had not learned to labour and live in comfort without the blood and sweat of their serfs, whom they always treated like cattle, they determined to grasp the Russian people once more into their power, and thereupon commenced a revolt against

your magnanimous redeemer, beloved of Jesus Christ!

At first the revolt glimmered like a spark in the ashes, almost imperceptibly. The Poles put on mourning, chanted seditious hymns against Russia, murmured in the streets, conspired secretly, gathered among themselves and extorted from the peasants money for the rebellion, excited the nation to rise against the beneficent Czar, the redeemer, and calumniated him, and even the gift of freedom granted by him to the people. In his presence, on the contrary, they calumniated the people, while they caressed and followed him, promising him various fair things, which they never meant to do, just to bring him on to their side, and to sow discord in the Russian family. They fired at their appointed chiefs in the Polish kingdom; killed like assassins several persons who, mindful of their oath, would not take part with the rebels; excited to mutiny our faithful, orthodox, devout soldiers; and narrowly failed to murder the Czar's brother the very day after his arrival in Warsaw, when they could not know how he would govern the Polish kingdom, and purely from brutal hatred.

Meanwhile the plot grew incessantly, and bands of conspirators multiplied. The chiefs of the revolt—Polish fugitives who had been concealing themselves abroad—gathered money, commanded risings, spread among foreign nations falsehoods and calumnies against us and against the Czar, saying he oppressed them, and endeavoured by tears and other tender deceptions to arm against us those who envy us.

Finally, when the chiefs of the rebellion thought they had friends enough abroad and that enough bands of rebels had been collected, then, on the hell-memorable night of the 10th and 11th of January [Old Style], they fell throughout the whole Polish kingdom on the sleeping Russian soldiers, and stabbed, slew, and strangled them. Those who defended themselves in houses were burnt alive. O my God, how much innocent, orthodox blood was shed by men calling themselves Christians! How many of our brothers perished that night by the hands of impious, hateful assassins! It was long since the world had heard of such brutal, ferocious murdering. Such fury is not known even among savage cannibals, and, hark! in Poland

it rages for the third time in the space of seventy years.

The slaughtering thus ordered by the Poles still continues. They are hanging our soldiers by the entrails, flaying the bodies of unarmed generals whom they have killed, falling upon peaceable inhabitants, forcing to revolt the Polish common people who love our Czar and repulse with all their might the rebellious nobles, and very often drag them captive before our military commanders. But when the rebels have force on their side, they compel others to follow them into the woods, arm them as they can, and encountering our military, place them in the front to meet an inevitable death, the rebels themselves, as their forefathers used to do, flying into the thicket. Those, on the other hand, who, fearing God, will not join in rebellion with them, are killed without mercy. The Polish priests not only do not check, in the name of Christ, this abominable slaughter, this revolt against the Czar, chosen of God, but, on the contrary, in spite of their calling, provoke it. They murder unarmed women, kill their own friends, change the

temples of God into dens of robbers, into workshops for every sort of weapon, lead on the bands of rebels, and in their sermons delivered in the churches demand from the tender Jesus the most varied and horrible means for the extermination of the orthodox.

But let us turn away our eyes from these Polish murderers and look around us. I have already told you that the Poles endeavour to ingratiate themselves with the people, whom not long ago they oppressed, and whom they would devour alive if they could. They attempt it in every manner, pretending to be the people's friends, and promising to them freedom and the distribution of land, and delivery from the recruitment, and cheap brandy, and the education of their children after their fashion, and all other things. Shut your ears, my brethren, to their insidious promises! Fly from their Judas-like embraces and kisses, from their perilous Catholic teaching! I conjure you by God not to trust to the words of these men, to whom an oath is a joke, and murder virtue. If they really wished to do you good, they had plenty of time for it,

and no one prevented them. Meanwhile remember how they treated you ten years, and especially forty years ago. At that time you had no property, neither wife nor daughter, nor labour nor fortune. Now, if such was your existence when the Russian Czar adopted you into his Russian family—when he, with all his strength, sought to protect you against the arbitrariness of the nobles by the inventory law, in which it was clearly laid down how many of you, for how many days, and in what manner, were to labour for the landed proprietor,—a law which the landed proprietors scarcely ever observed,—then, what sort of life did you lead 100 years ago, and still further back?

As to that, your bitter life, I will speak to you another time; but now I conjure you again and again, in the name of Christ God, not to believe in these promises of the Poles, to look on all their promises as the bait by which they think to catch your simplicity, that they may afterwards treat you as they please, that they may fetter you unarmed into eternal slavery—farm, as of old, your churches to the Jews—drive you like cattle, and take from you with impunity all your property,

and even your lives. Do not forget the Russian proverb, 'Pat the horse till you have him in the harness.' Bear in mind the Polish proverb, 'Promises and caresses are the delight of fools.' Remember that the lords are fighting for their arrogance, and not for your freedom. More freedom than you enjoy now is the portion of no one on the globe. You govern yourselves; you labour two days in the week for your land, or pay a small interest for it, and the rest of your time and all the fruits of your labour are yours.

May you profit by your freedom through the help of God, and may it become you well; but also say prayers to God for the orthodox Czar, our never-to-be-forgotten benefactor. Do not believe in the grants of lands by which our enemies, the foes of our Church, Czar, and country, seek to ensnare you to themselves. If they really give you some bit of barren soil, you will water it with your tears, and you will be imposed with such taskwork for it, that, as it was in old times, you will never have a free holiday. While your other Russian brethren, young old, men and women, will go on holidays to pray

in the church, you will be drenching yourselves with sweat and tears at haymaking in the field. And if they give you anything, they will take it back the first year that they no longer want you. Did anyone ever hear of the '*panowie Lachowie*' (Lechite or Polish gentlemen) keeping their words? A very different thing is the word and promise of our orthodox Czar. If he says anything, so it must be. As he told you that he would ransom the soil for the people from the landed proprietors, so he has done it unalterably. The waters of the Dnieper will turn back before the word of the Czar will remain unfulfilled. Do not believe, my brethren, that, having overpowered you, the lords would free you from recruitment. Where would they get their soldiers, a great number of whom they would require with their tumultuous dispositions? When the nobles, now on our soil with swords at our throats, lead your brethren into the woods in order to teach them to rebel against their Czar, what would they do if they could drive you like oxen, treat you like some dead thing, when there would be nobody to defend you?

With cheap brandy, the orthodox Christian can only be tempted by the devil, the Lech, or the poor Jew. We know very well whither tends the cheapness of that accursed brandy. The lord would place a Jew in his inn; the Jew would suck the sweat and blood of the orthodox, would deprive him of his last cow, his last bite of fruit, and his last ten eggs, of his home and happiness, of his health and life. Let us not endure such a diabolic invention; and so we shall be happier, richer, and shall live longer. For that reason brandy is not cheap in our country, in order that the people may feast less and sin less, that they may think more of God, and be more prosperous and more healthy, and that drunkenness may not remain unchecked, the cost of which is devoted to the support of the army, the redemption of the soil, the education of the people, and so on.

As to the education which the Catholic Poles would force upon your children, it is not worth speaking of. It is their design to transform your children into Catholic Poles, to tear them away from the orthodox confession; but as for

teaching them any good, that they never dream of. In general, think as you will of these baits presented by the rebellious and revolt-exciting nobles—these baits are but falsehoods and treachery, leading to sin, robbery, apostacy, and perjury. Look, my orthodox Russian brethren, with both eyes—look sharply around, and do not allow yourselves to be led away by various liars, rebels, and vagabonds, who, with you or without you, prowl about in divers hiding-places. As soon as you perceive any of these gentlemen beginning to approach you, lurking like a fox, beginning to speak against our Czar and the authorities, against our Russian brethren, against our wardens, our orthodox priests, then strike them on arm and leg, and bring them to the authorities. But, for God's sake, do not go beyond bounds and rise against the landed proprietors; and whatever you have agreed to and confirmed by your signature in the lawful deed of contract [the *gramota* of the Emancipation Act], that do exactly and conscientiously without needing constraint. This is required of you by conscience and justice, and is commanded by God and man. Even among

the Polish lords there are many good men who formerly neither wished nor did you wrong. When, by the grace of God, either you grow richer, or the merciful Czar ransoms the soil for you, they will then be good neighbours to you, and will willingly assist you with their intellect, advice, protection, and in cases of necessity with their fortune; helping you with loans and other such services as neighbourly obligations.

I am obliged now to address some words to you as to one particular effort of the rebels. They perceive that they cannot attain their bad designs without the country people; therefore, beside those deceptions by which they have sought to ensnare the peasants, and about which I have already spoken to you, they have calumniated you not only before foreign monarchs, but also before our Russian Czar. They have declared that you all desire a union with Poland—to be separated from your Russian brethren, from the orthodox Czar, your redeemer. A formidable, Satanic calumny! But, as to that, our Czar did not believe it; he is conscious of his people's fidelity, of their love for the faith of their forefathers; he knows that

an orthodox Russian will never betray either God or the Czar, that he would rather die than become an apostate, a Judas, such as sold Jesus Christ. Yet his soul suffered when his faithful people were calumniated; and the foreign monarchs have believed the calumniators' words, and, expecting that you will aid the Poles in their rebellion against the Czar, are ready to take up arms against him and our beloved Russia. But let them dare, and they will see that among the Russian people there are no traitors such as would sell Christ; and we will not be terrified nor troubled, for God is with us, who confounds the wicked and helps the work of right. One feeling will move us all—one full, unchangeable love for the Czar, the orthodox confession, and our native land. No foe is formidable to us. Fifty years ago we repulsed the whole world. Our God will not forsake us now!

APPENDIX II.

RUSSIAN TRUTH AND POLISH LYING.

ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS,—It is known to the whole world that lately the Poles have behaved with great treachery. They have been guilty of perfidy to our great Czar, Alexander Nicholaievitch, Emperor of all the Russias and King of Poland. For all his good they have returned evil. They have made riots and risen in insurrection.

They want Poland to be an independent kingdom. But Poland, alone, is not a large country. Out of Poland alone it is impossible to make a strong kingdom, with a separate king, as of old.

* The pamphlet or pseudo-historical sketch published at Moscow under the above title was distributed gratuitously or sold at the nominal price of four copeiks (less than twopence). In London or Paris, where paper and printing cost much less than at Moscow, a pamphlet of the same dimensions would have been sold for as many shillings or francs.

Accordingly they wish to take, in addition to their little Poland, nine Russian governments,* and the very holy city of Kieff, which they would turn into a Polish city. The Poles wish to rule where the Apostle Andrew, the First-called, planted the cross; where Saint Vladimir, the Equal of the Apostles, baptized the Russians in the orthodox faith; where numbers of saints sleep in the caverns of the Petcherskaia Laura. In the sacred city of Kieff, in the Jerusalem of Russia, instead of the churches of the Holy God, the Poles wish to establish Roman Catholic churches, and in the Cathedral of St. Sophia, in the Laura of Kieff, and in other holy places, to introduce 'the abomination that maketh desolate' spoken of by Daniel the Prophet.

The Poles want to root out the orthodox religion in these nine governments, and to convert the Russian people living there to the Latin religion; that they may no longer regard Jesus Christ but the Pope of Rome as the head of the Church; that in the sacrament they may not take the blood

* *i.e.* The Polish provinces seized at the three partitions of the 18th century, now incorporated with the Russian Empire.

of Christ, but unleavened bread alone; that they may not believe in the saints of the Eastern orthodox Churches who shine in holiness, but may accept as saints those who have appeared in their impure Latin Church. In one word, the Poles want Russians and orthodox Christians to forsake the customs, laws, and glory of their fatherland, and wickedly to follow the priests of the Roman Catholic religion.

The Poles wish to break the new law established by our orthodox Czar Alexander Nicholaievitch, so that bondage may exist as formerly, and that orthodox Russian Christians may live in terror of the Polish nobles of the Latin religion. That is what the Poles desire, that is why they are so turbulent, and that is why they began their insurrection immediately after our great Czar had liberated the peasants.

In their spite against the Russians, the Poles say that our Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, our orthodox religion, is heretical. They do not even regard us as Christians. They call our holy religion *chlospka vera*, that is to a say, a boorish [or slavish] religion. But what did the Poles do

with the orthodox when they were in power? How they used to torment and tyrannize over the Russians, how they used to pollute God's churches and give them on lease to Jews, is known to every one. Whoever reads the old books, the religious books of Cyril (?) and others, must know how the Poles behaved to the Russian people. In Little Russia, White Russia, and the Ukraine, the people know without books how their grandfathers and great-grandfathers were treated by the Poles. The Poles are now returning again to their old customs. They hang the orthodox, they torture the Russian priests and martyrise them. They beat their families, rob and burn their houses, and rob and burn the orthodox churches. And at the heart of all this are those Latin popes, who are priests in their way. These priests leave the cross of Jesus and go about Russian territory with guns and swords, killing the orthodox, and even their own Catholics, if they will not rise against the Czar.

They hang the people with their own hands, and then with the same hands serve the mass. The Latin priest receives confessions and also hangs those who remain true to their sovereign. Not

long ago our soldiers caught such a one. This Latin priest had already hanged eighteen persons, and the nineteenth was confessing with the noose in his hand. At that moment the priest was caught.

It is known to the whole world that we Russians are of Slavonian race, that our language is the Slavonian language, and that the holy Gospel is read by us and God's service performed in that same Slavonian tongue in which it was performed a thousand years ago when our first teachers, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, translated the books of the Church from the Greek. Without regarding that, the Poles, intoxicated with rage, tell and assure foreigners that we Russians are not Slavonians, but Calmuks or Tartars; that we are savages and do not know God; that the Russian Czar should not rule such a large empire; and that the Russian people should not live where they do live, but should be sent to Siberia, and the Russian land given up to the Poles, because they are Poles and true Slavonians. The Poles are really Slavonians by origin, but having subordinated themselves to the Pope of Rome, they forgot

the Slavonian tongue long ago, and now sing their prayers in the Latin language, which they don't understand.

Listen, orthodox Christians, as to how the Poles got up this insurrection. Our orthodox brothers who live in those nine* governments—that is to say, in Lithuania, White Russia, and in Kieff, Volhynia, and Podolia—were at one time in the power of the Poles. These countries were from time immemorial Russian, when, six hundred years ago, for our sins, with the permission of God, the Tartar Batu-Khan overran our land, &c. &c.

[The writer goes on to argue that the Lithuanian and Ruthenian provinces fell into the power of the Poles during the Tartar invasion, and that when (four hundred years afterwards) Russia, by joining in the partition of Poland, regained possession of them, she only acquired what lawfully belonged to her. The writer insists throughout that the great object of the Poles in rising against the Russian Government was to re-establish serf-

* There are three 'governments' in Lithuania Wilno, Grodno, and Kowno; and three in White Russia—Mogileff (in Polish, Mohilew), Witepsk, and Minsk.

dom and to destroy the Russo-Greek religion, and he gives horrible and revolting accounts of acts of cruelty which he accuses the Poles of having committed towards defenceless Russians.]

APPENDIX III.

[THE following memoir was never intended for the public eye. But it is only from documents *not* intended for the public eye that the truth can be known as to what the Russian Government really thinks of the difficulties of the Polish question. Thus in documents prepared for publication the Russian Government loves to quote statistics with the view of proving that in the Polish provinces incorporated with the Russian empire, the Poles form only an insignificant minority. In his private report the Minister of the Interior points out that if the Russian Government has the ignorant masses on its side, every man of the slightest education is opposed to it. In public documents great stress is laid on the fact that the great majority of the inhabitants of these provinces, and nearly the whole of the rural population, belong to the Russo-Greek Church. In the minister's private report, it is explained that many millions of the

Greek-Uniate peasantry, having been converted to the Russo-Greek religion against their will, and 'without understanding that they were returning to the religion of their forefathers,' have still a leaning towards the creed in which they or their parents were born; and, moreover, that the Roman Catholic religion being the religion of the noble, the wealthy, and the educated classes generally, is still, virtually, the dominant religion. The peasantry of the Russo-Polish provinces (*i.e.* of Lithuania and Ruthenia) were, for the most part, converted to Christianity by the Eastern Church. But, at the end of the sixteenth century, when the political union between Poland and Lithuania was formed, the Lithuanian and Ruthenian bishops of the Eastern Church formed a union with Rome. They accepted the doctrine of the double procession, and acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope. On the other hand, they were allowed to retain their ritual in the old-Russian or Slavonian tongue; and the priests of the new 'Greek-Uniate' Church were still allowed, as in the Eastern Church, to marry.

After the partitions of the eighteenth century,

Catherine II. forced some two millions of her new subjects to forsake the Greek-Uniate for the Russian Church. The Emperor Nicholas, after the insurrection of 1830, simply abolished the Greek-Uniate Church in the Polish provinces. The chief members of the higher clergy were gained over. The priests were called upon either to join the Russian Church or to become Roman Catholics—which for married priests was not easy. Many priests were sent to Siberia. Many more, having a wife and family to maintain, entered the Russian Church. The nobles who still belonged to the Greek-Uniate Church were also allowed, and at the same time compelled, to adopt either the Russo-Greek or the Roman Catholic religion. Unfortunately for them, in a national if not in a religious point of view, the great majority of the landed proprietors had long before joined the Church of Rome, thus separating their future from that of their peasantry, whose church though in union with that of Rome was yet not the same church.

In connecting the peasantry of the Greek-Uniate Church with the Russo-Greek Church, no ceremony was used, but only compulsion. Some

of the more obstinate among them were exiled, others adopted the doctrine of the double procession after being flogged; but only a few thousand, out of as many millions, remained Greek-Uniate, or relapsed, after the general conversion, into Greek-Uniatism. These backsliders were driven into the Russian fold during the present reign. The driver was General Stcherbinin—a civil functionary with a General's rank, whose proceedings were formally approved of by His Majesty the Emperor. In justice to General Stcherbinin, I must mention that he used no physical violence, but only persuasion accompanied by menaces.

It will be seen from Mr. Valouieff's secret report that the system of forcible conversion practised in the Polish provinces has not been attended with the success anticipated. As the lawyer has one language for the court and another for his client, so a Russian minister has one language for the public, at home and abroad, and another for his own sovereign. He may not tell the whole truth even to his sovereign; in the case of Poland it would be disrespectful to do so. He cannot say that every civilized person in the provinces seized

by Russia at the three partitions of the last century is still a Pole, and that every Pole hates Russia; nor that the Poles, as a nation, sigh for their ancient independence. He is obliged, moreover, to speak of the agitation which culminated in the insurrection of 1863 as the work of professional revolutionists acting in Poland only because other countries were closed to them. But, as far as he can do so with propriety, he gives a fair picture of the political, social, and religious condition of Lithuania and Ruthenia just before the outbreak of the insurrection; and he points out the iniquitous measures by which alone Russia can maintain her hold on provinces entirely Polish by civilization.

Mr. Valouieff is known to be one of the most intelligent and also one of the most liberal of His Imperial Majesty's ministers, and he has been an active supporter of every reform introduced into Russia during the present reign. In Poland, however, and in the Polish provinces, the one problem is—how to keep the country?—and it is only by raising up class against class, and by destroying every vestige of existing civilisation, that the Russians

can maintain their position. In annexing foreign provinces, as in appropriating another man's ideas, '*quand on vole il faut tuer;*' and if Russia retains her Polish provinces permanently, it is only by a murderous perversion and misapplication of the Voltairian precept that she will be able to do so. She may brutally destroy such life as they now possess. She has no power to infuse new life into them, and so transform them.].

Memorandum on the general Progress of Affairs in the Western Provinces from the early part of 1861 to the present time, drawn up by Mr. Valouieff, Minister of the Interior, from documents in possession of the Ministry of the Interior and the 3rd Section of H. M.'s Chancery (Secret Office). (Presented to the Committee on the Western Provinces in Oct. 1862.)

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF EVENTS.

The revolutionary movement, long nurtured in Germany, energetically suppressed in France, and so strikingly successful in the Italian Peninsula,

soon spread to the principal component parts of ancient Poland, to Posen, Galicia, and the present kingdom. But while Galicia and Posen, restrained by the systematic and decisive action of the Austrian and Prussian Governments, confined themselves to feeble manifestations of sympathy with the events occurring in the south-west of Europe, Warsaw, the capital of the kingdom, emboldened by the mild rule of Prince Gortchakoff, entered upon an open struggle with its legal Government. Having distinguished their opposition by the novel appearance of an unarmed insurrection, the leaders of the insurrectionary movement in the kingdom of Poland strove hard to strengthen their position abroad, by enlisting the sympathies of the Western Powers through the instrumentality of the foreign press and by accusations against Russia, and in the interior of the empire by developing a revolutionary propaganda and attracting to it, in particular, the inhabitants of the Western Provinces —Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, Kieff, and White Russia. However well history may have disproved the pretensions of Polish nationality to the provinces above mentioned, and however limited their

population of purely Polish origin, the propaganda immediately directed towards that minority, composed as it is of the most educated classes of society —of the nobility, the clergy, the officers of Government, of the teachers and the taught—that propaganda had a rapid success. Soon after the events at Warsaw of the $\frac{13}{25}$ and $\frac{15}{27}$ February, a certain sympathy became apparent at the principal points in the Western Provinces. The earlier symptoms of that state of feeling were—a feverish excitement of the public mind, especially observable in the Polish youth; a sudden haughtiness on the part of the Poles in their bearing towards Russians; a strained attention to the events passing in Poland, and an anxious expectation of news from that quarter; lastly, an ill-concealed joyfulness at the success of the opposition to the Government. In the meanwhile the leaders of the movement, taking advantage of the excited condition of the public mind in Lithuania, and in the Western Provinces generally, increased their endeavours to inflame the popular passions. It has been ascertained, that about this time the country began to be invaded by the revolutionary proclamations of

Mieroslawski and Czartoryski; by calls to oppose the authorities, and invitations to sympathize with the movement, and to imitate the scenes of Warsaw. The inhabitants were called upon to devote a certain portion of their income to the liberation of their common fatherland; funds were transmitted by secret channels to evil-disposed persons abroad; and the necessity of a good understanding between the educated and the lower classes, and principally with the villagers, began to be agitated, with the view to engender a hatred towards Russians and disaffection to the Government. Mourning and emblems of national grief gradually came into general use. Revolutionary verses, speeches, and proclamations of every kind—frequently even fictitious ones, such as the letter attributed to Archbishop Fijalkowski—soon made their appearance. These proved the existence of a moveable printing-office.

Political demonstrations increased, and took diverse forms; such as funeral services for those killed at Warsaw, the singing of patriotic hymns in churches, the celebration of anniversaries, and the glorification of the principal

events and leaders in former revolutions in Poland; the wearing of mourning, and the compulsion of others to do the same; noisy and numerous processions, disrespect to the authorities, disobedience of their orders, and insults to the military. These manifestations were all the while accompanied by the raising of funds for criminal objects, by an increased activity of the secret press, by a strained effort on the part of the educated classes to draw closer towards the people, with the decided object of destroying their allegiance to the Government, by means of false interpretations of such legislative measures as immediately concerned the interests of the peasantry. These endeavours went in some localities so far as to cause numbers of the higher orders of society to mix in crowds of the lower orders; ladies were seen to dance with drunken or only half-sober peasants, and gentlemen with peasant women. In these cases deep mourning was replaced by the most vivid colours. On separating, the common people were presented with revolutionary proclamations, verses, songs and hymns, and with emblems of grief, to be here-

after constantly worn. There were even cases of mumerous and noisy meetings prepared with a manifestation of violent intent, in order to force the Government to shed blood, and thus rouse the people. Taken separately, the development of that system of political demonstration and organised opposition to Government proceeded in different degrees of intensity, and there were periods in which the movement either rose or fell. In Wilno, the first demonstration after the events at Warsaw was made by Tyszkiewicz, district marshal of nobility. On the report of the late Minister of the Interior, H.I.M. was pleased, in accordance with the recommendation of General Nazimoff, to discharge Count Tyszkiewicz from the office which he held. That measure led to a special demonstration on the part of the nobles who had assembled in June, at the invitation of the Governor-General, to elect another marshal. The nobles presented an address of thanks to Count Tyszkiewicz, supported by forty-six signatures, in consequence of which General Nazimoff refused to confirm the new election, banished to various parts of the empire four of the

nobles who had been most active in the matter, and dismissed from the service the clerk who had been charged with the preparation of the address.

Another demonstration was produced in the district of Bielostock, in the Government of Grodno, by the temporary stay there of Count Andrew Zamoyski. The crowd assembled on his departure took off their hats, threw bouquets of flowers, and shouted 'Hurrah for Zamoyski, the first nobleman of Poland.'

The singing of hymns, the celebration of funeral services, and the wearing of mourning were continued during the months of May, June, and almost the whole of July, in several parts of the Governments of Wilno, Kovno, Grodno, and Minsk.

A solemn funeral service had already been celebrated in the month of April at Minsk, at the instigation of a district marshal of nobility and on the invitation of Archbishop Fijalkowski.

In the province of Kieff, according to a report of the Adjutant-General, Prince Wassilitchkoff the Governor-General, dated 5/17 December, 1861, the excitement produced by the events at War-

saw towards the end of February had entirely ceased by the month of May. The measures adopted in Warsaw towards calming the public agitation exercised a favourable influence on the Poles of the Western Provinces. Then the Imperial reprimand to the Provincial Marshal of Volhynia and the District Marshal of Zitomir for their participation in funeral services for the repose of those killed in the riots at Warsaw; the banishment to provinces of Russia Proper of the nobles who had taken an active part in those services; the exile to Omsk of a priest who had preached a revolutionary sermon; the severe warning and reproof addressed to the priests who had performed funeral services, and generally the rapid and increasing prosecution of persons who had participated in demonstrations, produced the desired effect, withheld the evil-disposed, and cooled the imagination of those who were being led away.

Although a few persons were found to be badly disposed, yet their actions were only special and desultory manifestations, possessing no common character or connection. By the month of August 1861, the position of affairs in the south-western

provinces had undergone no change, and the occasional Polish demonstrations were apparently of no great importance. Up to that time the action of the Government had been confined to the above-mentioned measures of precaution and administrative prosecution. The Governor-General of Kieff, as will appear from the forejoined, found other measures necessary, and the Governor of Podolia, in reporting to the Ministry of the Interior (Report of Actual State Councillor Braunschweig to the Minister of Interior, June 4/16, 1861) the state of the provinces confided to him, and the arrangements which he had made for the preservation of order, insisted with the view of definitely pacifying the country on the necessity of developing the Russian element in all the phases of social life; *i.e.* he recommended a series of measures involving many considerations, necessitating a lengthy execution, and promising only a remote result. The Governor-General of Wilno was equally silent on the adoption of any other measures except those of an administrative character for the restoration of tranquillity in the provinces committed to his care. But in the mean-

while the third section of H.I.M. Private Chancery (Secret Police) and the Ministry of the Interior had almost simultaneously taken up the question of the discovery of other means for suppressing the Polish movement in the Western Provinces. These departments were chiefly prompted by a consideration of the inconvenience which attended an exclusive recourse to administrative penalties inflicted at the discretion of the local authorities, and of the evident insufficiency of such measures for the attainment of the object desired; for, notwithstanding the successive adoption of those measures, the revolutionary propaganda and accompanying demonstrations had not been interrupted. The third section and the Ministry of the Interior adopted the idea of legal prosecution of political disturbances whenever the publicity of the actions of the participators permitted the possibility of such a course. Early in July projects for the establishment of special police courts for such cases were drawn up. The acting ministers of the Minister Valouieff informed the Governor-General of Wilno and Kieff by telegrams of the proposed institution of such courts.

The following replies were received:—1. From Prince Vassilitchkoff: 'I also find the proposed measures useful, but the most of inflicting penalties prescribed, permitting however in extreme cases recourse to existing special measures.' 2. From Adjutant-General Nazimoff: 'If you consider judicial police measures better adapted for suppressing demonstrations than adminstrative measures, I concur. I shall, however, transmit my opinion by post.'

General Nazimoff then requested permission to visit St. Petersburg on matters relating to the service, which was accordingly granted to him.

Events soon confirmed the necessity of adopting new measures for the preservation of public tranquillity. On the approach of the 31st July, the anniversary of the union of Lithuania with Poland in 1569, the leaders of the political movement in the Western Provinces prepared fresh demonstrations for the solemn commemoration of the fusion of the two countries. In the town of Rossieny, on the 31st July, a crowd of young men, women having taken some banners from a church, proceeded, with singing of hymns, towards a cross near the town, on the road to Kovno, and

then returned to the church. A similar procession was to have taken place at Kovno, with the participation of the inhabitants of the kingdom of Poland. After communicating with the military commander of the Government of Augustowo, in order that he might take the measures which depended on him to prevent the breaking out of a riot in the village of Alexoff (?), the Governor of the Province of Kovno, on his part, caused to be withdrawn the floating bridge across the Niemen, which separated the village from the town of Kovno, and placed along the banks of the river a platoon of Cossacks and a company of the garrison battalion. Notwithstanding these preparations, the inhabitants of Kovno of both sexes assembled on the morning of the 31st July in the Augustine Church, and thence formed into a procession, numbering about 5,000, and carrying crosses, banners, and images, accompanied by the clergy, proceeded towards the Niemen. A similar procession was at the same time approaching the river from the village of Alexoff (?) in the kingdom of Poland. Mass was performed on either side of the river, and then the crowd, having pushed back

the Cossacks, began to put up the bridge. Notwithstanding the warnings of the authorities, the priests and the people obstinately announced their intention of crossing the river at all hazards. In order to prevent bloodshed, now becoming unavoidable, Vice-Governor Koretsky, in charge of the province, who had no special directions for such a contingency, ordered the Cossacks to fall back. The crowd then crossed the river on the bridge, which they had re-established, and with solemn chants proceeded to the village of Alexoff,* returning to Kovno the same evening.

The same anniversary was celebrated in the town of Minsk on the 31st July. The ceremony was marked by the numerous attendance of the people in the church, by the ladies wearing coloured dresses instead of mourning, and confederate caps instead of bonnets, and also by the men wearing the national costume. The 31st July was similarly kept in other towns and places in Lithuania. Revolutionary hymns were even sung on that day in the churches of Lepel and Drissa, districts of the province of Vitepsk. On the 6th August a

* In my MS. translation the last syllable of this word seems to be incorrectly written.

religious ceremony was performed with extraordinary solemnity at Caswich, in the district of Lepel. After service, some of the landed proprietors, dressed in white robes, carried the banners round the church, and after the procession the whole crowd went down on their knees and sang a revolutionary hymn.

After that, under the plea of a report in circulation at Wilno, to the effect that in the early part of August a procession was to reach the town from the Kingdom, in which the inhabitants of Vilna were to take part, a crowd, composed of persons of every condition, began to assemble daily, from the first days of August, in the Pogulianka suburb of Wilna, and repeatedly sang revolutionary hymns over the grave of the criminal Konarski. In the evening of the 7th August, a crowd of about 5,000 persons proceeded from the town towards Pogulianka. Having at the town barrier met a company of infantry and two hundred Cossacks, a part of the crowd halted, while the other fell upon the foot-soldiers with the evident intention of disarming them and passing the barrier. Stones taken from the pavement, and brought up by the women in their pockets and

the skirts of their dresses, were showered upon the troops. The men began to arm themselves with pikes taken from a neighbouring fence. The Cossacks then dispersed the crowd by force. Having been put to flight, the crowd proceeded to the image of the Holy Virgin of OSTROBOMA (?), sang a revolutionary hymn there, repeating the chant before a crucifix, and then went home.

In the meanwhile, towards the end of July, special councils were held by order of H.I.M. to deliberate on the measures to be adopted in view of the state of affairs in the kingdom of Poland and the Western Provinces. They were attended by General Count Lambert, who had been appointed to fill the office of Lieutenant in the kingdom, and by General Nazimoff, who had arrived from Wilna. The latter pointed out the inimical tendency of the Roman Catholic clergy, and explained that, at that very time, many legislative enactments were naturally calculated to excite, not only among the clergy, but also among the whole of the local population professing the Roman Catholic faith, a feeling of disaffection and opposition towards the existing system of govern-

ment, especially in regard to the regulations connected with ecclesiastical matters. General Nazimoff pointed out, at the same time, some legislative acts which were humiliating to the Roman Catholic Church; such, for instance, as the ecclesiastical procession in commemoration of the establishment of the Uniate Confession performed on the same day as the procession of the Roman Catholic Church in honour of the Corpus Domini, and the direct subjection of one religion to the other, as conveyed in the prohibition to construct Latin Churches without the concurrence of the orthodox (Russian) diocesan authorities. Several other questions were submitted to preliminary discussion at the councils; such as the establishment of police courts, and the placing, if necessary, in a state of siege districts where disturbances assumed very large proportions.

At this time the Imperial Government received the first intelligence of the demonstration at Kovno and other places, and a despatch from the Governor of Minsk reporting the spread of disorder in the provinces under his charge. Count Keller advised the disarming of the inhabitants, as

in 1848. His Majesty the Emperor, after a preliminary discussion in the Imperial presence of the several measures proposed to be adopted in the North-Western Provinces, and extended thence, in case of need, to the South-Western Governments, was pleased to confirm, among others, the following proposals:

[Here follow proposals to increase the number of troops in the provinces in question; to disarm the local population by means of announcements from the police authorities, and without at first taking measures of a compulsory character; to prohibit demonstrations in the open air; to take no compulsory measures with reference to church demonstrations in the churches themselves, but to prosecute and punish such of the clergy as may be found guilty of favouring them or of offering no resistance to them; the known leaders of such movements to be arrested after the crowd has left the church, and in a 'circumspect and sudden' manner, so as not to increase the general agitation by such arrests. It is further recommended that 'the reasons for which such measures are adopted be announced in

circumspect and temperate language.' The other propositions, of which there are altogether as many as twenty, are to the effect that officials not to be relied upon be removed, and those absolutely under suspicion brought to trial 'according to due process of law;' that the state of siege be proclaimed where it is thought necessary; and finally—this being the twentieth and last proposition—'that certain questions relative to the Roman Catholics in the empire be examined at the Ministry of the Interior.' The memoir states that in fact 'certain administrative arrangements were made with reference to questions connected with the Roman Catholic Church,' but without specifying them. All the repressive measures above indicated were adopted and carried out.]

On the 29th August, [continues the memoir,] Assistant-General Nazimoff telegraphed to His Majesty the Emperor at Livadia in the Crimea, that the Western Provinces were tranquil; but on the 24th, he had already declared in a state of siege the towns of Wilna, Grodno, Bielostock, Bielsk, Brest-Litewski, and the province of Kovno,

with the exception of the Novo-Alexandrovsk district. In the province of Kieff, the town of Zitomir was placed in a state of siege towards the end of September. The disarming of the population, which had hitherto been considered unnecessary by Prince Vassilitchkoff, was, at the same time, extended to the South-Western Provinces. The adoption of these measures was necessitated by the continuation of the ill-affected propaganda in all its previous forms, and by the repetition of various political demonstrations. The most important of these were—

1. A procession formed at Grodno on the 14th August by the deacon Maiewski, notwithstanding the prohibition of the Governor and Governor-General, and which was only stopped on its way to the Niemen (over which it intended to pass in order to enter the kingdom) by being surrounded by the military; and,

2. The erection on the night of the 20th–21st September, on the cathedral square of the town of Zitomir, of a black cross with the inscription, 'To the memory of the Poles murdered in 1861.' This cross was removed by the police; but a turbulent

crowd led by ladies demanded its restoration, and the chief of the province was obliged to call in a company of infantry and gendarmes, which dispersed the crowd. Although at first, after the declaration of the state of siege, outward demonstrations became less frequent and were more cautiously conducted, yet the condition of affairs underwent but little change.* Mourning and national-dresses continued to be worn. Even in the provinces of Mogileff and Witepsk the same anti-governmental movement which had embraced the rest of the Western Provinces, although in lesser proportion, became apparent. The youths of schools everywhere took an active part in political demonstrations, and the university riots at St. Petersburg and other towns, in the autumn of 1861, showed that even beyond the limits of the Western Provinces, many men of Polish origin systematically cooperated with other agitators, and were in close relations with the secret leaders of the movement.

* General Nazimoff wrote to the Minister of the Interior, in Dec. 1861, that 'the excitement had not decreased in the least.'

In the meanwhile the Government adopted some measures supplementary to the original regulations against disorders in the Western Provinces, or of a character to remove opportunities for further rioting. In conformity with the view of the Governor-General of Kieff, it was considered inconvenient to prevent the meeting of the members of the Agricultural Society of the province.

On the 23rd August, His Majesty ordered that whenever the Governor-General in the Western Provinces should consider it necessary to place any particular locality in a state of siege, the persons whose conduct had been the principal cause of the adoption of such a measure should be tried by martial law, and the sentence carried into effect without loss of time. Later, on the 21st October, the Governor-General of Kieff was permitted to adopt the following measures without the previous declaration of a state of siege:

a. To dismiss functionaries in all branches of the service;

b. To establish in extraordinary cases military commissions for trial by martial law;

c. To adopt for the preservation of order at

his, Prince Vassilitchkoff's discretion, the measures laid down in the regulations proposed by the committee, and confirmed by His Majesty on the 5th August, 1861.

On the 22nd October, Prince Vassilitchkoff was authorised to dismiss from the university such Polish students as had been observed to participate in demonstrations, and whose conduct had been unfavourably reported by the police and university authorities, and to deport them under the surveillance of the police.

In answer to a question raised by Adjutant-General Nazimoff, His Majesty authorised on the 28th October the Governor-General to be invested with authority to remove even the members of the nobility in localities declared in a state of siege. On the report of the Minister of the Interior, dated 19th October, His Majesty the Emperor was pleased to write the following resolution: 'My immutable will to be again made known, that whenever a state of siege is declared, it is to be enforced in all its severity without any relaxation.' A military governor was appointed to Minsk, owing to the increase of disorders in that

province. At different periods Imperial orders postponed the nobility elections in the provinces of Wolna, Kovno, Grodno, Minsk, Witepsk, and Volhynia. [The nobility of Podolia had just petitioned for that province to be annexed to the kingdom of Poland.] Police courts were also ordered to be introduced in Mogileff and Witepsk and in some of the towns of the South-Western Provinces where they had not been previously established.

By order of General Nazimoff, a heavier house-tax on landlords of the Roman Catholic persuasion was now imposed at Wilna. That tax gave rise to complaints, and was a subject of correspondence between the Minister of the Interior and the Governor-General, who declared that he considered it necessary to continue the tax until the 1st October of this year.

Lastly, besides the authority of the police courts, an activity which produced results varied by localities, and in addition to the action of the military-judicial commissioners, the local authorities adopted administrative measures in the shape of penalties against persons guilty of political disturbances. A considerable number of those

persons were deputed to places of residence within the empire, more or less remote.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE COUNTRY (*i.e.* in Oct. '62).

It has already been stated that after some localities had been declared in a state of siege, demonstrations became less frequent and were more cautiously conducted. But except during the period which immediately followed the adoption of these measures, while the order and means of their execution were not practically demonstrated, the diminution of the outward signs of discontent cannot be ascribed to the effect of the state of siege. Other circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of greater tranquillity, such as the lateness of the season, the infliction of administrative penalties, the action of the police courts; and further, the participators in the riots had grown tired in some localities of making demonstrations, or perhaps had begun to act under other instructions secretly received from the chiefs of the movement. If the outward signs of discontent grew more feeble, the propaganda in the interior of the country acquired a relative strength. The late revolutionary appeals

to the people advise them to abstain from further demonstrations. Lithuania and the South-Western Provinces, these addresses say, have sufficiently shown to Europe their fixed determination to throw off the Russian yoke and to be united to Poland with its ancient boundaries. They recommend the people to wait for a more favourable opportunity—for events in Italy and Hungary, or for the revolution preparing in Russia. In the meanwhile, the national strength should be directed to the concentration of mutual measures in the work of liberation; to bringing the rural population over to the cause; to placing the Jewish element on an equality with the rest of the nation; to the dissemination among the lower orders, by means of education, of Polish ideas and traditions; to the promotion of a love of Polish history and national amusements; lastly, to the elevation of the popular mind, with a view to future events.

The priests, as usual, in order to render nugatory the action of this law, instructed the people at the confessional to commit perjury at the police courts, and actively instigated them to counteract the views of the Government. The

landed proprietors now secretly consulted whether it were possible by territorial sacrifices to gain the favour of the peasantry towards their cause. A sudden movement to establish schools for the people in which the Polish language should be taught was also observable, and the Ministry of the Interior was obliged in the spring of this year to direct the local authorities in the North-Western Provinces to these attempts. In the Southern governments the schools for the people had already been the object of the special solicitude of the Governor-General. [Which means, that those who established them were prosecuted, and fined or imprisoned.]

At last, revolutionary proclamations and sheets of a criminal character began to be circulated in all shapes and in every local dialect. They were scattered along the roads, left at houses, sent through the post-offices; while none of the distributors have ever been discovered.

It is impossible not to observe a general connection in all that is done in the Western Provinces. If in some respects Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine act separately, and even

differently, as for instance in the preparation of projects respecting land-banks, still it is in every case evident that all that is done in the north is at once and fully known in the south, and *vice versâ*; and that, in other respects, there is a systematic unity between the acts of the Polish party in the north and south, and in White Russia. There is everywhere the same tendency towards organised associations under the plea of forming rural or benevolent societies; everywhere absentees from the country of greater or less importance; everywhere, even on the shores of the Baltic, the celebration of certain anniversaries; everywhere the wearing of mourning, even in the capitals: in fact, a general desire to manifest an attachment to Polish nationality and to protest against an immediate dependence on Russia. Thus in the affair of Bogusz, the Marshal of Rogaczeff, the nobility of White Russia showed a tendency to unite with Lithuania on the basis of the restoration of the Lithuanian statute and the official recognition of the Polish language; in the project of the north-western land-bank, the use of the Polish language was recommended in the

transaction of the business; and lastly, at the provincial assembly of the nobles of Podolia, pretensions to union with Poland, and the separation of the whole of the Western Ukraine from the administrative unity of the empire, were openly manifested in the form of an address to H.I.M.

The outward tranquillity of the country, and the cessation to some extent of demonstrations in the streets and churches, present the important advantage of rendering more difficult any action on the feelings of the masses, and of placing the Government less frequently under the necessity of having recourse to legal indictments and administrative penalties. The state of siege was raised at Wilna on the 1st October. In the Government of Minsk and Mohilew it was considered possible to permit the convocation of the provincial assemblies of the nobility, the first in the month of November, the second in January 1862. But the decrease of outward signs of perturbation can only be temporary. The events at the election of Minsk may necessitate arrangements similar to those which were made in the case of the Podolian assembly [*i.e.* imprisonment of the marshals of the nobility]

and another adjournment of the election of Mohilew. In fact, notwithstanding all the absence of sympathy on the part of the masses of the rural population towards the Polish agitation, *it is still to be feared that even amongst those classes an anti-governmental movement may in time be produced.* It became expedient to profit by experience, and to discuss anew the measures to be adopted in order to ensure the safety of the empire in the West. H.M. accordingly ordered the re-appointment of the 'Western Committee.'

Up to the present time experience has given us a series of facts which deserve attention.

Neither the state of siege, nor the action of police courts, nor the latitude given to the local authorities with regard to administrative penalties, has as yet afforded the benefits which had been anticipated. Positive results were expected, and only palliative results obtained. No firm consistency or certain mutual agreement can be traced in the actions of the several authorities. Views have been liable to change and to diversity. Circumstances have not been faultlessly anticipated. Attention has been, and is still, directed

towards modes of action which the Government have long contemplated, or towards such as do not promise the desired effect, or which require a process of time inadmissible under present circumstances.

In the Western Provinces the Government have on their side only the masses of the rural population, which cannot be utilized without the effusion of blood, without the destruction of the general principles of civil order, and without the danger of disturbing those principles in the neighbouring [*i.e.* Russian] provinces, and thence even in other portions of the empire. It is of course possible to raise the peasantry against the proprietors. The well-known scenes of Galicia would put to flight those nobles who now so haughtily call these provinces Lithuania or Poland. But can we determine on the use of such measures? Will it be possible to arrest their effect at an ideal line, separating one district from another? The nobility, clergy, citizens, the scattered gentry (*szlachta*), are more or less inimical to us, or, at all events, indifferent observers. The Jews have not joined the movement, but they cannot be said

to have opposed it. They see the advantage of neutrality, they ask for fresh privileges, and by that position certainly afford a negative advantage to the Government. But we can scarcely find in them the power of any influence on the settlement of the question. With regard, however, to the orthodox clergy, and to the upper and middle classes of the Russian inhabitants of the provinces, their small numbers and the manner in which they are scattered, and particularly the absence of any signs of independence, have prevented those elements of the local population from acquiring any real importance.

Lastly, throughout the empire in the oldest provinces of Russia, even in Little Russia, where the ancient hatred of the Poles has been preserved in all its force, *there exists a striking indifference towards the struggles in which the Government is involved against the revolutionary pretensions of the Poles. Nowhere, either by word or deed, has the slightest sign of sympathy been shown towards that struggle and towards the preservation of the interests of the unity of the State.* A few newspaper articles are of no account in this case. In

order to be convinced of the spirit in which those are chiefly written, we have only to turn to the *Den (Day)*, where it treats of the Podolian address. The pretensions of the Podolian nobles are certainly not admitted, but that non-admission is based entirely on the theory of nationality; there is no reference to Russia as a state, and when the Government is mentioned it is only to give expression to an opinion that the Government could not satisfy the wishes of the Poles, even if it desired to do so, because the days of the Vienna Congress have passed. The above facts require some explanation.

The state of siege, as it was practically applied, especially in the Lithuanian Provinces, was scarcely deserving of the name. Practically it was confined to a greater severity of police regulations, and the institution of military courts whose verdicts were either not in accordance with martial law, or not carried into execution when founded on it. Michalowski, the proprietor, in the Government of Kovno, at whose house several dozens of muskets were discovered after that province had been disarmed, together with several pounds of

powder, was only kept in custody during the enquiry, and then sent to reside on his estate under the surveillance of the police. Others were banished to distant governments, or, as in the Kieff government, drafted into the military service. The governors of provinces generally acted with perfect independence in the confirmation of the verdicts of the military courts and in the infliction of administrative penalties. They banished to distant provinces, without any previous reference to the Minister of the Interior as to the place to be selected for such residence, and they brought the exiles back at their own pleasure after the expiration of a greater or less period of banishment. Thus, in the province of Wilna, some priests were recalled after five months' banishment who had been the chief promoters of local religious demonstrations. Recently, when the Minister of the Interior proposed to Adjutant-General Nazimoff the expulsion of some other priests who had taken part in the funeral services for the assassins executed at Warsaw, General Nazimoff replied (20th Sept. 1862), that banishment was attended with considerable expense for post-horses, and that it would

be convenient for the punishment of the guilty to select a few monasteries to which they might be sent under surveillance.

The police courts have likewise proved inoperative, owing to the manner in which they have been conducted by the local authorities. The instructions issued by the Ministry of the Interior prescribed to the court to prosecute chiefly, not the singing of hymns of a suspicious character, but rather the compelling of others to join in such singing, and the insulting of persons who did not wish to join in it; that in case of the irregular acquittal of an accused person, the prosecution should be carried to the next court of appeal, and that any irregularity on the part of the district judges and advocates should be reported in the proper quarter. Notwithstanding these instructions the prosecutions in the police courts were generally accusations of singing hymns in churches; appeals were made but rarely, and no representations were ever made of the improper discharge of duties by judges, advocates, and others, although the unsatisfactory conduct of these officers was sometimes reported in general

terms. In the same manner, attention was not equally or properly bestowed by those courts on the latitude which had been allowed to them with regard to the infliction of penalties. Thus it appears that in the Government of Kieff 298 persons were condemned in fines amounting to more than 20,000*r.* (3,000*l.*); whereas in that of Wilna 27 persons were fined to the amount of 716*r.* (107*l.*), and in Minsk and Mohilew 52 persons to the extent of 900*r.* (135*l.*). Nor are the reports of the police courts forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior at proper intervals according to their instructions. In the province of Witepsk, not a single case has been brought before the police courts, but the Government several times recommended the banishment and dismissal of Korsak, the President of the Civil Court, who had been at the head of several demonstrations. The Ministry of the Interior addressed the Minister of Justice on that subject, and in May last President Korsak was relieved of his duties, and, by the order of the Home Ministry, expelled from the province.

The extensive correspondence of the Ministry

of the Interior with the local authorities testifies to the cooperation which has always been afforded by the ministry, and its attention to their representations, and the extreme care with which the forms of the law have been observed in cases of divergence of opinion. The results of such relations cannot, however, be said to have been satisfactory. It is only fair to state that the relations between the Ministry of the Interior and the Governor of Kieff presented fewer difficulties than those with the Governor of Wilna; but even in the southern districts events were frequently at variance with the anticipations of the local authorities, or took them sometimes unawares. Thus the Governor of Podolia, one of the most able and active lieutenants in the whole of the Western Provinces, reported with reference to the nobles of the province, that the most important and influential section of the Polish population, the great landed proprietors, had always been distinguished by their conservative principles and by their abstinence from manifestations of sympathy with Polish nationality.

[In conclusion, the author recommends the

adoption of the following measures 'in order to counteract the effect of the Polish propaganda and to retain possession of the Western Provinces.']

1. To establish in the Western Provinces a purely Russian administration; i.e. to replace by Russian officials, or by those who are devoted to Russia, such Polish employés as have no sympathy with the views of the Imperial Government.

2. To endeavour to Russianize the peasantry by every possible means, and first, by establishing a considerable number of popular schools in which the Russian language should be exclusively taught.

3. To place these schools under orthodox priests.

4. To defray the expenses of such schools by a tax on the land to be paid by the proprietors.

5. To maintain constantly the antagonism between the nobles and the peasantry, and to prevent by every possible means any union of those classes.

APPENDIX IV.

THE ARRANGEMENTS OF 1815.

At the end of the campaign of 1812–13 Russia found herself the mistress of the whole of ancient Poland. After it had been vainly proposed by Austria and Prussia on their own behalf, and by England on behalf of Europe, that the Emperor of Russia should consent to the reconstruction of the Poland of 1772—a proposition never seriously pressed—Lord Castlereagh declared himself 'compelled in this the fourth instance of Russian aggrandisement within a few years, by a sense of public duty to Europe, and especially to His Imperial Majesty (Alexander I.), to press for a modification, not for an abandonment, of His Imperial Majesty's pretensions to extend his empire farther to the westward.'* At this time

* Correspondence relating to the Negotiations of the years 1814 and 1815 respecting Poland; presented to the House

Austria and Prussia had lost all their Polish territory, and it did not appear probable that they would ever get any important part of it back again, without going to war. This explains their sudden disinterestedness in respect to that Poland which not many years before they had helped to destroy.

Although it had been settled by the Treaty of Kalisch (February 28, 1813), to which Austria, Prussia, and Russia were parties, that the Duchy of Warsaw should be divided and partitioned between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, 'according to arrangements to be made by these three Powers, without any intervention of the Danish Government,' * 'it is nevertheless understood,' writes Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool, 'that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia considers himself entitled to dispose of the whole Duchy of Warsaw, with all its fortresses, on the ground that his troops first occupied the Duchy; that, however, as matter of grace and favour,

of Commons by command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of the address dated May 15, 1865, page 7 (Letter to Emperor Alexander).

* Correspondence, &c. page 3.

he means to assign to Prussia the city and territory of Dantzic, and a district necessary for connecting Ancient Prussia with the other Prussian territories: and it is further understood that it is the intention of His Imperial Majesty to connect the residue of the Duchy of Warsaw with the Russian provinces which were allotted to Russia by the former divisions of Poland, and to erect them into a separate monarchy, to be governed by His Imperial Majesty as King of Poland, under such arrangements as may be judged suitable for reviving the kingdom of Poland under the Russian dynasty. And this measure is alleged to be necessary, on the principles of moral duty, in order to produce a due improvement in the government of His Imperial Majesty's Polish subjects, and of the people of the Duchy of Warsaw, who are at present subject to him, by His Imperial Majesty's military occupation of the duchy. The contemplation of this measure has necessarily created great alarm and consternation in the Courts of Austria and Prussia, and diffused general apprehension throughout the European States.'

The 'arrangements judged suitable for reviving the kingdom of Poland under the Russian dynasty,' included, of course, the establishment of a constitutional government in the new kingdom. On this point Lord Castlereagh, who desired the revival of a kingdom of Poland apart from Russia, but not the revival of a kingdom under the Russian dynasty, wrote to the Emperor of Russia as follows:—

'I must also entreat, Sire, if you find me opposed, in a certain extent, to your Imperial Majesty's pretensions on the Duchy of Warsaw, that you will not therefore consider me indisposed to witness, even with satisfaction, that your Imperial Majesty should receive a liberal and important aggrandisement on your Polish frontier. It is the degree and the mode to which I alone object.'*

And again:—

'I should press these considerations with the more reluctance if I did not feel persuaded that there is a course open to your Imperial Majesty to pursue, which will combine your beneficent

* Correspondence, &c. page 6.

intentions towards your Polish subjects with what your allies and Europe, Sire, claimed at your hands. They desire not to see the Poles humiliated or deprived of a mild, conciliatory, and congenial system of administration. *They desire not that your Imperial Majesty should enter into any engagements restrictive of your sovereign authority over your own provinces.* They only wish you, Sire, for the sake of peace, to ameliorate gradually the frame of your Polish administration, *and to avoid, if you are not prepared for the complete reunion and independence of Poland, that species of measure which, under the title of higher import, may create alarm both in Russia and the neighbouring States;* and which, however it may gratify the ambition of a few individuals of great family in Poland, may in fact bring less of real liberty and happiness to the people than a more measured and unostentatious change in the system of their administration.'*

Here it is plainly set forth that no one wished His Imperial Majesty 'to enter into any engagements restrictive of his sovereign authority over

* Correspondence, &c. page 7.

his own provinces.' More than that, the Emperor of Russia, struck by Lord Castlereagh's suggestion that he should ameliorate gradually the frame of his Polish administration, replied—

'As regards the concern which I owe to my own subjects, and my duties towards them, it is for me to be aware of them; and it is only the uprightness of your motives which could have made me change the first impressions which the reading of this passage of your letter produced upon me.'

Ultimately the best plan for the Western Powers to adopt seemed to be to let the Emperor of Russia form his constitutional Kingdom of Poland, on condition of his giving up Posen to Prussia, and Galicia to Austria. This was called 'yielding on the political if His Imperial Majesty would yield on the territorial question.' The discovery is due to Prince Hardenberg, that to join a constitutional kingdom of Poland to Russia, would be to weaken, not to strengthen, that empire; and that Poles and Russians, placed under the same sceptre, instead

* Correspondence, &c. page 12.

of uniting and endeavouring to regain the Polish territory, which it was now proposed to cede to Prussia and Austria, would fight among themselves. This view is set forth in the following passage, extracted from a confidential memorandum communicated by Prince Hardenberg to Lord Castlereagh:—

'Plus j'y pense et plus je suis du sentiment que de notre côté nous devons céder sur la question politique, parceque j'y vois beaucoup plus de profit que de danger pour le repos de l'Europe en général, et pour les voisins de la Russie en particulier.' Je vois la force et la puissance de celle-ci plûtôt affaiblie qu'augmentée par ce nouveau Royaume de Pologne sous le sceptre du même souverain. La Russie proprement dite perd des provinces très-considérables * et fertiles. Combinées avec le Duché de Varsovie, elles auront une constitution tout-à-fait différente, et beaucoup plus libérale que celle de l'Empire. Les Polonais jouiront de privilèges que les Russes

* It is known that the Emperor Alexander proposed, in 1814 and 1815, to include his Polish provinces, now falsely called Russian provinces, in his new Polish kingdom.

n'ont point. Bientôt l'esprit des deux nations sera tout-à-fait en opposition, leurs jalousies empêcheront l'unité, des embarras de tout genre naîtront, et un Empereur de Russie, en même tems Roi de Pologne, sera moins redoutable qu'un Souverain de l'Empire Russe, réunissant à celui-ci la plus grande partie de *ce pays qu'on ne lui dispute pas, comme province.* Je ne crains nullement que les sujets anciennement Polonais de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, tendant sans cesse à se joindre à leurs compatriotes, donnent lieu à des troubles. Une administration sage et paternelle obviéra facilement à toutes les appréhensions de cette nature. En un mot, la conviction la plus intime s'est formée dans mon esprit, qu'en voulant empêcher l'Empereur de rétablir un Royaume de Pologne sous son sceptre, nous travaillons contre notre propre intérêt, tant par les raisons que je viens d'exposer que parceque nous nous ôtons le meilleur moyen de négocier sur les frontières.' *

Lord Castlereagh, however, was still of opinion that the effect of forming a constitutional king-

* Correspondence, &c. page 29.

dom of Poland under the Russian Crown would be to attract the Polish provinces of Austria and Prussia to Russian Poland. 'I am convinced,' he wrote to Lord Liverpool, January 11th, 1815, after the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw between the three Powers had been decided upon, 'that the only hope of tranquillity now in Poland, and especially of preserving to Austria and Prussia their portions of that kingdom, is for the two latter States to adopt a Polish system of administration as a defence against the inroads of the Russian policy.'

For no one, in 1815, thought Russia was likely to oppress and attempt to denationalize the Poles. It was her interest and object at the time to conciliate and make once more a nation of them. Such, at least, were the views of the Emperor Alexander personally. Lord Castlereagh afterwards recommended the three Powers to 'take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institutions they may think fit to govern them, the portions of that nation that may be placed under their re-

* Correspondence, &c. page 41.

spective sovereignties.'* 'Experience' he wrote, 'has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness of the Poles or the peace of that important portion of Europe can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manners and sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes.'

This was written, not, as is now sometimes supposed, for Russia, but specially for Prussia, under whose government endeavours had been made to Germanize even the city of Warsaw. The Prussians had introduced a German administration and the German language into all their Polish provinces, and Lord Castlereagh probably thought that this in some measure explained the readiness with which the Poles of Prussian Po-

* Correspondence, &c. page 43.

land had risen in 1806 to throw themselves into the arms of France.

About a month afterwards, February 1815, a distinguished Polish nobleman, Prince Radzivil, called on the Duke of Wellington at Vienna, 'and,' says the Duke in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, 'after adverting to the promises made by the Emperor of Russia to the Poles, and reading the Constitution according to which His Majesty had promised they should be governed, said that he was apprehensive that His Majesty would be under the necessity of departing from his promises to please his Russian subjects; and that even if the system should be completely carried into execution in the Duchy of Warsaw, it would not be extended to the Polish provinces which had been under the dominion of Russia before the war; and that in the meantime the Prussian and Austrian Governments, but particularly the latter, showed but little inclination to adopt the liberal principles in regard to the Poles recommended by your Lordship to those Powers. Under these circumstances, Prince Radzivil expressed a wish that the subject should be taken

up again in the Conferences of the five Powers, and that I should propose that the Emperor should take upon himself the title of "King of Poland," and should govern all his Polish subjects according to the Constitution His Majesty had promised them, and that the other Powers should conform to the same as far as was practicable. I could not discover, from what he said, whether Prince Radzivil had or not been sent by the Emperor; but I told him that I could not again revive the subject of Poland, nor could I repeat unnecessarily what your Lordship had entered upon the Protocol of the Conferences of the five Powers regarding that kingdom. That it would be highly satisfactory to us to find that the Poles were well governed by the different Powers under which they were placed, and we should applaud any liberal system according to which any of the Powers should announce to the world that they intended to govern their Polish subjects; but that it was *impossible for us to propose such a system*, or to go further than your Lordship had done.' *

* Correspondence, &c. page 45.

Finally, the following article was presented at the Congress by the Russian plenipotentiary, and approved by the other plenipotentiaries :—

'Le Duché de Varsovie, à l'exception de la ville libre de Cracovie et de son territoire, ou des provinces dont il a été autrement disposé en vertu des articles ci-dessus, est réunie à l'Empire de Russie. Il y sera lié irrévocablement par sa Constitution pour être possédé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, ses héritiers et ses successeurs à perpétuité. Sa Majesté Impériale réserve de donner à cet état, jouissant d'une administration distincte, l'extension intérieure qu'elle jugera convenable. Elle prendra avec ses autres titres celui de Czar ("Roi") de Pologne, conformément au Protocole usité et consacré pour les titres attachés à ses autres possessions.'

Fifteen years afterwards Russia (as Prince Hardenberg alone had foreseen) having failed to conciliate the Poles, the insurrection of 1830 took place. On its suppression, England, which in the first instance had objected so strongly to the formation of a constitutional kingdom under the Russian sceptre, insisted on the maintenance of

this kingdom with all its constitutional rights. In point of law, an agreement is no doubt an agreement, and must be observed in its integrity, even though the party who demands the execution of certain clauses may in the first instance have objected to their introduction. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Polish Constitution of 1815 was granted spontaneously by the Emperor of Russia notwithstanding the opposition of the Western Powers; and this, no doubt, explains to some extent why Austria and Prussia did not complain of its being withdrawn, and why England and France only complained very faintly, at the suggestion of the Poles themselves, and without feeling directly aggrieved in the matter. If the West of Europe ever goes to war for Poland, it will not be with any absurd intention of conquering a constitution for the Poles, but with the more simple and intelligible view of liberating Poland, as Greece and Belgium were liberated through the aid of England and France, and as Lombardy was liberated by France and Sardinia.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE, LONDON.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 June, 2018